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Executive Summary  
 
In the aftermath of a serious chemical release and fire at Chevron’s Richmond oil refinery in August, 
2012, the Brown Administration formed an Interagency Working Group to examine ways to improve 
public and worker safety through enhanced oversight of refineries, and to strengthen emergency 
preparedness in anticipation of any future incident. The Working Group consisted of participants from 
13 agencies and departments, as well as the Governor’s office. Over an eight-month period, the Working 
Group met internally and with industry, labor, community, environmental, academic, local emergency 
response and other stakeholders.  The Working Group’s findings and recommendations include: 
Findings 
  Oversight and Coordination: Multiple regulatory agencies have responsibility for oversight of 
aspects of refineries, sometimes with overlapping jurisdiction.  Agency actions and efforts to ensure 
information sharing, joint prioritization of enforcement or regulation, or other coordinated efforts 
to avoid potential duplicative action, are insufficient. 
  Emergency Response and Preparedness: Regulations need to define more precisely a refinery’s 
requirements for reporting leaks or releases of a hazardous material to local and state agencies. 
Hazardous Materials Area Plans developed at the local level are written as general response 
guidance and not specifically to address the unique hazards a refinery poses. The current air 
monitoring network also does not provide real-time air pollution tracking following an industrial 
accident in all geographic regions. 
  Safety and Prevention of Hazardous Events: Refineries are subject to California Accidental Release 
Program (CalARP), Risk Management Program (RMP), and Process Safety Management (PSM) 
regulation, as well as an Industrial Safety Ordinance in Contra Costa County, where four refineries 
are located. However, gaps in the regulatory schemes exist, including limitations on their ability to 
cover all aspects of process safety and the extent to which they are enforceable. Regulatory 
agencies face multiple issues relating to inspection and enforcement capabilities including: difficulty 
in hiring, retaining, and training inspectors; lack of mechanisms for information sharing and 
coordination; deficiencies in data and transparency; and, insufficient penalties to create meaningful 
deterrence. 
  Community Education and Alerts: There are shortcomings in existing emergency alert systems, 
public education and timely dissemination of public information. These difficulties include 
coordination between emergency responders and challenges in communicating with surrounding 
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communities regarding health risk and appropriate actions. Public involvement is not well integrated 
into air monitoring improvement discussions.  
Recommendations 
  Oversight and Coordination: An Interagency Refinery Task Force will be created within the 
California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) by 
September 1, 2013, to coordinate agencies’ activities and carry out 
the recommendations in this report. 
  Emergency Response and Preparedness: The Governor’s 
Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), formerly the California 
Emergency Management Agency (Cal EMA), will coordinate 
improved emergency response by clarifying reporting thresholds 
during hazardous materials release or threatened release, and 
work with local Certified Unified Program Agencies (CUPAs) to 
create refinery-specific elements in Hazardous Materials Area 
Plans. The Working Group has identified at least four elements 
that must be included in the Area Plans: (1) alignment of radio 
communications between response officials; (2) clear criteria for 
the establishment of a Unified Incident Command and Joint 
Operation Center; (3) plans and protocols for persons outside the 
refineries; and (4) requirements for joint drills and exercises. The 
California Air Resources Board (ARB), in collaboration with the 
California Air Pollution Control Officers Association (CAPCOA), is 
working on a parallel effort focused on toxic air contaminant 
monitoring to improve knowledge and information sharing for 
real-time air data. 
  Safety and Prevention of Hazardous Events: Existing 
regulations and practices must be strengthened to ensure that 
more data and information is provided to agencies.  In addition, 
agency enforcement capabilities need to be enhanced. Additional 
regulatory changes to improve refinery safety procedures include 
five prevention strategies that should be required as soon as 
possible, requiring  refineries to: (1) implement inherently safer 
systems to the greatest extent feasible; (2) perform periodic safety 
culture assessments; (3) adequately incorporate damage 
mechanism hazard reviews into Process Hazard Analyses; (4) 
Glossary of Terms 
Damage mechanism hazard review is an 
assessment of potential damage 
mechanisms that can affect refinery 
processes, including corrosion, stress 
cracking, and mechanical degradation of 
metals. 
 
Human factors is a scientific discipline 
concerned with understanding the 
interaction of individuals with each other, 
with facilities and equipment, and with 
management systems. 
 
Inherently safer systems requirements 
ensure that refineries incorporate the 
highest level of reliable hazard reduction to 
the maximum extent feasible.  
 
Leading and lagging indicators are 
predictive and retrospective metrics used to 
identify potential weaknesses and recurring 
problems, and also identify potential 
corrective action. 
 
Root cause analysis is an analysis that 
addresses the fundamental underlying 
problems after an incident.  
 
Safety culture is a commitment to safety as 
an overriding priority at all management 
levels of a facility.  
 
Safety case is an alternative regulatory 
approach focused less on prescriptive 
regulation and more on comprehensive 
safety plans developed by facilities. 
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complete root cause analysis after significant accidents or releases; and (5) explicitly account for 
human factors. The Working Group additionally identified three areas for further study that include 
reporting of leading and lagging indicators, increasing worker involvement, and exploring the safety 
case approach.   
  Community Education and Alerts: State agencies will evaluate improvements to public input during 
the emergency planning process, create enhanced public information and outreach protocol for use 
during a toxic chemicals release or fire, and improve alerts and public access to information during 
emergency events. Agencies are also working toward enhanced public availability of air monitoring 
information.  
For actions identified in this report requiring regulatory change, the Governor’s office has directed the 
relevant agencies to begin that process immediately.  Where actions identified require Legislative 
authority, the relevant agencies will consult with the Legislature.  This report also identifies interim 
steps to improve interagency coordination and public communication, and to improve air monitoring 
near refineries, which the relevant agencies will undertake as soon as possible in order to ensure that 
this report results in measurable progress in the coming year. 
iii. 
  
 
 
A. Introduction 
On August 6, 2012, the Chevron refinery in Richmond, California, experienced a catastrophic pipe 
failure, releasing flammable fluid that partially vaporized into a large cloud. The vapor cloud engulfed 19 
employees, including one fire-fighting employee who ran directly through the ensuing fire. All 
employees fled quickly, barely escaping serious injury or death. The ignition and burning of the 
vaporized fluid created a large plume that spread well beyond the refinery confines, causing 
approximately 15,000 people in the surrounding communities to seek medical attention. 
Multiple agencies opened investigations after the incident, with those investigations by the California 
Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) and the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (CSB) now completed and reported publicly. Chevron also completed its own 
internal investigation. All three investigations identified serious concerns about process safety 
management procedures at the refinery and expressed need for stronger preventative safeguards. 
The incident at Chevron also provided an opportunity to take a more comprehensive look at industry 
performance, as well as agency regulation and oversight. While refineries in California are subject to 
detailed regulation by multiple agencies and already have extensive health and safety programs in place, 
additional measures and alternative approaches offer the potential for enhanced prevention and risk 
reduction, without imposing significant new regulatory burdens.  
In October 2012, the Brown Administration formed an Interagency Working Group on Refinery Safety to 
identify means of improving refinery and agency performance.  These agencies met regularly over the 
course of eight months and analyzed their respective roles and responsibilities to identify gaps, areas of 
overlap and areas in need of improved coordination.
1 
The Working Group examined the following areas:  
                                                           
1 The group consisted of the following agencies and departments: California Emergency Management 
Agency (Cal/OES); California Energy Commission (CEC); California Environmental Protection Agency 
(Cal/EPA); Cal/EPA – Air Resources Board (ARB); Cal/EPA – Department of Toxic Substances Control 
(DTSC); Cal/EPA –State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB); California Technology Agency (CTA); 
Department of Finance (DOF); Department of Public Health (DPH); Labor and Workforce Development 
Agency (LWDA); LWDA – Department of Industrial Relations (DIR); LWDA/DIR – Division of Occupational 
Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA); and Office of the State Fire Marshal (OSFM) .   
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  Oversight and Coordination – How to coordinate actions of multiple agencies and oversee 
implementation of recommendations. 
  Emergency Response and Preparedness – How to strengthen emergency preparedness and 
response in the event of an incident, through planning, coordination and communication among 
agencies at all levels. 
  Safety and Prevention of Hazardous Events – How to prevent refinery accidents that threaten 
the health and safety of workers, communities and the environment, and promote greater 
safety and avoidance of hazards.  
  Improved Communication and Interaction with the Public and Surrounding Communities – 
How to better inform and educate the public about refinery safety risks, preventive measures, 
emergency procedures, and agencies’ roles and responsibilities relating to refinery safety and 
emergency preparedness and response. 
The Working Group grounded its recommendations in the experience and insight of refinery workers, 
community residents, oil industry executives, governmental enforcement agency staff, and firefighters 
from city and county fire departments.  It conducted a series of meetings with key stakeholders in 
northern and southern California. Technical consultants from the RAND Corporation and the University 
of California, Berkeley, assisted in planning and conducting the meetings and analyzing the results.  
Additionally, as part of this interagency effort, the California Air Resources Board began collaborating 
with the California Air Pollution Control Officers Association, which represents local air pollution control 
districts, to develop a plan that will examine state and local air monitoring practices in the event of a 
refinery accident involving the release of toxic air contaminants, suggest areas of improvement, and 
encourage statewide best practices.  
This report contains the Working Group’s conclusions and recommendations, but it is not intended to be 
exhaustive or the final word on this subject. Some recommendations can and will be implemented 
immediately, including the creation of an Interagency Refinery Task Force starting on September 1, 
2013.  Other recommendations will require sustained effort and collaboration among agencies and 
others to implement; still others will need further evaluation and development before a decision is 
made about whether to put them in place. We welcome feedback on the report.  The Task Force will 
carefully review comments received and issue a final report in the months ahead.  
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B. Stakeholder Perspectives 
Over a six-month period, the Working Group held meetings and engaged in discussions with labor, 
community, industry, enforcement agencies and emergency response stakeholders. Major themes 
discussed are summarized below.  
1.  Labor 
Workers involved in facility operations, represented by the 
United Steelworkers, reported that refinery structures are old 
and outdated, corrosion is pervasive, process safety 
management staffing has been reduced and preventive 
maintenance is often not conducted before failure occurs. 
Workers who exercise their authority to shut down unsafe 
operations may experience retaliation by management. Several 
workers additionally reported that management does not take 
seriously the monitoring of employee exposures to hydrogen 
sulfide, which can be acutely fatal. 
The operations workers recommended that the process safety 
management (PSM) requirements enforced by Cal/OSHA be 
enhanced based on an Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) 
adopted by Contra Costa County. Process safety management 
refers to regulatory standards developed by U.S. OSHA to 
prevent accidental releases of hazardous substances. In 
addition, refineries should be required to share useful leading 
indicators (early warning signs) of safety risks with workers and 
enforcement agencies. Criminal sanctions to deter unsafe 
practices were also recommended. 
Workers involved in maintenance, represented by building and 
construction trades unions, reported that training of most 
maintenance workers is inadequate. They also reported that 
refineries use mostly contract workers, including out-of-state 
workers, to conduct maintenance during planned shutdowns of 
a refinery process (also referred to as turnarounds), and that 
contract workers have less training and experience and, 
therefore, are less safe. 
“Refinery Safety in California: Labor, 
Community and Fire Agency Views” 
The Labor Occupational Health Program at UC 
Berkeley, which helped facilitate both the labor 
and community stakeholder meetings, published 
a report, “Refinery Safety in California: Labor, 
Community and Fire Agency Views.”  In the area 
of emergency response, the report called for 
better coordination between on-site fire brigades 
and public agencies, improved monitoring and 
public disclosure of air pollutant releases during 
both incidents and routine refinery operations, 
and improvements in the current emergency 
public warning system required to facilitate 
greater community preparedness.  
 The report also noted that the medical services 
costs of refinery incidents and the long-term 
health status of affected individuals are not 
tracked long-term. To prevent further incidents, 
the report suggests strengthening risk 
management by requiring a comprehensive audit 
of corrosion damage, improving means for 
workers to report unsafe conditions, and 
improving public disclosure of information to 
government and the public on maintenance and 
corrective actions. It also recommends greater 
worker involvement in management decisions 
pertaining to health, safety and environmental 
performance. Finally, the report outlines concerns 
over the growing sulfur content of crude oil 
imports and energy intensive operations of 
refineries, and their impacts on air emissions.  
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The construction trades workers recommended that refineries be required to train maintenance 
workers through state-approved apprenticeship programs. The same workers also echoed the 
recommendation of large civil and criminal penalties for unsafe practices. 
2.  Community 
Meetings with community members were held in northern and southern California. Northern California 
participants included members of an ongoing Refinery Safety Collaborative consisting of labor, 
community groups and environmental organizations. 
Participants in both locations called for more information about long-term exposures and health effects 
from refinery emissions.  Residents in southern California expressed concerns about visible flaring of 
gases from refineries. Participants in the northern California meetings reported that immediately after 
the Chevron fire, emergency communication from local agencies – via sirens and telephone – was 
inconsistent and unclear.  They recommended state-of-the-art, real-time monitoring of air contaminants 
where people live beyond refinery property lines (fence lines), as well as air quality monitoring to help 
predict exposure levels. They also recommended the establishment of clear criteria to trigger 
notification to local residents of an incident that provides clear information and instructions. 
3.  Industry 
Oil industry executives with expertise in refinery operations attended a day-long workshop facilitated by 
the RAND Corporation. Participants discussed the number of agencies involved in refinery oversight and 
the need for better coordination. The group also acknowledged the aging of refinery facilities and the 
changing workforce. The group discussed best practices for ensuring that refineries operate safely, 
including resource prioritization, mentorship, knowledge sharing, a strong safety culture with an 
emphasis on management of change, mechanical integrity assurance through high-quality maintenance, 
employee engagement in the risk management decision process, and support for employees who raise 
safety issues. 
The group also recommended simplifying agency involvement and establishing one point of contact in 
government for refineries. They further recommended a focus on safety problem prevention rather than 
traditional enforcement and issuance of penalties. The Contra Costa County ISO was cited as a successful 
model of regulation due to its focus on human factors
2  and safety culture
3. The “safety case 
approach”—an alternative regulatory approach under which there is less prescriptive regulation and 
                                                           
2“Human factors” is a scientific discipline concerned with understanding the interaction of individuals with each 
other, with facilities and equipment, and with management systems. 
3 Safety culture is a commitment to safety as an overriding priority at all management levels of a facility. 
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more focus on comprehensive safety plans developed by facilities — was also cited as a potential model 
for consideration. This is discussed in greater detail further in the report. 
A smaller group organized by the Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA) met to further discuss 
recommendations based on Contra Costa County’s ISO model. The group recommended that Cal/OSHA 
inspectors work collaboratively with local inspectors from the Certified Unified Program Agencies, or 
CUPAs. CUPAs are coordinated local agency enforcement programs for regulating hazardous materials 
through Area Plans for Hazardous Materials Emergency Response (Area Plans) and facility-specific 
Hazardous Materials Business Plans to prevent or minimize releases of hazardous materials.  
In some geographic locations, steps would need to be taken to ensure that CUPA staff are sufficiently 
qualified to enforce regulations related to prevention. The group also echoed recommendations for 
adopting a possible safety case model in which refineries would submit safety plans that could serve as a 
blueprint for Cal/OSHA to use in administering existing Process Safety Management regulations. 
4.  State and Local Agencies 
Enforcement agency staff, including Cal/OSHA and CUPA employees, discussed the need for better 
understanding areas of responsibility and increased coordination. Enforcement staff recommended that 
interagency coordination be increased through written standardized protocols and regular cross-training 
of staff, including drills. They also recommended stronger safety incentives and penalties for multiple 
and repeat violations. Finally, staff recommended further study of the safety case approach.  
City and county firefighters noted a need to improve immediate access to a refinery during an 
emergency and improved communication between their departments and the firefighting staff of 
refineries. Firefighters recommended that mechanisms be developed to ensure immediate access to a 
refinery during an emergency, and that a protocol be developed for effective communication between 
their departments and firefighting staff at refineries. They additionally echoed recommendations to 
adopt requirements based on the Contra Costa County ISO throughout California. 
5.  RAND Corporation Findings 
The RAND Corporation prepared a memo, “Refinery Process Safety Performance and Models of 
Government-Industry Relations,” discussing some of the issues involved in considering new models of 
industry regulation. The memo notes that evidence is mixed as to whether refinery safety in the U.S. has 
improved over the past 30 years, but that the safety record of U.S. refineries is not as strong as in other 
countries.  It argues that Cal/OSHA’s current enforcement program is not achieving significant 
prevention gains, both because the agency has limited resources to devote to inspections, and because  
its inspections in recent years have not detected many violations or hazards.  RAND advocates that 
Cal/OSHA move in the direction of the safety case approach, but notes that evidence to date on whether 
5 
  
 
 
the safety case has improved performance is mixed, and that implementing this approach requires 
significantly greater agency resources than currently employed. The memo suggests that Cal/OSHA 
adopt an incremental approach for transitioning to the safety case, perhaps by expanding the Contra 
Costa County ISO.  The memo also discusses the desirability of developing lagging and leading indicators 
of refinery performance and suggests that this be done through a collaborative industry-labor process. 
A copy of the RAND Corporation memo can be found in the Appendix. 
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C. Investigative Findings to Date  
On January 30, 2013, the state’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) issued 25 
citations to Chevron, including 11 “Willful Serious” citations, and almost $1 million in civil penalties after 
a six-month investigation of the Richmond refinery fire. On April 12, 2013, Chevron released its own 
internal incident report. On April 19, 2013, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
adopted an Interim Report on the causes of the incident and made specific recommendations to 
Chevron and federal, state and local government agencies and authorities.  
1.  Cal/OSHA and CSB Findings 
Both Cal/OSHA and CSB documented deficiencies at the Chevron refinery occurring before, during and 
after the August 6, 2012, incident that threatened the health and safety of the refinery’s workers and 
surrounding communities. The agencies’ findings include: 
Before the incident: 
  Chevron failed to follow the repeated recommendations of its own pipe inspectors and 
metallurgical scientists, dating back to 2002, to replace the 36-year-old corroded pipe that 
ultimately ruptured and caused the fire; 
  Chevron failed to test the thickness of piping in all areas identified as susceptible to corrosion 
and leaks due to the high sulfur content of the crude oil and the high temperature and pressure 
of the liquid passing through the piping; and, 
  Chevron failed to conduct an effective Process Hazard Analysis
4 of the operations of the No. 4 
Crude Unit.   
During the incident: 
  Chevron failed to implement its own emergency procedures to shut down the No. 4 Crude Unit 
when the leak occurred; 
  Chevron failed to recognize the potential for a catastrophic release of ignitable gas-oil leaking 
from the pipe, ordered its own employees to strip insulation from the leaking pipe with metal 
                                                           
4 Process Hazard Analysis is an assessment of potential hazards associated with an industrial process.  It is used to 
make risk management decisions to prevent accidental releases of hazardous chemicals. 
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tools and a high-pressure water stream, and ordered contract employees to erect a scaffold 
below the leaking pipe;  
  Chevron failed to conduct air monitoring for hazardous chemicals where employees were 
working during the uncontrolled leak; and, 
  Chevron failed to limit the number of workers who entered the incident zone and ensure that all 
workers exposed to hazards were provided with and were using the necessary personal 
protective equipment.  
After the incident: 
  Chevron allowed workers to enter the demarcated danger zone after the fire was extinguished 
despite the known hazards posed by metal structures, vessels and piping that were determined 
by Chevron’s own certified civil engineer to be structurally unsound;  
  Chevron failed to conduct an evaluation of the new pipe materials before selecting them as part 
of the rebuild of the fire-damaged unit; and, 
  A second Cal/OSHA inspection investigating Chevron’s leak repair procedures found that clamps 
and fittings used as temporary repairs on the outside of leaking piping systems throughout the 
refinery were not removed and replaced permanently at the next scheduled turn-around (shut 
down for major repairs) as required by Chevron’s own procedures and the industry association’s 
recommended practice
5.  
Copies of the Cal/OSHA citations and the CSB Interim Report, and the full details of these investigations’ 
findings, are included in the Appendix.  
2.  Chevron’s Internal Investigation Findings 
Chevron’s internal report found that the incident was caused by incomplete and inadequate hazard 
recognition, insufficient responses to identified hazards, and that the refinery’s emergency response 
was also deficient. Specific findings in this report include: 
  The Process Hazard Analysis for the No. 4 Crude Unit  did not consider the potential for 
corrosion due to the high sulfur content of liquid at high temperatures and pressures, and the 
                                                           
5 This practice is known as American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice 570, Piping Inspection Code: 
Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Rerating of In-Service Piping Systems. 
8 
  
 
 
low silicon content of the failed carbon steel pipe (piping with high silicon content better resists 
corrosion caused by sulfur in crude oil); 
  The pipe wall thickness threshold for inspection and repair of piping did not incorporate safety 
factors in Chevron’s existing guidelines or the American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended 
Practice 574
6; 
  The 2002 wall thickness testing information was not captured by Chevron’s data system and 
acted upon; 
  The 2009 review of the piping circuit “did not include a 100% component-by-component 
inspection”; 
  The 2011 turnaround did not include every component in the carbon steel piping connecting the 
No. 4 Crude Unit to the atmospheric distillation tower, known as the 4-sidecut piping circuit; 
  The June 2012 pipe inspection results were not entered in the data base and no re-inspection 
occurred; 
  Inspection guidelines of piping “were not fully implemented and action items were not tracked 
until completion”; 
  Piping circuit inspections need to include “appropriate damage mechanisms using a 
standardized methodology and documentation system”; and, 
  The emergency response and assessment after the discovery of the leak “did not fully recognize 
the risk of piping rupture and the possibility of auto-ignition”. 
A copy of the Chevron internal incident report is included in the Appendix.  
Copies of CSB investigation reports of previous oil industry incidents, and the testimony of U.S.OSHA 
officials, are also included in the Appendix. 
   
                                                           
6  American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice 574: Inspection Practices for Piping Components. 
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D. Chemical Safety Board and Chevron Investigators’ Recommendations  
The CSB’s Interim Report (April 19, 2013) contained 20 recommendations directed at Chevron USA, local 
officials in the City of Richmond and Contra Costa County, the Governor, Legislature, state agencies of 
California, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The CSB presented its recommendations at a 
public forum in Richmond on April 19, 2013.
7 The recommendations include: 
  Establishment of a multi-agency process safety regulatory program for all California oil refineries 
to improve public accountability, transparency and performance of chemical accident 
prevention and mechanical integrity programs, as well as greater sharing of data and 
coordination of enforcement activities between all affected government agencies; 
  Revision of the Industrial Safety Ordinance currently in effect in Contra Costa County to require 
facilities to determine the effectiveness of the safeguards documented in the Process Hazard 
Analysis; to incorporate stronger requirements for the use of “inherently safer” systems and 
materials; and, to consider establishment of similar ISOs in other California counties where oil 
refining occurs; 
  Revision of Cal/OSHA’s regulation on “Process Safety Management of Acutely Hazardous 
Materials”, to require improvements to mechanical integrity and Process Hazard Analysis 
programs for all California refineries, and require the incorporation of applicable industry best 
practices and inherently safer systems and materials to the greatest extent feasible;  
  Increased use of advanced methodologies for hazard analysis and evaluation of safeguards by 
industry and government agencies, including use of both “lagging” and “leading” indicators – 
which provide early and later warning signs – to monitor and evaluate refinery performance; 
and, 
  Greater dissemination to the general public and between collaborating government agencies, 
the results of hazard analyses and performance evaluations conducted by the refineries 
themselves and by government agencies.  
Chevron’s internal incident investigation also contained a series of recommendations for the 
corporation going forward.  Several of these recommendations mirror those of the CSB and the 
abatement requirements arising from the Cal/OSHA citations. These include: 
                                                           
7 Recommendations from the Chemical Safety Board are advisory in nature and are not legally binding on any 
party.   
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  Piping circuit inspections that include “appropriate damage mechanisms using a standardized 
methodology and documentation system”
8; 
  Changes are needed in inspector training and competency, oversight of mechanical integrity, 
inspection plans and escalation procedures; and,  
  Revised policies and checklists so that process safety and inspection information is “considered 
when evaluating leaks and addressing the issue of whether to shut down or continue operation 
of equipment.” 
   
                                                           
8 Damage hazard mechanisms are further discussed in Section F.3.c. 
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E.  Findings 
1. Oversight and Coordination 
 Regulatory agencies with responsibility for refinery oversight have overlapping jurisdictions, and no 
single state or local regulatory entity has a complete picture of the compliance status of a refinery.  
Multiple agencies with varying authority engage in relatively limited information sharing about 
regulatory compliance requirements. Overall coordination among the various agencies that regulate 
refineries is also limited.  Improved coordination, communication and oversight are essential and will 
result in smarter, more targeted enforcement, while avoiding the potential for inconsistent and 
unnecessary regulatory requirements. Improved coordination will also increase opportunities for 
exploring innovative approaches to improve refinery safety and performance (see Recommendation F.1).  
2. Emergency Response and Preparedness 
The Chevron incident revealed shortcomings in the corporation’s emergency response protocol, 
difficulties in coordination between emergency responders, and challenges in communicating with 
surrounding communities regarding health risk and appropriate actions. Emergency response by 
refineries and state and local agencies will likely be inadequate unless coordination is improved and 
other changes are made to existing emergency planning and preparedness programs.  
Regulatory Background 
The lead agency responsible for emergency response coordination at the state level is the Governor’s 
Office of Emergency Services. Cal OES develops the State Emergency Plan, which includes various 
emergency functions that address specific emergency planning topics. Cal/EPA is the lead agency for the 
Emergency Function for Hazardous Materials and Oil (EF-10), an Annex to the State Emergency Plan. 
Cal/EPA also oversees the 83 local Certified Unified Program Agencies, which have the responsibility to 
produce Area Plans for Hazardous Materials Emergency Response and to oversee facility-specific 
Hazardous Materials Business Plans to prevent or minimize releases of hazardous materials. Area Plans 
and Business Plans are part of the six Unified Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Materials Management 
programs which fall under CUPA responsibility. In addition to these responsibilities, CUPAs have other 
duties as determined by their local government that include participating on local Hazardous Materials 
(HazMat) teams to varying degrees.  
The Area Plan is the local government blueprint for response to a hazardous materials release or 
threatened release. Area Plans must include requirements for multi-agency notification and 
coordination, impact minimization and emergency response. Agencies covered by Area Plan provisions 
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include law enforcement, fire services, medical and public health services, poison control centers, and 
care and shelter services.  State law and regulations establish minimum standards for these plans. 
In preparing and amending Area Plans, CUPAs incorporate information collected from the Hazardous 
Materials Business Plans submitted annually by refineries and other facilities that handle hazardous 
materials. Because the Business Plans identify hazardous materials at the facilities, they are useful to 
determine the appropriate level of emergency planning necessary to respond to a release.  The Business 
Plan regulations also require businesses to prepare a site map, develop an emergency response plan, 
and implement a training program for employees. 
California emergency response agencies at the local and state level use the Incident Command System 
to assure command and control for any major disaster, establishing a Unified Incident Command to 
ensure that all agencies are working together and a Joint Information Center to coordinate 
communication with the public.  Refineries and other facilities are obligated to immediately report a 
significant release of hazardous materials to local emergency responders, CUPAs and the State Warning 
Center.  
The federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) also requires facility owners 
to submit inventories of hazardous materials and report certain accidental releases that must be 
included in EPCRA. Additionally, EPCRA requires the following elements: (1) a State Emergency Response 
Commission (SERC); and (2) Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs).  Cal OES provides staff 
support to the SERC and the six LEPCs across California. The LEPCs are intended to serve as a forum for 
discussion and public input and for stakeholders and agencies to work together on training and other 
hazardous materials emergency planning activities at the local level.   
Findings  
The Working Group made the following specific findings about emergency response protocols. 
2.1 Area Plans 
Hazardous Materials Area Plans do not have a specific element for refineries but are instead written as 
general response guidance.  Refineries are uniquely dangerous and capable of generating significant 
fires, and plumes of toxic smoke, chemicals and vapors in communities. Refinery-specific elements in 
Area Plans could help improve overall community preparedness in the event of an emergency such as 
the Chevron incident.  Some specific deficiencies identified include the following: 
a.  Alignment of Radio Communications Between Response Officials  
The refinery and the responding public fire agencies did not communicate or could not 
communicate with one another on the same radio frequency during the response to the Chevron 
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incident.  When on-site fire brigades and public fire agencies operate on different radio frequencies 
during a disaster, they cannot communicate and coordinate their efforts (see Recommendation 
F.2.1.a). 
b.  Establishment of a Unified Incident Command and Joint Operation Center. 
The refinery and the local agencies did not establish a Unified Incident Command (UIC) and a Joint 
Operation Center (JOC) with a Joint Information Center during the Chevron incident.  This hampered 
the ability of the response agencies to rapidly assess the public health risk associated with the fire 
and translate that into actionable information for other entities including local hospitals (see 
Recommendation F.2.1.b). 
c.  Plans and Protocols to Protect Persons Outside of a Refinery  
Area Plans generally do not address issues such as how to alert and direct public transit systems 
during a release or fire. For example, during the Chevron incident, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) 
system and Amtrak had no guidance from responding agencies about what actions to take. Gaps 
also exist for alerting and directing businesses and public agencies, such as utilities and public works 
agencies, potentially putting workers in danger. In addition, there are generally no protocols for how 
to deal with public spaces such as shopping malls where people may congregate. These issues could 
be better managed at the time of an incident with a Unified Incident Command, and Area Plans 
could specify how to address these issues (see Recommendation F.2.1.c). 
d.  Drills and Exercises  
Local emergency response professionals throughout California underscored the importance of 
regular practice exercises and drills with refinery and public emergency response teams. In practice, 
the frequency of drills varies significantly. Contra Costa County engages in drills at least annually 
with each of their four refineries, whereas drills are less frequent in other areas. It can be financially 
difficult for local agencies to provide response resources and cover the cost of emergency exercises 
and drills (see Recommendation F.2.1.d).  
e.  Preparation for Airborne Releases  
Area Plans often do not include any design, technical review, or advisory role for the ARB, even 
though worst-case scenarios often involve serious toxic air contaminant releases. Review of Area 
Plans by local air districts and the ARB, especially in all communities with refineries and other large 
facilities that could release toxic air contaminants, could help ensure that the plans incorporate 
appropriate information and responses (see Recommendation F.2.1.e).  
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2.2 Assessment Plan for Monitoring of Toxic Air Contaminants  
The Chevron incident highlighted the need to evaluate emergency air monitoring protocols and 
capabilities.  Accidental air emissions at industrial facilities are generally short-lived, and therefore local 
air districts play an important role in monitoring at the time of the event.  While a statewide air 
monitoring network exists, it is primarily designed to track compliance with long-term state and federal 
air quality standards. The technical capability to monitor, evaluate and report local releases of toxic air 
contaminants on a real-time basis following an industrial accident or other unplanned release varies 
among local air pollution control districts.  Air districts would benefit from an assessment of the best 
preparedness and response practices and emerging technologies that would enable them to determine 
real-time exposures to airborne emissions during local emergencies. Furthermore, increased 
coordination between the local air districts, public and environmental health departments, the CUPAs, 
and local hazardous materials responders will help provide enhanced local response for future refinery 
incidents (see Recommendation F.2.2). 
2.3 Early Notification of Release or Threatened Release of a Hazardous Material   
Reporting requirements when there is a leak or release of a hazardous substance are not well defined, 
making them challenging to comply with and enforce. Under California Health & Safety Code Section 
25504 (b), the Business Plans for refineries must contain emergency response plans and procedures to 
govern their activities “in the event of a reportable release or threatened release of a hazardous 
material.”  These plans must require “immediate notification to the administering agency and to the 
appropriate local emergency rescue personnel”, as well as notification to the State Warning Center. The 
term “immediate” is not defined, nor is the size or nature of the release that triggers the requirement. 
As a result, refineries do not always notify local agencies promptly when there is a leak or possibility of 
fire.  During the Chevron incident, for example, the company failed to immediately notify local agencies 
after the leak, and finally made the initial call eight minutes after the fire broke out (see 
Recommendation F.2.3). 
3. Safety and Prevention of Hazardous Events 
The three investigations of the Chevron incident raise significant concerns about ongoing refinery 
practices and prevention of future accidents.  Each of the investigation reports identified incomplete or 
inadequate policies and procedures at the Richmond refinery, incomplete or ineffective implementation 
of existing policies and procedures, a failure to evaluate the pipe safety problem during the Process 
Hazard Analysis, and a failure to act on internal reports about hazards (reports that were not made 
available to regulatory agencies). 
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While the investigation reports focused on the Chevron Richmond refinery, the findings raise significant 
issues relevant to the state’s 14 other oil refineries.  Following the Richmond incident, for example, 
Cal/OSHA found a similarly corroded pipe in a crude unit at Chevron’s El Segundo refinery. More general 
trends in refinery safety also give rise to concern. According to CSB, as well as the RAND report noted 
above, the U.S. oil industry’s safety record is inferior to its global counterparts.  A 2008 report by the 
insurer Swiss Re found accident-related losses four times higher at U.S. refineries than the rest of the 
world. Additionally, in recent Congressional testimony, U.S. OSHA officials stated that the same causal 
factors leading to the Richmond refinery incident in August 2012 could be found throughout the 
country’s oil refineries. U.S. OSHA also reports that refinery managers fail to take steps to prevent 
catastrophic accidents even after serious accidents have occurred. As a result, U.S. OSHA implemented a 
National Emphasis Program in 2007 to comprehensively inspect the process safety management 
programs of most of the nation’s refineries because of persistent problems in refinery performance. 
Unfortunately, that program ended in 2010 due to resource constraints. 
The Working Group concludes that refinery safety in California can and must be improved. But 
prevention of dangerous events at California refineries is complicated by the fact that refineries are 
highly complex environments requiring specialized expertise and information to detect potential 
hazards. Other challenges identified at the stakeholder meetings include: California refineries are aging; 
they are processing higher sulfur crude which increases corrosion; maintenance is often deferred; and, 
worker and contractor training may not always be adequate. 
Regulatory Background 
The federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (United States Code, Title 42, Section 7412(r)) required 
the U.S. EPA to promulgate rules to prevent accidental releases of regulated substances and reduce the 
severity of releases that do occur. Congress required that the U.S. EPA program be coordinated with a 
comparable U.S. OSHA process safety management program.  
In response to Congressional directive, U.S. OSHA adopted the federal Process Safety Management 
standard in 1992, and the California Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) adopted the state’s PSM 
standard (California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 5189) pursuant to its mandate to adopt 
standards that are at least as effective as U.S.OSHA standards.  DIR, through Cal/OSHA, administers and 
enforces this standard. The purpose of the PSM standard is to prevent releases of hazardous chemicals 
that could expose employees and others to serious hazards. After the 1999 fire at the Tosco Refinery in 
Martinez, California, which killed four workers, the state established a dedicated Process Safety 
Management Unit.  Cal/OSHA’s PSM Unit is the only such dedicated program in the nation. 
U.S. EPA adopted the federal Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions (CAPP), also known as the Risk 
Management Plan Rule, in 1996. These regulations require facilities to submit risk management plans 
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(RMPs) if they have more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a process. The RMPs 
must include a hazard assessment of the facility, an accidental release prevention program, and an 
emergency response program (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Chapter I, Subchapter C, and Part 
68). California had previously adopted its own accidental release prevention program, and amendments 
to this program in 1997 created the current California Accidental Release Prevention Program (California 
Health & Safety. Code, Division 20, Chapter 6.95). The CalARP program operates in parallel to the federal 
CAPP regulations with certain state-specific requirements. Cal OES administers CalARP as part of the 
State’s Unified Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Materials Management Program and the CUPAs 
implement the program at the local level. The purpose of the CalARP program is to prevent accidental 
releases of substances that can cause serious harm to the public and the environment, to minimize the 
damage if releases occur, and to satisfy community right-to-know law.  
The requirements of the Cal/OSHA PSM program and the CalARP program are very similar because the 
same industrial processes affecting workers may also affect public health and the environment.  Both 
programs include requirements related to process safety information, process hazard analyses, 
mechanical integrity, and management of change. The difference is in focus; Cal/OSHA’s PSM program 
focuses on potential on-site chemical releases and processes that affect the health and safety of 
workers, while the CalARP RMP focuses on potential off-site chemical releases and emergency response. 
In 1998, Contra Costa County adopted County Ordinance Chapter 450-8, the Industrial Safety Ordinance. 
The ISO expands on the CalARP program for refineries and chemical plants that are already required to 
submit an RMP. Although the Contra Costa County ISO only includes facilities in unincorporated portions 
of the county, the City of Richmond adopted an Industrial Safety Ordinance in 2000 (Municipal Code 
Chapter 6.43, RISO) that is similar to the County's. The Chevron refinery located in the City of Richmond 
is subject to this ordinance. The purpose of the ISO is to prevent accidental release of hazardous 
chemicals; improve accident prevention by soliciting participation from industry and the community; 
and, conduct periodic audits of the plans and inspections of the industrial plants. 
The PSM and the CalARP programs, as well as the Contra Costa County ISO, require refineries to submit 
and regularly update safety plans. The safety plans must describe a number of elements of a safety 
program, including a hazard review, written operating procedures, worker training requirements, 
maintenance requirements, compliance audits, and incident investigation procedures. 
Evaluation of Existing Programs 
The Working Group studied the Cal/OSHA PSM program, the CalARP program, and the Contra Costa 
County ISO to identify areas for improvement. Overall, the Working Group concluded that the ISO 
contains the most far-reaching provisions and holds the most promise for improving safety. Specifically, 
the ISO expands significantly on the PSM and the CalARP program by requiring: 
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  A safety plan that is a public document, and which must be submitted to the local CUPA (in the 
case of Chevron, to the Contra Costa Health Services); 
  A root cause analysis, performed by the facility, as part of their incident investigations for major 
chemical accidents or releases, and submission of the root cause analysis report to the CUPA 
(see Recommendation F.3.1.d); 
  A Human Factors Program is required for certain elements, including the Process Hazard 
Analysis, operating procedures, incident investigation, training, and managing change to the 
emergency response and operations organizations (see Recommendation F.3.1.e); 
  An independent incident investigation, including a root cause analysis, by the county at the 
county’s discretion; 
  Consideration and evaluation of inherently safer technologies and materials by the refineries in 
some decisions (see Recommendation F.3.1.a); and, 
  Public meetings after safety plan reviews and preliminary audits by the county. 
The Working Group also identified significant areas for improvement based on specific gaps in the ISO, 
the CalARP program and the Cal/OSHA PSM regulation: 
  The Contra Costa County ISO is only valid in unincorporated areas of the county, and the City of 
Richmond’s ordinance was not as extensive as the Contra Costa ordinance at the time of the 
Chevron accident.  Although the City of Richmond has amended its ISO to conform to the 
county’s model, other cities and counties that contain refineries do not have an ISO.  There is no 
statewide consistency. 
  Both the Contra Costa County and City of Richmond ISO contain permissive or discretionary 
compliance language, which limits enforceability of some provisions of the ordinance.   
  Under the ISO, refineries are only required to implement inherently safer systems to the extent 
feasible, are only required to do so during Process Hazard Analysis, and inherently safer systems 
are only required in new construction but not in rebuilds, repairs, or corrective action.  Although 
documentation is required when a refinery rejects an inherently safer system as infeasible, the 
ordinance does not require the refinery to provide supporting documentation to show that any 
selected system is inherently safer, making it difficult or impossible for agencies to verify the 
claim (see Recommendation F.3.1.a). 
  The CalARP program only requires the refinery to conduct a compliance audit every three years 
and to maintain a copy of the audit on site, a schedule not frequent enough to ensure 
compliance with regulatory requirements (see Recommendation F.3.2).   
  The CUPA is required to evaluate the CalARP RMP at a refinery ”periodically” and conduct 
inspections for compliance only once every three years (see Recommendation F.3.2).  
  The Cal/OSHA PSM regulation and the CalARP program describe procedures that refineries must 
follow to prevent catastrophic releases of toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive chemicals, but 
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do not specify exactly how the employer will carry out those procedures.  This can leave 
regulators without clear interim benchmarks or authorization to use all available methods of 
evaluating the safety performance of refineries (see Recommendation F.1.1). 
  The PSM regulation and the CalARP program do not explicitly authorize Cal/OSHA or the CUPAs 
to evaluate and enforce the following aspects of process safety: inherently safer systems; use of 
indicators to evaluate performance; the impact of human factors on safe operations; 
management of change when applied to organizational shifts; damage mechanism hazard 
review as part of the standard Process Hazard Analysis; effectiveness assessments of the Process 
Safety Analysis safeguards; and, an assessment of the safety culture at the facility (see 
Recommendation F.3.1).  
 
In addition to the above limitations in the three existing safety structures, the Working Group identified 
pervasive issues relating to enforcement capacity, including serious limitations in staffing of regulatory 
agencies; difficulty hiring, retaining, and training inspectors with the necessary skill set; lack of 
mechanisms for information sharing and coordination among agencies with overlapping or 
complementary jurisdictions; and, insufficient penalties to create meaningful deterrence. For example, 
in response to Cal/OSHA’s findings of 25 willful and serious violations at Chevron, the maximum penalty 
Cal/OSHA was statutorily authorized to assess was $963,200. Air districts for their part are limited to 
penalties no greater than $10,000 for releases of toxic air contaminants that constitute an air toxics 
nuisance. These penalty amounts are unlikely to provide a meaningful deterrent to noncompliance, 
considering that average revenue at California refineries exceeds $185 million per day.
9Finally, there is a 
significant data and transparency deficiency.  Refineries are not required to provide regulatory agencies 
with critical information that could help agencies assess safety and plan for effective oversight and 
prevention, including self-inspection reports, certain testing reports, and turnaround work plans and 
schedules (a turnaround is a planned, periodic shut down of a refinery process unit or plant to perform 
inspection, maintenance and repair work) (see Recommendation F.3.3). 
4. Community Education and Alerts 
The investigative reports and stakeholder meetings highlighted shortcomings in communication of 
emergency alerts and other relevant information to the public.  These include: 
1.1 Emergency Alerts and Public Education  
                                                           
9: California Energy Commission analysis of weekly refinery data and Oil Price Information Service pricing 
information.  
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During the Chevron incident, nearby residents immediately saw the rapidly forming black cloud from the 
refinery, but had little sense of the severity of the situation or what individual actions they should take 
in response, including what to do when the siren alert sounded.  Furthermore, the auditory alarms and 
automated phone systems in place were not widely heard. The reverse 911 system used to 
communicate a warning and shelter in place to the surrounding communities did not work as expected 
during the incident, and calls were delayed to some people for hours.  
At the local and state level, the Incident Command System is used to establish a Unified Incident 
Command and establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) to coordinate public communication.  During 
the Chevron incident, the local agencies did not establish a Joint Operation Center (JOC) and JIC.  As a 
result, communication with the public was not well-coordinated.  This resulted in conflicting statements 
being made by responding agencies and confusion among members of the public and local health care 
providers. 
Moreover, relatively few people in Richmond had registered in the local Community Warning System 
(CWS) for cell phone alerts during emergencies, and there were no other mechanisms at the time of the 
incident for alerting people via email, text, or other electronic means.  Overall, information was poorly 
disseminated to the public and other media sources.   
More generally, the Working Group found that members of local communities and the public do not 
have consistent, accessible, adequate and timely information about refinery safety risks, preventive 
measures, emergency procedures, and different agencies’ roles and responsibilities relating to these 
areas (see Recommendation F.4.1). 
4.2 Public Involvement in Emergency Planning 
Currently, the main mechanism for public involvement in local emergency response specific to chemical 
hazards is through the Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs), established pursuant to the 
federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). As required by EPCRA, LEPCs 
must be comprised of the public, industry and government. The six LEPC regions in California cover very 
large geographic areas, making the involvement of community members difficult because of travel time 
and expense of attending meetings.  The large geographic areas covered by LEPCs also contribute to the 
loss of a sense of community. LEPC duties and functions depend on voluntary efforts by individuals. 
Many of the LEPCs in California are fairly inactive and several have not updated their emergency plans 
on a regular basis, as required. Since California law directs the CUPAs to collect and make available to 
the public chemical information from facilities, LEPCs, which are not aligned geographically or 
functionally with the CUPAs, have become disconnected from community right-to-know efforts in 
California (see Recommendation F.4.2).  
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1.3 Public Involvement in Air Monitoring Improvements 
ARB and local air districts currently make hourly ambient air monitoring data from the existing network 
for particulate matter and ozone readily accessible on the Internet. But people living near refineries 
generally have limited or no access to immediate data on toxic air contaminant levels in the community 
or information on associated health risks.  More comprehensive and timely information on the latter 
should be gathered and made available on the Internet (see Recommendation F.4.4).  
1.4 California Air Response Planning Alliance  
The California Air Response Planning Alliance (CARPA) is a statewide organization that consists of 
representatives from Cal OES, Cal/EPA, ARB, the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 
(OEHHA), U.S. EPA, local air districts, health officers, and other first responders.  CARPA was formed to 
help develop standard procedures and statewide capabilities to monitor sudden air releases following a 
disaster and to provide technical expertise to evaluate the risk of exposure to the public. CARPA may be 
a resource that can be used in planning, preparedness, training, and exercise efforts of enhanced 
community-based monitoring for airborne release emergencies (see Recommendation F.4.5). 
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F. Recommendations 
The Working Group recommendations fall into four broad categories: (1) improved agency coordination 
through the establishment of an Interagency Refinery Task Force; (2) emergency management and 
response; (3) safety and prevention; and (4) education and outreach to the public. 
1.  Interagency Refinery Task Force 
An Interagency Refinery Task Force will be created to carry out the recommendations contained in this 
report and to promote more coordinated agency oversight of refineries. 
The Task Force will work with state, federal and local agencies to facilitate and monitor the 
implementation of recommendations in this report. While the process has identified a number of initial 
recommendations, other concepts will require additional study, experience and discussion to ensure 
they meet California’s needs. 
The Task Force will be located within the California Environmental Protection Agency, building on the 
agency’s experience overseeing 83 local Certified Unified Program Agencies, coordinating the 
implementation of the Unified Hazardous Material Program, and developing and managing the 
California Environmental Reporting System, a statewide electronic reporting database.  
 The Task Force will be formed by September 1, 2013.  
Participating agencies will include: Cal OES, Cal/EPA, ARB, DTSC, SWRCB, DIR, Cal/OSHA, DPH, the 
California Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA), and OSFM.   U.S. EPA, CUPAs, and local air 
pollution control districts in locations where refineries operate will be invited to participate as members 
of the Task Force. 
The Interagency Refinery Task Force is not a substitute for state and local agency activities. Rather its 
role will be to better coordinate each agency’s individual functions and to facilitate information sharing, 
with the goal of ensuring that refineries comply with all regulatory requirements and continue to 
improve and enhance protections for workers, communities and the environment.  One of the benefits 
and challenges of the Task Force will be to bridge the gap between agencies with distinctly different 
mandates. 
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Specifically, the Interagency Refinery Task Force will complete the following tasks: 
1.1. Enhance coordination of oversight and enforcement activities by regulatory agencies, including 
the following: 
a.  Facilitate coordination of enforcement activities, including cross-referrals, cross-training, 
and joint or coordinated inspections and auditing, as appropriate; 
b.  Communicate to workers and communities information about the availability of hotlines 
to report potential violations to the state, and create a system to ensure that agencies 
share information about refinery-related calls from all systems, including web-based 
complaint systems and call lines;  
c.  Analyze patterns and trends in refineries’ worker safety and environmental 
performance to determine if additional regulatory authority is needed and to encourage 
the adoption of industry best practices at refineries, and identify what additional 
information is needed from refineries to enable regulatory agencies to provide more 
effective oversight;   
d.  Facilitate the development of an information and data sharing system among state, 
local and federal agencies to include information about inspections, compliance, 
injuries, emissions, and enforcement activity as well as the means to collect information 
identified in reports, a process for timely flow of information and a process for public 
dissemination; and, 
1.2 Designate a “Refinery Information Officer” to provide a state-level, single point of contact for 
the public regarding the regulation and safety of refineries in California.  The Refinery 
Information Officer will be a catalyst for improved public participation, education and outreach 
about refinery emissions and releases, safety metrics, regulatory compliance status, emergency 
planning and response, and the roles of various agencies.  The Refinery Information Officer will 
be a member of the Interagency Refinery Task Force and will work with local, state and federal 
regulatory agencies to coordinate public participation efforts by the various regulatory 
programs, including regularly scheduled public updates to communities surrounding refineries. 
1.3 Establish forums in northern and southern California for ongoing dialogue among industry, 
labor, community, environmental groups and regulators.  These “Refinery Safety Forums”  
should  focus, among other things, on joint learning, sharing of good process safety practices 
among California refineries, examination of performance metrics, root cause analysis of 
incidents, and  other issues proposed in this report for further evaluation .  
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1.4 Continue the more technically-oriented “Contra Costa County Community Awareness 
Emergency Response Group Safety Summits”.  These meetings currently bring government 
agencies, industry and labor together on a regular basis to discuss more detailed issues about 
prevention of refinery hazards and incidents.  Similar meetings should be set up for southern 
California.   
The Working Group will estimate the costs to implement the Task Force program and identify 
mechanisms for covering these costs. Costs should be funded through fees on refineries operating in 
California. 
2. Emergency Response and Preparedness 
The Working Group found broad-based consensus for strengthening existing protocols for refinery-
specific emergency response systems, particularly the need for increased communication and 
coordination efforts. 
Emergency preparedness and response activities 
should continue to be led by Cal OES, with ongoing 
delegation of emergency functions related to 
hazardous materials and oil spills to Cal/EPA. 
These agencies will work together, with the CUPAs 
and other state and local agencies, to implement 
the following recommendations by January 2014.  
 The Working Group recommends the following 
measures: 
1.1 Improved Area Plans 
Cal OES should require counties with refineries to 
develop a specific element in their Hazardous Materials Area Plan for refinery response.  These refinery-
specific elements must, at a minimum, include the elements described below:   
a.  Alignment of Radio Communications between Response Officials  
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Rule 90.523 allows a nongovernmental fire department to 
operate on the same radio frequency band as a governmental fire agency when they are supporting 
each other.   
Cal OES will ensure that local Area Plans require that refineries, and other facilities that could be subject 
to fire or explosion, obtain approval for joint operations with local fire departments on each other’s 
Recommendations on Emergency Response 
and Preparedness: An Overview 
Better coordinated and more effective 
emergency response will require Cal OES to:  
 
1.  Work with CUPAs to create refinery-specific 
elements in Hazardous Material Area Plans 
2.  Clarify reporting thresholds during 
hazardous materials release or threatened 
release 
 
Additionally, the Air Resources Board and 
California Air Pollution Control Officers 
Association are developing a plan to improve 
toxic air contaminant monitoring. 
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communications systems.  In addition, Area Plans should include protocols for those joint operations 
and communication. 
In the interim, or in the absence of such approval, responders should leverage existing communications 
systems that provide interoperability in the area (e.g. East Bay Regional 700 MHz P25 Trunked Radio 
Communications System). Such systems should be incorporated into Area Plans as a back-up 
communications system that will work for all responders.  
In addition, Cal OES should require the CUPAs to establish operation protocols and procedures with 
agency fire department communications centers for refinery incidents and establish periodic testing of 
the communications systems between agencies to keep staff current on operations and to identify 
issues with the systems that may require repair or service. 
b.  Establishment of a Unified Incident Command and Joint Operation Center 
Area Plans must include clearer criteria for the scale and scope of an incident that requires 
establishment of a Unified Incident Command. In general, any incident that requires significant 
communication with the public, the media, and medical facilities should trigger establishment of a 
Unified Incident Command and Joint Operation Center.  The Joint Operation Center should be 
responsible for supporting the Incident Command and would deal with off-site consequences and 
recovery.   It should include the county and city as well as regional and state representatives.  
Additionally, a Joint Information Center, controlled by a public agency, should be located in the Joint 
Operation Center to ensure that communications with the public are accurate and timely.  A health 
officer should oversee the release of health-related information. 
c. Plans and Protocols to Protect Persons Outside of a Refinery  
Area Plans must be enhanced to include provisions for how to evaluate, manage, and communicate with 
entities that may need to act to protect groups of people. Specific consideration should be directed 
toward plans for working with public transit agencies, railroads, utilities and other employers that may 
have workers in the field, and locations (such as malls) where people congregate. 
d. Drills and Exercises  
Area Plans must include adequate and specific requirements for training and exercise schedules. 
Additionally, public response agencies and the refinery fire department should be required to train 
together and conduct at least annually an on-site exercise to assure that all systems work, and that the 
participants know how to use those systems and how to work with one another to implement the 
response plan.   
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e. Preparation for Airborne Releases  
The ARB and local Air Quality Management Districts should be involved in the technical evaluation of 
Area Plans and in ongoing partnerships with CUPA programs, especially in areas where there are 
refineries or other potential major sources of toxic air releases.  The partnership should include Area 
Plan design, technical review, cross-training, preparedness exercises, coordination and communication. 
1.2 Assessment Plan for Monitoring of Toxic Air Contaminants  
ARB, in collaboration with CAPCOA, has prepared a project plan to identify, evaluate and recommend 
improvements to state and local air monitoring practices and define statewide best practices in the 
event of a refinery accident involving the release of toxic air contaminants (a copy of the plan will be 
released shortly). The project will include expert and public involvement, and will examine opportunities 
to use atmospheric modeling and monitoring programs for two purposes: (1) provide the public with 
information about potential exposures in the event of an unplanned release; and (2) provide local 
agencies with exposure estimates to help alert the public during an incident. This effort is scheduled for 
completion by October 1, 2014. 
1.3 Early Notification of Release or Threatened Release of a Hazardous Material   
The Business Plan requirements applicable to refineries currently require “immediate” reporting of a 
hazardous materials release or threatened release. Cal OES should consider regulations to clarify key 
terminology in Health & Safety Code 25504(a), specifying criteria for reporting thresholds and a clearer 
definition of “immediate.”  A significant vapor cloud release, such as in the Chevron incident, would 
certainly be defined as a release of hazardous material, as would any leak that requires the refinery fire 
department to respond, or a leak that occurs on specific high risk units.   
3. Safety and Prevention of Hazardous Events  
In light of the input from stakeholders and the analysis of existing programs, the Working Group 
identified a set of immediate actions that should be taken, and several longer-term issues for 
investigation, in order to improve safety and prevention of hazardous events. Ultimately, some safety 
approaches, such as the safety case model, may hold promise but require careful evaluation to assure 
likelihood of success in California. For the near-term, the Working Group evaluated ways to improve 
existing regulations, guidelines and activities designed to reduce risks and improve safety at refineries. 
The recommended actions could be implemented through regulation or statute. For example, 
enforceable requirements for inherently safer systems could be incorporated into the CalARP and PSM 
programs, or they could be required in legislation adopting major components of the Contra Costa 
County ISO into California law.  
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Immediate Actions 
3.1 Strengthen PSM Programs 
Five state-of-the art prevention strategies must 
be incorporated into the CalARP and Cal/OSHA 
PSM programs and made enforceable 
statewide. These strategies include: (1) the 
adoption of inherently safer systems, (2) use of 
safety culture assessments, (3) incorporation of 
damage mechanism hazard reviews, (4) root 
cause analyses requirements, and (5) required 
consideration of human factors.   The Working 
Group further identified some additional 
necessary changes to the CalARP program.  
Finally, several changes are needed to strengthen agency enforcement authorities and provide agencies 
with additional information to improve oversight.  These actions are described in more detail below.  
a.    Require Refineries to Implement Inherently Safer Systems 
The intent of inherently safer system requirements is to ensure that refineries incorporate the greatest 
degree of hazard reduction, to the maximum extent feasible, in order to avoid major accidents or 
releases. The focus is on adopting measures that are permanent and inseparable from the production 
process, as opposed to adding on equipment or installing external layers of protection.  For example, 
had an inherently safer system approach been in place at its Richmond refinery, Chevron would have 
been forced to demonstrate why continuing to use low-silicon metal susceptible to corrosion was the 
best solution, given other inherently safer options. Under the requirements of this program, refineries 
would be required to report the methodologies, documented findings, rationale, and conclusions used 
to select particular systems, during PHA as well as during rebuilds, repairs, corrective action, and 
incident investigation. This can be done by strengthening current Cal/OSHA PSM requirements and 
CalARP RMP requirements through either rulemaking or legislation.   
b.   Require Refineries to Perform Periodic Safety Culture Assessments  
An organization’s safety culture is reflected in the way risk is perceived, specific incidents and situations 
are addressed, and priorities are adjusted during day-to-day decision making. Safety culture for any 
organization is difficult to assess. Nonetheless, assessments of safety culture can help increase safety 
orientation and decrease incidents.  Safety culture assessments can also help regulators evaluate 
whether the refinery’s focus on safety remains at a high level over time, and provide facility operators 
the opportunity to address deficient practices. Refineries should be required to conduct safety culture 
5 Prevention Strategies for Statewide 
Programs 
 
Existing State prevention programs should be 
strengthened to require refineries to: 
 
1.  Implement inherently safer systems 
2.  Perform periodic safety culture 
assessments 
3.  Conduct damage mechanism hazard 
reviews 
4.  Conduct a root cause analysis after 
significant accidents or releases 
5.  Explicitly account for human factors 
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assessments at least every three years. Such a requirement can be done by strengthening current 
Cal/OSHA PSM requirements and CalARP RMP requirements through either rulemaking or legislation.   
c.    Require Refineries to Conduct Damage Mechanism Hazard Reviews  
Current PSM and CalARP programs require facilities to include a Mechanical Integrity Process Safety 
element. The Mechanical Integrity element requires facilities to ensure the mechanical integrity of 
processes through purchasing of new or replacement equipment, performing inspections, and other 
actions. But current regulation does not require that a type of analysis known as damage mechanism 
hazard review be conducted at refineries.  This review analyzes risks presented by all process failure 
mechanisms at refineries, including corrosion, stress cracking, damage from high temperatures, and 
mechanical or metallurgical assisted degradation, and should be included as part of the Mechanical 
Integrity element.  
In addition, the results of the damage mechanism hazard reviews, as well as other Mechanic Integrity 
reviews currently required, should be explicitly incorporated in the information provided to Process 
Hazard Analysis teams at refineries. Current regulation (both the Contra Costa County ISO and Title 8 
PSM regulations) requires that these results be used by Process Hazard Analysis teams at refineries, and 
it is critical that these teams have the expertise to understand this information. 
 
d.   Require Root Cause Analysis After Significant Accidents or Releases 
When accidents occur, it is necessary to know why they happened so that similar accidents may be 
prevented in the future. Incident investigation procedure under current state and federal law require 
facilities to document findings and recommendations, and identify contributing causes. However, 
understanding root causes, or “why” an incident occurred, is recognized by industry safety experts as 
necessary to address the fundamental underlying problems and prevent recurrences. Facilities that fall 
under Contra Costa County’s ISO are required to perform a root cause analysis as part of their incident 
investigations for major chemical accidents or releases, and to submit the root cause analysis report to 
Contra Costa Health Services. The root cause analysis reports are made available to the public. These 
requirements are broader than those currently existing at the federal or state level and should be 
established statewide. The CalARP and PSM Incident Investigation procedures must be strengthened to 
require a root cause analysis for significant chemical accidents or releases.  This should be done by 
amending current PSM and CalARP programs through either rulemaking or legislation. 
e.   Require Refineries to Explicitly Account for Human Factors  
Human limitations and needs must be considered to manage and reduce error.  The outcome of a 
certain activity or task can be strongly affected by the operational procedure followed, the performance 
level or skill required, and existing safeguards.  Two approaches can help address this issue:  (1) 
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Management of Change processes should include personnel change, such as how a new operator within 
a unit, or altered shift schedules for inspectors, may affect emergency response, and (2) human factors 
analysis should provide a better understanding of the very real human element in facility operations and 
incident prevention. Federal and state regulations require human factors to be considered during 
Process Hazard Analysis. However, these factors are not a required consideration in any other processes 
under the PSM or the CalARP programs.  
The Contra Costa County ISO requires that Management of Change procedures encompass staffing 
changes, including reorganization in operations, maintenance, health and safety, or emergency 
response.  The ISO also requires a human factors program to be conducted for all covered facilities. 
California’s PSM and CalARP regulation should be amended so that its requirements for human factors 
and Management of Change are substantially equivalent to that of the Contra Costa County ISO. This 
should be done by amending current PSM and CalARP regulations through either rulemaking or 
legislation. 
3.2 Strengthen the CalARP Program 
The CalARP program must be strengthened in the following additional ways: (1) refineries should 
conduct an annual compliance audit and provide the audit to the CUPA, and (2) CUPAs should evaluate 
the CalARP RMP at a refinery and perform an inspection at least annually. 
3.3  Strengthen  Enforcement Capacity 
There are several actions that should be taken to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of regulatory 
agencies:  (1) increase the maximum penalty amounts for violations of health, safety and environmental 
requirements so they provide a stronger incentive for compliance; (2) provide agencies with sufficient 
resources to carry out effective regulatory oversight of refineries.  This year’s budget directs Cal/OSHA 
to use its existing fee authority to fund an additional 15 positions for inspectors in the PSM program, 
which is a very helpful start; and (3) require refineries to provide regulatory agencies with timely 
information about operations critical to effective oversight and monitoring, including inspection reports, 
certain testing reports, and turnaround work plans and schedules, with appropriate safeguards to 
ensure confidentiality.   
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Recommendations for Further Study 
The Working Group recommends that the Interagency Refinery Task Force review the following areas 
for future action.  
3.4 Process Safety Leading and Lagging Indicators  
Indicators are a standard method of measuring and evaluating performance over time, and they can 
help identify actions to improve performance and reduce hazards. Indicators can also provide insight 
into a factor that is more difficult to measure directly, such as safety. Designing strong “leading” and 
“lagging” indicators can potentially drive continuous process improvement at refineries. Leading 
indicators are predictive and used to identify potential weakness in safety systems early on to allow 
potential corrective action (e.g., whether various activities have been completed on schedule, number 
of open incident investigations, etc.), while lagging indicators are retrospective and may indicate the 
potential for recurring problems (, e.g., number of PSM incidents that have occurred, number of injuries 
or releases). The Interagency Refinery Task Force will review literature and guidance on leading and 
lagging indicators currently existing internationally and in the U.S., and in consultation with the Refinery 
Safety Forums, develop recommendations for appropriate indicators and how they should be used.  
3.5 Worker Involvement  
The Interagency Refinery Task Force will convene a labor-management committee to identify effective 
methods to fully involve workers in investigating hazards, recommending corrective actions, and 
providing input in the risk management decision making process, while considering current employee 
participation requirements under CalARP regulation. One approach to consider is the “Triangle of 
Prevention” strategy developed by the United Steelworkers to report and investigate incidents and near 
misses, analyze root causes, recommend and track solutions based on a hierarchy of controls, and learn 
and share lessons. The committee should also identify stronger methods to prevent retaliation against 
workers who report unsafe conditions to either management or government agencies, or who exercise 
their rights under company safety programs to shut down unsafe operations.  
3.6 Safety Case Approach  
Several countries have adopted the “safety case model” to reduce risks in complex industrial processes 
such as refineries.  Under this model, government agencies license and permit the operation of a facility 
based on a comprehensive safety plan (the employer’s “safety case”) covering all aspects of the 
operation, which is evaluated by government regulators. The safety case model relies on industry 
expertise in self-policing, but it may also allow workers to participate more fully in safety decisions. The 
experience of the countries where the safety case model has been established indicates several 
prerequisites for success, including: 
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  A designated unit dedicated to enforcement at complex facilities and a large number of 
inspectors to conduct the initial licensing evaluation and periodic audits; 
  A specialized skill set and a high competence level among inspectors, including chemical and 
mechanical engineers, process plant operators and social science experts able to evaluate 
human factors, training effectiveness, safety culture, and other factors; 
  Salaries and benefits that typically are higher than other regulatory compliance officers in order 
to hire and retain highly qualified inspectors;  
  A dedicated funding source (general fee, licensing or certification fees, fees for service) paid by 
the industry; and, 
  A substantial change in the regulatory framework to allow regulators to require refinery 
operators to adopt policies and practices beyond what is required by existing law.  
Because the safety case approach represents a paradigm shift from the traditional deterrence-based 
enforcement approach, and because of the significant resources and changes to the regulatory 
framework it entails, consideration of adopting this approach will take time. In other countries, the 
safety case approach typically has been developed in a multi-year, three-part effort involving 
government agencies, industry, and workers and their unions.  In consultation with the Refinery Safety 
Forums, the Task Force will study the safety case approach, including review of relevant literature and 
the experience of other jurisdictions, evaluation of its benefits and costs in California, and the steps that 
would be necessary for its adoption here.  
4. Community Education and Alerts 
Members of local communities and the public should 
have consistent, accessible, adequate and timely 
information about refinery emissions and safety risks, 
preventive measures, and emergency procedures. There 
should be an easy mechanism for community 
participation in emergency planning and preparedness.  
The following steps should be taken:  
4.1 Improve Emergency Alerts and Public Education  
Cal OES will work with other state and local agencies to 
ensure that systems to alert residents during an 
emergency are timely and operational. For example, the 
Recommendations on Community 
Education and Alerts: An Overview 
Improving the current system of public 
involvement, information-sharing, and 
understanding of emergencies can be 
accomplished if agencies:   
 
1.  Improve existing alert systems and 
create a more comprehensive system 
to notify local residents 
2.  Increase public involvement in 
emergency planning processes 
3.  Increase public involvement in air 
monitoring 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) now has the capability to broadcast tailored text 
messages county-wide to all cell phone users, and this should be incorporated into Area Plans and 
deployed in major incidents from now on.  Cal OES will also work with FEMA to reduce the area that can 
be targeted by these warnings, so that only the affected community is warned. Land-line telephone calls 
are not reliable in emergencies, but remain valuable because some people (such as elderly residents) 
may not have cell phones; counties should identify a reliable provider and back-up provider and test the 
system at least annually to assure it works rapidly and effectively.  Additional alert mechanisms include 
email, Twitter, social media, and local Community Warning System alerts. The latter exist in many 
California communities, and could benefit from additional outreach to increase the percentage of 
participating residents. Finally, emergency outreach and warning systems should be designed to alert 
people and provide information in all major languages spoken in a community. Provisions requiring 
multilingual emergency communications to the public should be added to all Area Plans.  
Cal OES must also work with other state and local agencies and refineries to improve public education 
and outreach in communities near refineries about what to expect and what to do in the event of a 
release of toxic chemicals or fire.   This may help the public better understand refinery safety risks, 
preventative measures, emergency procedures, and the different roles and responsibilities of agencies.  
4.2 Increase Public Involvement in Emergency Planning 
Cal OES, with other state and local agencies, will evaluate ways to improve the use of the State 
Emergency Response Commission and LEPCs include the public in the emergency planning process. Cal 
OES will also ensure that California’s emergency management systems are more closely aligned with 
federal EPCRA requirements for emergency response planning. One option is to align the geographic 
scope of the LEPCs with the CUPAs. The more compact, local scale of the 83 CUPAs make them more 
appropriate for community participation as compared to the large geographic scale of the current six 
LEPCs.  The LEPCs could provide a forum for community participation, unified with the CUPAs current 
preparedness and community right-to-know functions.  
4.3 Improve Public Involvement in Air Monitoring  
ARB and CAPCOA should consider the following elements in their project plan
10 to improve state and 
local air monitoring practices as possible program improvements:  increase the availability of air 
monitoring data on local and state websites; develop user applications and other electronic tools to 
make data more accessible; and, local town hall meetings for community education.  
 
                                                           
10 See Recommendation 2.2 
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4.4 Review of the California Air Response Planning Alliance (CARPA)  
Cal/EPA and ARB will reach out to the California Air Response Planning Alliance to determine its current 
capabilities and how it can be used to improve emergency preparedness for future refinery accidents 
and emergencies. 
G. Conclusion  
Improving refinery safety is a goal strongly shared by industry and stakeholders.  As this report details, 
refinery safety in California can and must be improved. Government agencies and industry can work 
together to develop and implement stronger accident prevention and hazard reduction measures. 
Government agencies can improve interagency coordination, emergency response procedures, and 
communication and outreach to the public.  Over the long term, more fundamental changes in the 
current regulatory framework may be needed. The Interagency Refinery Task Force established as a 
result of the report will guide the efforts of government, industry, labor, community and environmental 
stakeholders to help achieve the highest possible level of safety and prevention. 
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 Members of the Governor’s Interagency Working Group 
Agencies participating in the Working Group include the following: 
  Governor’s Office of Emergency Services  (Cal OES) 
  California Energy Commission (CEC) 
  California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) 
  Cal/EPA – Air Resources Board (ARB) 
  Cal/EPA – Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) 
  Cal/EPA –State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) 
  California Technology Agency (CTA) 
  Department of Finance (DOF) 
  Department of Public Health (DPH) 
  Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) 
  LWDA – Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) 
  LWDA/DIR – Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) 
  Office of the State Fire Marshal (OSFM) 
Acronyms 
  CalARP: California Accidental Release Prevention Program 
  CUPA: Certified Unified Program Agency 
  CWS: Community Warning System 
  ISO: Industrial Safety Ordinance 
  JIC: Joint Information Center 
  JOC: Joint Operation Center 
  LEPC: Local Emergency Planning Committee 
  PHA: Process Hazard Analysis 
  PSM: Process Safety Management 
APPENDIX A- 1  RMP: Risk Management Plan 
  SERC: State Emergency Response Commission 
  UIC: Unified Incident Command 
Regulatory Agencies 
A number of federal, state, regional, and local agencies – with varying degrees of coordination between 
agencies, as described below – enforce or otherwise administer laws and regulations to protect the 
safety and health of workers, communities, and the environment. 
Safety and prevention of hazardous events 
Occupational safety and health:  The state Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) 
enforces regulations adopted by the state Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board (OSHSB) 
to protect worker safety and health. The regulations are at least as protective as regulations 
adopted by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (U.S. OSHA) under the federal 
Occupational Safety and Health Act. Both of the state agencies are housed within the California 
Department of Industrial Relations (DIR), which is in turn housed within the Labor and Workforce 
Development Agency (LWDA). 
Accidental release prevention: Regional and local Certified Unified Program Agencies (CUPAs), which 
are certified by the California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA), administer California’s 
accidental release prevention (CalARP) program. The CalARP program parallels risk management 
plan (RPM) requirements adopted by the US Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) under the 
federal Clean Air Act. The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) provides technical 
assistance and evaluation of this aspect of the CUPA program. 
Hazardous waste control: CUPAs administer regulations governing the generation, handling, 
transportation, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes. These regulations conform with those 
adopted by the U.S. EPA under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The California 
Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) provides technical assistance and evaluation of this 
aspect of the CUPA program. DTSC is housed within Cal/EPA. 
Hazardous substances storage: CUPAs administer regulations governing aboveground storage of 
petroleum and underground storage of hazardous substances. These regulations conform with 
those adopted by the U.S. EPA under the federal Water Pollution Control Act. The California State 
Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) oversees, enforces and assists with these programs. 
SWRCB is housed within Cal/EPA. 
Air pollution control: Air pollution control districts (APCDs) adopt and enforce local air pollution 
quality plans and regulations that are consistent with standards established by the U.S. EPA and the 
California Air Resources Board under the federal Clean Air Act. APCDs also issue permits to refineries 
APPENDIX A- 2and other stationary air pollution sources. The ARB oversees compliance by the APCDs with state 
and federal law. 
Emergency preparedness and response  
State Emergency Plan: Cal OES prepares the state’s plan for responding to significant emergencies 
including those involving release of hazardous materials. The plan includes coordination of 
hazardous materials activities by Cal/EPA and medical services by the California Health and Human 
Services Agency (HHSA).  
Accidental release prevention: This program is described above. It includes requirements to prepare 
for emergencies in the event of a hazardous substances release. 
Area plans: CUPAs develop and implement area plans for emergency response to a hazardous 
materials release. Area plans provide for emergency planning and rescue procedures, coordination 
between agencies including coordination of medical services, public safety, and public information 
for the geographic area covered by the CUPA. The regulations governing area plans are generally 
consistent with those adopted by the U.S. EPA under the federal Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). Cal OES identifies the required content of area plans, and 
Cal/EPA ensures that CUPAs develop and implement them. 
Business plans: CUPAs administer regulations governing business plans prepared by industrial 
facilities. Business plans include inventories of hazardous chemicals, emergency response plans and 
procedures, and training for employees on the emergency procedures. The regulations governing 
business plans conform with regulations adopted by the U.S. EPA under the federal Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Cal OES provides technical assistance and evaluation of 
the business plans program as part of Cal/EPA program oversight. 
Fire Safety: CUPAs administer regulations governing hazardous material release response plans and 
inventory statements submitted to local fire agencies. These regulations are related to business plan 
requirements under EPCRA described above. The Office of the State Fire Marshall (OFSM) ensures 
implementation of these programs. 
Public health and medical services: The California Department of Public Health (DPH) and the 
California Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA), both housed within the HHSA, notify local 
health departments, public health services, emergency medical services agencies, hospitals, and 
other medical providers during an emergency. 
Community education and alerts 
Business plans and area plans: These programs are described above. They include procedures to 
inform and alert the public. 
Emergency planning and community right-to-know: The State Emergency Response Commission 
(SERC), whose members are appointed by the Governor, has established six local emergency 
APPENDIX A- 3planning committees (LEPCs) throughout the state to assist with emergency response planning. 
LEPCs include government, environment, transportation, and hospital officials; police, fire, civil 
defense, and public health professionals; facility representatives; media; and, representatives from 
community groups. SERC and LEPCs carry out requirements under EPCRA, including provisions to 
ensure public access to facility documents concerning hazardous material inventories, routine toxic 
chemical releases, emergency planning and emergency releases. 
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Before the California Department of Industrial Relations and  
the Governor’s Task Force on Refinery Safety 
State of California 
 
June 11, 2013 
 
A major explosion at the Chevron refinery in Richmond California in August 2012 did not, 
fortunately, kill anyone, but it led 15,000 people in the community to seek medical attention.  That 
event spurred the Governor to establish a Task Force to examine what steps should be taken to 
improve refinery safety in the State.   
 
RAND was asked by Christine Baker, the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations, to 
investigate several issues in order to inform the Task Force’s discussions.  This memo is the 
response to that request.  It has 3 parts. The first summarizes information about different 
regulatory models and provides some recommendations about how to proceed in adopting new 
models.  The second briefly summarizes suggestions about the role that measures of “leading 
indicators” can play in future regulation.  The third reviews what existing measures tell us about 
changes over time and comparisons across continents. 
 
Models of Regulation 
 
The American model of work safety regulation relies on inspectors to detect hazards at facilities 
and ensure that they are corrected.  California’s model is similar except that it puts a greater 
emphasis on investigating serious accidents that have occurred and less on planned inspections.  
Over the last 25 years, a perspective has developed that argues that this model is poorly suited to 
ensure safety at very complex facilities, especially those characterized by risks that have low 
frequency but very high disaster potential.  This perspective emerged first in Europe, triggered by 
disasters in the North Sea and at Seveso, Italy.  The former led the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Norway to develop a “safety case” approach to regulating off-shore oil platforms in the 1990s, an 
approach later expanded to other high-hazard process industries.  The European Union’s Seveso 
                                                 
1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be 
interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the 
RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to 
federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private 
review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective 
analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the 
world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 
2 This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT392.html. 
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Directives ordered some similar measures for all member states.  The safety case approach puts 
the responsibility on facilities to explain what they will do in order to try to ensure their safety.  The 
regulatory authority has to judge whether this effort is acceptable and then takes a role of auditing 
to ensure that the firm does what it says it would do.  It generally does not inspect to find hazards, 
leaving that job to the company. 
 
The major efforts in the United States to address safety issues in refineries (and the chemical and 
petrochemical industries) also emerged in the early 1990s. They included the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) standard of 1992 
and the Environmental Protection Agency’s requirement for Risk Management Programs (RMPs).  
Both of these were focused on facilities which used minimum quantities of specified toxic 
substances.  OSHA’s PSM rule mandated many of the standard activities already used in industry 
to ensure safe operations.  Both OSHA and the EPA required that firms have a written document 
that explained how the firm would carry out these requirements.  The EPA document had to be 
submitted to the agency and redone every 5 years.  It also required that process safety incidents 
related to the chemicals included in the RMP had to be reported to EPA, although this 
requirement appears to have been weakly enforced and suffered from major non-compliance.
3  
 
Both regulatory agencies appear to have devoted only limited resources to refineries.  For 
example, in the 5 years from September 2007 through July 2012, there were 63 inspections at 
California refineries (excluding accident investigations).  With about 16 operating refineries, this is 
about 80 “refinery-years;” so there was less than 1 inspection per refinery per year.  Federal 
OSHA has inspected refineries even less frequently, despite a recent campaign focused on 
refinery safety. 
 
Moreover, the inspections that Cal-OSHA has carried out have not been very effective at 
detecting hazards.  During the same period, 5 of 15 complaint inspections cited a violation, 
including only one serious violation.  Among the 48 programmed inspections, only 4 cited a 
violation, including only one serious violation.  Thus even when there have been inspections, they 
have contributed relatively little to hazard abatement. We believe Cal-OSHA could be more 
effective if it shifted its role to place more emphasis on monitoring whether the companies are 
meeting their own measurable goals for process safety. 
 
One point that needs to be stressed is that both the safety case model in the UK and the 
Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) approach used in California’s Contra Costa County involve 
considerably more resources than OSHA or Cal-OSHA have deployed in the refinery industry.  
                                                 
3 Gomez M, Casper, Smith (2007) 
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According to Ian Travers, the Director of the Hazardous Facilities Unit that oversees UK safety 
cases, the Unit typically conducts several audits each year at refineries to assess their safety 
case activities.
4  Although we have not calculated the resources used by Contra Costa County 
agencies, their interactions with refineries clearly have been much more frequent than those by 
Cal-OSHA.  The implication of these findings is that any new initiative, whatever its form, is likely 
to require additional resources if it is to be effective. 
 
Some have argued that the safety case process often leads to initial gains in hazard recognition 
and abatement.  However, it must remain “a living document” in order to fulfill its objectives.  As 
Ian Travers commented, the main potential concern with the safety case approach is that 
describing and documenting how you will manage risks is not the same as actually managing 
risks. 
 
The Governor’s Task Force held numerous hearings for labor, community, and industry 
representatives.  At a meeting with the last group on March 18 in Santa Monica, the participant 
from Shell in Contra Costa County, who had also spent considerable time in a Southern California 
refinery, said that she believed that the attention to safety was noticeably greater in the North as 
a result of Contra Costa’s ISO program.  None of the other industry representatives there spoke 
to that point, either to agree or disagree. 
 
In developing new public policies, it is generally better, other things equal, to choose options that 
can achieve a goal with a minimum of disruption.  Familiar routines, in this regard, are preferable 
to brand new ones.  This maxim suggests giving serious consideration to strengthening the 
Contra Costa ISO model rather than requiring all to adopt new methods.   
 
However, we have to acknowledge that, at this point, we don’t have a sufficient understanding of 
all that goes on in the ISO regime to be able to identify the exact ways in which it differs from the 
UK safety case operation.  While there may be useful lessons to be gained by further examination 
of the UK system, we still think that it makes the most sense to extend and improve the ISO 
model as the basis for new proposals. 
 
The Role of Leading Indicators 
 
Above, we referred to the role of the regulator in auditing the firm’s safety program.  But what 
practices or conditions should it be auditing?  You can’t look at everything.  Everyone seems to 
agree that the traditional measure of injury rates has two major flaws:  first, it doesn’t tell you 
                                                 
4 Personal communication, March 17, 2013. 
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much about low-frequency, high severity risks like explosions.  In addition, although past injury 
rates may be predictive of future injury rates, what is needed are measures of activities that are 
known or believed to be effective at preventing explosions and similar events.  These are referred 
to as “leading indicators.”  The terms “leading” and “lagging” indicators can be a source of 
confusion.  In the simplest terms, a “lagging indicator” is a measure of the riskiness of a facility 
during a certain prior period.  In contrast, a “leading indicator” helps to predict riskiness in a future 
period. 
 
But a more meaningful distinction is between indicators which have preventive potential and 
those which do not.  Both may be predictive.  The number of injuries this year may predict the 
number next year, but it cannot prevent them.  In contrast, more frequent inspections of safety 
equipment may prevent injuries and, if they do, a measure of that activity will also contribute to 
predictions.  In this sense, a useful leading indicator must be an activity or condition that has 
preventive value.  We usually lack hard evidence about preventive value, which means that the 
judgments are now made primarily on the basis of professional judgment.  
 
At the request of the US Chemical Safety Board, the American Petroleum Institute developed a 
recommended practice (RP 754) that obligates its member firms to adopt several types of both 
lagging and leading indicators.  All of the lagging indicators focus only on events that pertain to 
process safety hazards (e.g., releases from pressure vessels and pipes), not general safety 
hazards.  For leading indicators, the API did not stipulate which ones firms should use, but gave 
several examples, including whether various activities have been completed on schedule, fatigue 
risk management measures (e.g., overtime), completion of emergency response drills, safety 
critical equipment inspection and deficiency management. 
 
RP754 requires each company’s facilities to report a summary of both lagging and leading 
indicators to the employees and their representatives.  It also requires a summary of lagging 
indicators be provided to local communities and emergency management officials.  It says that 
the Company may provide refinery-specific summaries of leading indicator data to the 
communities and EMS officials. 
 
California should take advantage of the API’s increased commitment to the principle of reporting 
to the public. The Contra Costa ISO already does require more reporting than RP754.  United 
Steelworker unions in Northern California have been considering which process measures should 
be reported.  The State can bring union and management together statewide and use their 
recommendations to decide on a new set of measures that, ideally, are reliable, relevant, easy to 
measure, and auditable.  The most important measures to focus on are the leading indicators, 
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because they can drive the auditing process.  The lagging indicators of process safety events are 
likely to have low statistical power—that is, they are unlikely to be able to identify statistically 
significant changes at refineries and differences among refineries (Mendeloff et al. 2012). 
 
Evidence of the Effectiveness of Alternative Regulatory Models 
 
A study commissioned by the UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in 2004 reviewed the 
evidence regarding the costs and benefits of the safety case approach (Vectra 2004).  It found 
essentially no hard evidence on the net benefits of the policy.  There was a great deal of opinion, 
most of it (but not all) suggesting that the policy had led to better hazard identification.  There was 
also a good deal of questioning by industry about whether the program was worthwhile.  Ian 
Travers indicated that there had not been any strong empirical work since that review that would 
alter the conclusion.  Our review of the literature since 2004 did not find articles that suggest 
otherwise. 
 
A review of the various sources of information about measures of process safety outcomes 
(“lagging indicators”) that provide comparisons over time or across countries suggests the 
following points: 
 
  The number of fatal process safety accidents at refineries in the US has declined from 
the level it had reached in the 1980s. 
  The US Chemical Safety Board has stated that it believes that U.S. refinery safety is 
worsening.  This view reflects, in part, the fact that, prior to 2007, only about 10% of the 
roughly 50 investigations carried out by the CSB involved refineries.  Today, 6 of its 12 
active investigations involve refineries.   
  Swiss Re (2006), a large re-insurer, reports finding that refinery safety practices in the US 
make them less safe than those in Europe. 
  The United States has a disproportionate share of the world’s highest cost refinery 
disasters over the last 30 years, suffering half of the events despite having less than one-
quarter of world’s refineries and refining capacity. (Marsh and McLennan 2011) 
  The lagging measure of the rate for process safety events reported by API for US 
refineries (for 2011) and by its European counterpart for European refineries (for 2010) 
show that the European rate was about twice as high.  This result is fairly surprising 
because most Western European fatality rates are considerably lower than US rates 
across most industries (Mendeloff and Staetsky, 2012).  We suspect that process safety 
events are underreported to a greater extent in the US. 
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Although uncertainty remains, we interpret the available data to indicate that process safety 
performance at US refineries is worse than it is in Europe.  We think the evidence is mixed about 
whether US refinery safety has improved or declined during the last 30 years.   
 
Summary and Recommendations: 
 
We have found that: 
1—US safety performance at refineries has not been good by international standards. 
2—However, Cal-OSHA inspections of refineries typically find so few hazards that they contribute 
relatively little to refinery safety. 
 
As a result, we make the following recommendations: 
1—Place more responsibility on firms to lay out how they will ensure safety and have regulators 
focus on auditing their performance.  
2—Adopt an incremental approach for making the transition from the current enforcement 
program to the one recommended.  
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State of California
Division of Occupational Safety and Health
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management District Office
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 (Index Code 4037)
Concord, CA 94520-7996
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
To:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
Inspection Number: 314331877
Inspection Date(s): 08/06/2012 - 01130/2013
and its successors
841 Chevron Way
Richmond, CA 94801
Issuance Date:
CSHO ID:
Optional Report #:
Reporting ID:
01130/2013
A0572
04-13
0950663
Inspection Site:
841 Chevron Way
Richmond, CA 94801
This Citation and Notification of Penalty (hereinafter Citation) is being issued in accordance with
California Labor Code Section 6317 for violations that were found during the inspection/investigation.
This Citation or a COPy must be prominentlY posted upon receipt by the employer at or near the
location of each violation until the violative condition is corrected or for· threeworkillg davs,
whichever is longer. Violations of Title 8 of the California Code ofRegulations or of the California
Labor Code may result in some instances in prosecution for a misdemeanor.
YOU HAVE A RIGHT to contest this Citation and Notification ofPenalty by filing an appeal with the
Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board. To initiate your appeal, you must contact the Appeals
Board, in writing or by telephone, within 15 working days from the date of receipt ofthis Citation. If
you miss the 15 working day deadline to appeal, the Citation and Notification ofPenalty becomes a final
order ofthe Appeals Board, not subject to review by any court or agency.
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APPENDIX C-1Informal Conference - You may request an informal conference with the Manager ofthe District Office
which issued the Citation within 10 working days after receipt ofthe Citation. However, ifthe citation
is appealed, you may request an informal conference at any time prior to the day of the hearing.
Employers are encouraged to schedule a conference at the earliest possible time to assure an expeditious
resolution of any issues. At the informal conference, you may discuss the existence of the alleged
violation, classification of the violation, abatement date or proposed penalty.
Be sure to bring to the conference any and all supporting documentation of existing conditions as well
as any abatement steps taken thus far. If conditions warrant, we can enter into an agreement which
resolves this matter without litigation or contest.
APPEAL RIGHTS
The Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (AppealsBoard) consists of three members appointed
by the Governor. The Appeals Board is a separate entity from the Division ofOccupational Safety and
Health (Division) and employs experienced attorneys as administrative law judges to hear appealsfairly
and impartially. To initiate an appeal from a Citation and Notification of Penalty, you must contact the
Appeals Board, in writing or by telephone, within 15 working days from the date ofreceipt ofa Citation.
After you have initiated your appeal, you must then file a completed appeal form with the Appeals Board,
at the address listed below, for each contested citation. Failure to file a completed appeal form with the
Appeals Board may result in dismissal of the appeal. Appeal forms are available from district offices of
the Division, or from the Appeals Board: .
Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board
2520 Venture Oalcs Way, Suite 300
Sacramento, CA 95833
Telephone: (916) 274-5751 or (877) 252-1987
Fax: (916) 274-5785
Ifthe Citation you are appealing alleges more than one item, you must specify on the appeal form which
items you are appealing. You must also attach to the appeal form a legible copy ofthe Citation you are
appealing.
Among the specific grounds for an appeal are the following: the safety order was not violated, the
classification of the alleged violation (e.g., serious, repeat, willful) is incorrect, the abatement
requirements are umeasonable or the proposed penalty is umeasonable.
Important: You must notify the Appeals Board, not the Division, of your intent to appeal within 15
working days from the date ofreceipt ofthe Citation. Otherwise, the Citation and Notification ofPenalty
becomes a final order ofthe Appeals Board not subject to review by any court or agency. An informal
conference with the Division does not constitute an appeal and does not stay the 15 working day appeal
period. Ifyou have any questions concerning your appeal rights, call the Appeals Board, (916) 274-5751
or (877) 252-1987.
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APPENDIX C-2PENALTY PAYMENT OPTIONS
Penalties are due within 15 working days of receipt of this Citation and Notification of Penalty unless
contested. Ifyou are appealing any item ofthe citation, remittance is still due on all items that are not
appealed. Enclosed for your use is a Penalty Remittance Form for payment.
Ifyou are paying by credit card (MasterCard and Visa), please have the Penalty Remittance Form on-
hand when you are ready to malce our payment. The company name, index code, reporting ID, and
Citation number(s) will be required in order to ensure that the payment is accurately posted·to your
account. Please go to www.dir.ca.gov/dosh to ac:cess the secureIJayment processing sit~.
Ifyou are paying by check, return one copy ofthe Citation, along with the Notice ofProposed Penalties
Sheet and the Penalty Remittance Form and mail to:
Department of Industrial Relations
Cashier, Accounting Office
P.O. Box 420603
San Francisco, CA 94142-0603
CALIOSHA does not agree to any restrictions, conditions or endorsements put on any check or money
order for less than the full amount due, and will cash the check or money order as ifthese restrictions,
conditions, or endorsements do not exist.
NOTIFICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION
For violations which you do not contest, you should notify the Division of Occupational Safety and
Health promptly by letter that you have taken appropriate corrective action within the time frame set forth
on this Citation and Notification of Penalty. Please inform the District Office listed on the Citation by
submitting the CALIOSHA Form 160 and/or 161 with the abatement steps you have talcen and the date
the violationwas abated, together with adequate supporting documentation, e.g., drawings orphotographs
ofcorrected conditions, purchase/work orders related to abatement actions, air sampling results, etc. The
adjusted penalty for serious and general violations has already been reduced by 50%on the presumption
. that the employer will correct the violations by the abatement date. Ifthe CAL/OSHA Form 161 is not
received in the District Office within 10 days following the abatement date, the abatement credit is
revoked, causing the penalty to double.
Note: Return the CALIOSHA Form 160/161 to the District Office listed on the Citation and as shown
below:
Division of Occupational Safety and Health
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550
Concord, CA 94520
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APPENDIX C-3EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
Employer Discrimination Unlawful - The law prohibits discrimination by an employer against
an employee for filing a complaint or for exercising any rights under Labor Code Section 6310 or 6311.
An employee who believes that he/she has been discriminated against may file a complaint no later than
six (6) months after the discrimination occurred with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement.
Employee Appeals - An employee or authorized employee's representative may, within 15 working days
of the issuance of a citation, special order, or order to take special action, appeal to the Occupational
Safety and Health Appeals Board the reasonableness of the period of time fixed by the Division of
Occupational Safety and Health (Division) for abatement. An employee appeal may be filed with the
Appeals Board or with the Division. No particular format is necessary to initiate the appeal, but the
notice of appeal must be in writing.
Ifan Employee Appeal is filed with the Division, the Division shall note on the face ofthe document the
date of receipt, include any envelope or other proof ofthe date of mailing, and promptly transmit the
document to the Appeals Board. The Division shall, no later than 10 working days from receipt of the
Employee Appeal, file with the Appeals Board and serve on each party a clear and concise statement of
the reasons why the abatement period prescribed by it is reasonable.
Employee Appeal Forms are available from the Appeals Board, or from a District Office ofthe Division.
Employees Participation in Informal Conference. Affected employees or their representatives may
notify the District Manager that they wish to attend the informal conference. Ifthe employer objects,
a separate informal conference will be held.
DISABILITY ACCOMMODATION
Disability accommodation is available upon request. Any person with a disability reqUIrIng an
accommodation, auxiliary aid or service, or a modification ofpolicies or procedures to ensure effective
communication and access to the programs of the Division of Occupational Safety and Health, should
contact the Disability Accommodation Coordinator at the local district office or the Statewide Disability
Accommodation Coordinator at 1-866-326-1616 (toll free). The Statewide Coordinator can also be
reached through the California Relay Service, by dialing 711 or 1-800-735-2929 (TTY) or 1-800-855-
3QOO (TTY-Spanish).
Accommodations can include modifications of policies or procedures or provision of auxiliary aids or
services. Accommodations include, but are not limited to, an Assistive Listening System (ALS), a
Computer-Aided Transcription System or Communication Access Realtime Translation (CART), a sign-
language interpreter, documents in Braille, large print or on computer disk, and audio cassette recording.
Accommodation requests should be made as soon as possible. Requests for an ALS or CART should be
made no later than five (5) days before the hearing or conference.
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APPENDIX C-4State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health Inspection Dates: 08/06/2012 - 01130/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ill: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification ofPenalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841ChevronW<l.Y, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 1 Item 1 Type of Violation: General
8 CCR 5155(e)(1) Workplace Monitoring.
(1) \Vhenever it is reasonable to suspect that employees may be exposed to concentrations of airborne
contaminants in excess oflevels permitted in section 5155(c), the employer shall monitor (or cause to have
monitored) the work environment so that exposures to employees can be measured or calculated.
On August 6, 2012, the Employer failed to monitor the work environment for an uncontrolled lealc of
petroleum hydrocarbons located within the 4 Crude Unit so that exposures of employees to concentrations of
airborne contaminants identified in 5155(c) (i.e. toluene, benzene, xylenes, particulates, etc.) could be
measured or calcUlated.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 1350.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for infolTIlation on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-5State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health Inspection Dates: 08/0612012 - 01130/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037) Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
. Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
84J Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 1 Item 2 Type ofViolation: General
8 CCR 5189(d)(3)(A)(2)- Information pertaining to the equipment in the process.
(A) Information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include at least the following:
2. Piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's);
The Employer's piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID"s) Failed to include information pertaining to the
guided wave monitoring devices on the 8-inch #4 side-cut line located on the C-llOO Column in Crude Unit
#4. < I
P&ID number D-308308-22
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03118/2013
$ 1350.00
See pages I through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for infonnation on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-6State of California Inspection Nmnber: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health Inspection Dates: 08/06/2012 - 01130/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification ofPenalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron WaY,Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 2 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious
8 CCR 1511. General Safety Precautions.
8 CCR 151l(b) Prior to the presence of its employees, the employer shall make a thorough survey ofthe
conditions of the site to determine, so far as practicable, the predictable hazards to employees and the kind and
extent of safeguards necessary to prosecute the work in a safe manner in accordance with the relevant parts of
Plate A-2-a and b ofthe Appendix.
On August 6, 2012, Chevron, the Employer responsible for safety and health conditions at the work site, failed
to make a thorough survey ofthe conditions of the site to determine, so far as practicable, the predictable
hazards and the kind and extent of safeguards necessary to prosecute the work in ~ safe manner which would
protect Brand Energy Services, Inc. employees during the erection ofscaffolding at the source of an
uncontrolled leak ofpetroleum hydrocarbons located underneath piping insulation located within the 4 Crude
Unit.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 25000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-7State of California
Division of Occupational Safety and Health
Cal/OSHA Concord District Office (0950663;4037)
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550
Concord, CA 94520
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penaltv
Inspection Number: 314331877
Inspection Dates: 08/06/2012 - 0113012013
Issuance Date: 01130/2013 .
CSHO ID: A0572
Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Company Name:
InspectionSite:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way~ Richmond,CA 94801
Citation 3 Item 1 Type of Violation: Serious
8CCR 5141(a)-(c)
8CCR 5141(a) Engineering Controls. Harmful exposures shall be prevented by engineering controls whenever
feasible. (b) Administrative Controls. Whenever engineering controls are not feasible or do not achieve full
compliance, administrative controls shall be implemented ifpracticable. (c) Control by Respiratory Protective
Equipment. Respiratory protective equipment, in accordance with Section 5144, shall be used to prevent
harmful exposures as follows:
(1) During the time period necessary to install or implement feasible engineering controls;
(2) Where feasible engineering controls and administrative controls fail to achieve full compliance; and
(3) In emergencies.
On August 6, 2012, the Employer failed to prevent harmful exposures to employees by failing to implement
effective engineering controls, administrative controls, or by requiring the use of respiratory protective
equipment for Chevron and contract employees located in direct vicinity ofan uncontrolled leak ofpetroleum
hydrocarbons located within the 4 Crude Unit.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 25000.00
,/
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-8State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/06/2012 -0113012013
CallOSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841.CheyronWay, Ric1uJ.1ond, .CA 94801
Citation 4 Item 1 Type of Violation: Serious
8CCR 5189. Process Safety Management of Acutely Hazardous Materials.
8CCR 5189(e) Process Hazard Analysis.
(1) The employer shall perform a hazard analysis appropriate to the complexity of the process for identifying,
evaluating, and controlling hazards involved in the process and shall determine and document the priority
order for conducting process hazard analyses based on the extent ofprocess hazards, number ofpotentially
affected employees, age of the process and process operating history, using at least one ofthe following
methodologies.
(A) VYhat-If;
(B) Checklist;
(C) VYhat-If/Checklist;
(D) Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP);
(E) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); or
(F) Fault-Tree Analysis.
The Employer failed to perform an effective Process Hazard Analysis of the 4 Crude Unit. Specifically, it
failed to identify, evaluate and control potential hazards caused by upstream and downstream units that provide
and receive feed from the #4 Crude Unit. '
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 25000.00
See pages I through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-9State of California
Division of Occupational Safety and Health
CaIlOSHA Concord District Office (0950663;4037)
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550
Concord, CA 94520
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Inspection Number: 314331877
InspectionDates:08/06/2012-01130/2013
Issuance Date: 01130/2013
CSHO ID: A0572
Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Company Name:
Inspectioll Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 5 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious
8 CCR 5189(l)(2)(A) - Management of Change
(2) The procedures shall assure that the following are addressed prior to any change:
(A) The technical basis for the proposed change;
(B) Impact of change on safety and health
The Employer failed to address in writing in the Management of Change (MOC number 25789) completed on
November 21, 2012, the technical basis for the change and the impact ofthe change on safety and health with
regard to changing the 8-inch section of pipe from carbon steel to 9 Chrome piping on the 4 Sidecut line
located within the 4 Crude Unit.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 25000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-10State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/06/2012-01130/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Compan)' Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond,CA 94801
Citation 6 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious
8CCR 5192 (q)(3)(D)
Employees engaged in emergency response and exposed to hazardous substances presenting an inhalation
hazard or potential inhalation hazard shall wear positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
while engaged in emergency response, until such time that the individual in charge of the IeS determines
through the use of air monitoring that a decreased level ofrespiratory protection will·not result in hazardous
exposures to employees.
On August 6,2012, an emergency responder, the engineer in charge on Engine Foam Truck 60, was operating
a fire monitor in the direct vicinity of an uncontrolled release ofpetroleum hydrocarbons located in the 4 Crude
Unit. This responder was not wearing a positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 25000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-11State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/06/2012-0l/30/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01/30/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 7 Item 1 Type of Violation: Serious
8CCR 5192(q)(3)(E)
(E) The individual in charge of the ICS shall limit the number of emergency response personnel at the
emergency site in those areas ofpotential or actual exposure to incident or site hazards, to those who are
actively performing emergency operations. However, operations in hazardous areas shall be performed using
the buddy system in groups of two or more.
On August 6, 2012, the Employer's incident commander failed to limit the number ofpersonnel in the direct
vicinity of an uncontrolled leak ofpeti'oleum hydrocarbons that expanded into a catastrophic event within the 4
Crude Unit, in that multiple employees not actively performing emergency operations were present in areas of
potential or actual exposure to incident or site hazards.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 25000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for infonnation on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-12State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/06/2012-0l/30/2013
CallOSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Che'lronWay, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 8 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious Willful
3203(a)(2). Injury and Illness Prevention Program
(a) Effective July 1, 1991, every employer shall establish, implement and maintain an effective Injury and
Illness Prevention Program (Program). The Program shall be in writing and, shall, at a minimum:
(2) Include a system for ensuring that employees comply with safe and healthy work practices. Substantial
compliance with this provision includes recognition of employees who follow safe and healthful work
practices, training and retraining programs, disciplinary actions, or any other such means that ensures
employee compliance with safe and healthful work practices.
The Employer's Injury and Illness Prevention Program was not effectively implemented, because on August 25,
2012, the employer failed to ensure that employees were following Chevron's safe work procedures for access
to the fire-damaged restricted area, which was also designated by Cal/OSHA as an Order to Preserve zone.
Employees did not follow the safe work procedures jointly established by Chevron and CallOSHA and entered
the restricted area carrying a rolling ladder to talce a lower explosive limit (LEL) gas sample at the hole in the
C-llOO 4 Sidecut piping located within the 4 Crude Unit.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 70000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-13State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/06/2012-01/30/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penaltv
Company Name:
InspectionSite:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 9 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious Willful
3203(a)(6)(B). Injury and Illness Prevention Program
(a) Effective July 1, 1991, every employer shall establish, implement and maintain an effective Injury and
Illness Prevention Program (Program). The Program shall be in writing and, shall, at a minimum:
(6) Include methods and/or procedures for correcting unsafe or unhealthy conditions, work practices and work
procedures in a timely manner based on the severity of the hazard:
(B) When an imminent hazard exists, which cannot be immediately abated without endangering employee(s)
and/or property, remove all exposed personnel from the area except those necessary to correct the existing
condition. Employees necessary to correct the hazardous condition shall be provided the necessary
safeguards.
The employer's Injury and Illness Prevention Program was not effectively implemented, because on August 25,
2012, the Employer failed to prohibit employees from entering a fire-damaged restricted area where imminent
hazards existed as a result ofthe August 6, 2012 fire within the 4 Crude Unit. The restricted area was also
designated by Cal/OSHA as an Order to Preserve zone. Employees were instructed to breach the red "danger"
tape barricades that designated the restrictive area. Employees entered the restricted area carrying a rolling
ladder to talce a lower explosive limit (LEL) gas sample at the hole in the C-llOO 4 Sidecut piping located
within the 4 Crude Unit.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 70000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-14State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health Inspection Dates: 08/0612012 - 01/3012013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Sujte 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond,CA 94801
Citation 10 Item 1 Type of Violation: Serious Willful
8CCR 3383(b). Body Protection.
8CCR 3383(b) Clothing appropriate for the work being done shall be worn. Loose sleeves, tails, ties, lapels,
cuffs, or other loose clothing which can be entangled in moving machinery shall not be worn.
On August 6, 2012, Chevron, the Employer responsible for safety and health conditions at the work-site, failed
to ensure that contract employees from Brand Energy Services, who were erecting scaffolding to provjde access
to the leaking 4 Sidecut piping located within the 4 Crude Unit, were wearing clothing appropriate forthe work
that would protect Brand Energy Services employees from the hazards ofuncontrolled leaking petroleum
hydrocarbons exceeding 600 degrees Fahrenheit, including potentjal thermal burns.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/1812013
$ 70000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-15State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/06/2012-01/30/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01/30/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notmcation of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 11 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious Willful
8CCR 5144(c)(1)(D)
Respiratory Protection Program.
5144(c)(I)(D)
In any workplace where respirators are necessary to protect the health of the employee or whenever -respirators
are required by the employer, the employer shall establish and implement a written respiratory protection
program with worksite-specific procedures. The program shall be updated as necessary to reflect those changes
in workplace conditions that affect respirator use. The employer shall include in the program the following
provisions, as applicable: (D) Procedures for proper use ofrespirators in routine and reasonably foreseeable
emergency situations.
On August 6, 2012, the Employer failed to implement the requirements of its respiratory protection program
for proper use ofrespirators in routine and reasonably foreseeable emergency situations while responding to an
uncontrolled petroleum hydrocarbon leak located within the 4 Crude Unit as follows:
1) Chevron, as the Employer responsible for safety and health conditions at the work-site, failed to ensure that
contract employees from Brand Energy Services were using respiratory protection where reasonably
foreseeable exposures to leaking petroleum hydrocarbons existed during the erection of scaffolding to.provide
access to the source ofthe leak.
2) Chevron failed to ensure that employees who were not part of the emergency response to an uncontrolled
petroleum hydrocarbon leak located within the 4 Crude Unit, but were working in the direct vicinity ofthe
leak were using respiratory protection where reasonably foreseeable exposures to leaking petroleum
hydrocarbons existed. Several non-incident response employees working in the vicinity of the 4 Crude Unit
were engulfed in a dense vapor cloud without respiratory protection.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 70000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-16State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health Inspection Dates: 08/06/2012 - 0113012013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01/30/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification ofPenaltv
Company Name:
InspectionSite:.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
84LChevronWay, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 12 Item 1 Type of Violation: Serious Willful
8CCR 5189(f)(1)(A)(4)
(f) Operating Procedures.
(1) The employer shall develop and implement written procedures that provide clear instructions for safely
conducting activities involved in each process consistent with the process safety information and shall
address at least the following:
(A) Steps for each operating phase:
4. Emergency operatiops, including emergency shutdowns, and who may initiate these procedures;
On August 6, 2012, the Employer failed to implement its Emergency Procedure, 4CU-XE-103 (" C-llOO
Overhead Small Leak, No Fire or Small Leak, Small Fire") to shutdown the 4 Crude Unit where an
uncontrolled hydrocarbon leak was located underneath the #4 side-cut piping insulation. Instead ofusing this
Emergency Procedure, which was developed precisely for this type of event, the Employer took an offensive
action using a pike pole and fire hoses to pry and blast the insulation from the pipe.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03118/2013
$ 70000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for infonnation on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-17State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/06/2012-01130/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037) Issuance Date: 01/30/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 . CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penaltv
Compan)' Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
84LChevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 13 Item 1 Type of Violation: Serious Willful
8CCR 5189(f)(l)(C) Operating Procedures.
The employer shall develop and implement written procedures that provide clear instructions for safely
conducting activities involved in each process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at
least the following: (C) Safety and Health Considerations:
1. Properties of, and hazards presented by, the chemicals used in the process;
2. Precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including administrative controls, engineering controls, and
~ personal protective equipment;
3. Control measures to be taken ifphysical contact or airborne exposure occurs;
4..safety procedures for opening process equipment (such as pipeline breaking).
5. Verification ofraw materials and control ofhazardous chemical inventory levels; and,
6. Any special or unique hazards.
On August 6, 2012, the Employer failed to implement its own written procedures to prevent exposure
consistent with the Employer's process safety information to respond to an uncontrolled petroleum hydrocarbon
leak located within the 4 Crude Unit, as follows:
1. The Employer failed to shutdown the 4 Crude Unit consistent with engineering controls outlined in the
Emergency Procedure "C-lIOO Overhead Small Leak, No Fire or Small Leak, Small Fire - 4CU-XE-103";
2. The Employer, after deciding to not shut down the 4 Crude Unit, failed to perform a Joint Job Site Visit
(JJSV), Job Hazard Analysis (JHA), and Health and Safety Evaluation (HSE) consistent with the Employer's
administrative controls, which are required by the Employer's written safety programs, prior to responding
to the leak;
3. The Employer (Chevron), the employer responsible for safety and health conditions at the work site,
supervising Brand Energy Services employees, failed to abide by its own Stop Work Authority program
when Brand employees raised concerns about the hazardous conditions present at the work site and ordered
Brand employees to continue.
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for infonnation on employer and employee rights and ~esponsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-18State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/06/2012- 01130/2013
CallOSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01/30/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
4. The Employer failed to ensure that personal protective equipment was adequate and used by all exposed
Chevron and Brand Energy Services' employees prior to engaging in response efforts; and
5. The Employer failed to utilize available information pertaining to the unique hazards identified from past
piping inspections related to the piping condition prior to engaging in response efforts for the uncontrolled
leak.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 70000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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Division of Occupational Safety and Health Inspection Dates: 08/06/2012 - 01/30/2013
CallOSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 0113012013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 14 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious Willful
8 CCR 51890) (3) Mechanical Integrity. Equipment Deficiencies.
0)(3) Equipment deficiencies. The employer shall correct deficiencies in equipment which are outside
acceptable limits defined by the process safety information in subsection (d) before further use, or in a safe and
timely manner provided means are taken to assure safe operation.
The Employer failed to correct deficiencies in its high-temperature 4 Sidecut piping located within the 4 Crude
Unit that were identified by its Reliability Department after conducting inspection and testing in accordance
with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, with the American Petroleum Institute
document, RP 939C "Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion Failures in Oil Refineries," and
with the Employer's own guidelines, entitled, "Corrosion Mitigation Plan 2006 and Updated Inspection
Strategies for Preventing Sulfidation Corrosion Failures in Chevron Refineries." The Employer failed to
replace the 4 Sidecut line located within the 4 Crude Unit, in accordance with recommendations received from
its Reliability Department as early as 2002.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/18/2013
$ 70000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-20State of California Inspection Number: 314331877
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/06/2012-01/30/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penaltv
Company Name:
.Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 15 Item 1 Type of Violation: Serious Willful
8 CCR 5192(q)(2). Emergency Response to Hazardous Substance Releases. (2) Elements
(1) Emergency response plan: An emergency response plan shall be developed and implemented to handle
anticipated emergencies prior to the commencement of emergency response operations. The plan shall be in
writing and available for inspection and copying by employees, their representatives, and Division
personnel.
(2) Elements of an emergency response plan: The employer shall develop an emergency response plan for
emergencies which shall address, as a minimum, the following to the extent that they are not addressed
elsewhere:
(A) Pre-emergency planning and coordination with outside parties.
(B) Personnel roles, lines of authority, training and communication.
(C) Emergency recognition and prevention
(D) Safe distances and places of refuge
(E) Site security and control
(F) Evacuation routes and procedures
(8) Decontamination
(I) Emergency alerting and response procedures
(K) Personal protective equipment (PPE) and emergency equipment
On August 6, 2012, the Employer failed to implement its emergency response plan for an uncontrolled
petroleum hydrocarbon leak located within the 4 Crude Unit. The Employer, specifically, failed to address
and implement the following elements in the plan prior to commencement of emergency operations:
1. Personnel roles, lines of authority, training, and communication: Lines of authority were unclear regarding
when the unit would be shutdown and actions which could disturb the leaking pipe would cease. Firefighters
used a pike pole and then fire hoses to remove insulation off of a leaking pipe while it was on line and under
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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Citation and Notification of Penalty
CompanJ Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, 9A 94801
pressure. Emergency shutdown of the unit was not initiated until after a major release and fire occurred.
Emergency responders were not clear regarding what frequency they were to communicate on.
2. Emergency recognition and prevention: The Employer failed to recognize the potential for a large release of
ignitable hydrocarbon liquid, aerosol and vapor from a pressurized leaking pipe-line during the erection of
the scaffolding or from the offensive actions using a pike pole and fire hoses to pry and blast the insulation
from the pipe.
3. Safe distances and places ofrefuge: The exclusion zone was not sized adequately to provide safe distances
tb protect all employees in the area from the release ofhydrocarbon aerosol and vapor.
4. Site security and control: Access to the leale area was not adequately controlled. Individuals not actively
performing response actions were allowed close access to the source ofthe leak.
5. Decontamination: Decontamination equipment, such as deluge showers, was not staged in appropriate
locations. One employee, soaleed with hydrocarbon in the release, was hosed off with a water hose that was
located after his exposure.
6. Personal protective equipment: Requirements for protective clothing and respirators were not adequately
planned or implemented. When the release expanded, many employees were not protected by respiratory
protection and were engulfed in a dense hydrocarbon mist and vapor cloud. This cloud later ignited.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03118/2013
$ 70000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/06/2012-01130/2013
CallOSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01/30/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: A0572
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 04-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Sit~:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
Citation 16 Item 1 Type of Violation: Serious Willful
8CCR 6845. Piping, Fittings, and Valves.
8 CCR 6845(a)(1). Excluded and optional piping systems specified in Section 1.2.2 ofAPI 570-2003, are
subject to inspection and testing by the employer in accordance with good engineering practices.
Reference 8 CCR 5189G)(2)(B). Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally
accepted good engineering practices.
The Employer failed to conduct inspection and testing of its high-temperature 4 Sidecut piping located within
the 4 Crude Unit in accordance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, with the
American Petroleum Institute document, RP 939C, "Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion
Failures in Oil Refineries," and with the Employer's own guidelines, entitled, "Corrosion Mitigation Plan 2006
and Updated Inspection Strategies for Preventing Sulfidation Corrosion Failures in Chevron Refineries." Both
guidelines recommend that 100 percent of areas ofvulnerability be inspected to identify damaged mechanisms.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03118/2013
$ 70000.00
to' "I.. .. r • -.. •••
Compliance Officer/District Manager
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-23State of California
Division of Occupational Safety and Health
CallOSHA Process Safety Management District Office
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 (Index Code 4037)
Concord, CA 94520-7996
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
NOTICE OF PROPOSED PENALTIES
Company Nfime:
Inspection Site:
Mailing Address:
Issuance Date:
Reporting ID:
Tnrlex Code'
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
841 Chevron Way, Richmond,'CA 94801
01130/2013
0950663
4037
Summary of Penalties for Inspection Number 314331877
Citation 1, General = $ 2700.00
Citation 2, Serious = $ 25000.00
Citation 3, Serious = $ 25000.00
Citation 4, Serious = $ 25000.00
Citation 5, Serious = $ 25000.00
Citation 6, Serious = $ 25000.00
Citation 7, Serious = $ 25000.00
Citation 8, Serious = $ 70000.00
Citation 9, Serious = $ 70000.00
Citation 10, Serious $ 70000.00
Citation 11, Serious = $ 70000.00
Citation 12, Serious = $ 70000.00
Citation 13, Serious = $ 70000.00
Citation 14, Serious = $ 70000.00
Citation 15, Serious = $ 70000.00
Citation 16, Serious = $ 70000.00
TOTAL PROPOSED PENALTIES = $ 782700.00
Penalties are due within 15 working days ofreceipt of this notification unless contested. Ifyou are appealing any
item of this citation, remittance is still due on all items that are not appealed. Enclosed for your use is a Penalty
Remittance Form. /
Ifyou are paying by credit card (MasterCard and Visa): Please have this form on-hand when you are ready to
make your payment. The company name, index code, reporting ID and Citation number(s) will be required to
ensure that the payment is accurately posted to your account. Please go to www.dir.ca.gov/dosh to access the
secure payment processing site.
Ifyou are paying by check: Mail this Notice of Proposed Penalties, the Penalty Remittance Form, along with a
copy of the Citation and Notification ofPenalty to:
APPENDIX C-24DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
CASIllER, ACCOUNTING OFFICE
P. O. BOX 420603
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94142-0603
CALIOSHA does not agree to any restrictions, conditions or endorsements put on any check or money order for
less than the full amount due, and will cash the check or money order as if these restrictions, conditions or
endorsements do not exist.
. (
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APPENDIX C-25State of California
Division of Occupational Safety and Health
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management District Office
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 (Index Code 4037)
Concord, CA 94520-7996
Phone: (925) 602-2665'Fax: (925) 602-2668
To:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
Inspection Number: 314332370
Inspection Date(s): 08/30/2012 - 01/30/2013
and its successors
841 CHEVRON WAY
RICHMOND, CA 94801
Issuance Date:
CSHO ID:
Optional Report #:
Reporting ill:
01130/2013
T6126
001-13
0950663
Inspection Site:
841 CHEVRON WAY
RICHMOND, CA 94801
This Citation and Notification of Penalty (hereinafter Citation) is being issued in accordance with
California Labor Code Section 6317 for violations that were found during the inspection/investigation.
This Citation or a cOPY must be prominently posted upon receipt by the employer at or near the
location of each violation until the violative condition is corrected or for three working days•.
whichever is longer. Violations of Title 8 ofthe California Code of Regulations or of the California
Labor Code may result in some instances in prosecution for a misdemeanor.
YOU HAVE A RIGHT to contest this Citation and Notification ofPenalty by filing an appeal with the
Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board. To initiate your appeal, you must contact the Appeals
Board, in writing or by telephone, within 15 working days from the date ofreceipt ofthis Citation. If
you miss the 15 working day deadline to appeal, the Citation and Notification ofPenalty becomes a final
order ofthe Appeals Board, not subject to review by any court or agency.
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APPENDIX C-26Informal Conference - You may request an informal conference with the Manager ofthe District Office
which issued the Citation within 10 working days after receipt ofthe Citation. However, ifthe citation
is appealed, you may request an informal conference at any time prior to the day of the hearing.
Employers are encouraged to schedule a conference at the earliest possible time to assure an expeditious
resolution of any issues. At the informal conference, you may discuss the existence of the alleged
violation, classification of the violation, abatement date or proposed penalty.
Be sure to bring to the conference any and all supporting documentation of existing conditions as well
as any abatement steps taken thus far. If conditions warrant, we can enter into an agreement which
resolves this matter without litigation or contest.
APPEAL RIGHTS
'0
The Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (Appeals Board) consists ofthree members appointed
by the GOverhOr. The Appeals Board is a separate entity from the Division ofOccupational Safety and
Health (Division) and employs experienced attorneys as administrative lawjudges to hear appeals fairly
and impartially. To initiate an appeal from a Citation and Notification ofPenalty, you must contact the
Appeals Board, in writing or by telephone, within 15 working days from the date ofreceipt ofa Citation.
After you have initiated your appeal, you must then file a completed appeal form with the Appeals Board,
at the address listed below, for each contested citation. Failure to file a completed appeal form with the
Appeals Board may result in dismissal ofthe appeal. Appeal forms are available from district offices of
the Division, or from the Appeals Board:
Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board
2520 Venture Oaks Way, Suite 300
Sacramento, CA 95833
Telephone: (916) 274-5751 or (877) 252-1987
Fax: (916) 274-5785
Ifthe Citation you are appealing alleges more than one item, you must specify on the appeal form which
items you are appealing. You must also attach to the appeal form a legible copy ofthe Citation you are
appealing.
Among the specific grounds for an appeal are the following: the safety order was not violated, the
classification of the alleged violation (e.g., serious, repeat, willful) is incorrect, the abatement
requirements are unreasonable or the proposed penalty is unreasonable.
Important: You must notify the Appeals Board, not the Division, of your intent to appeal within 15
working days from the date ofreceipt ofthe Citation. Otherwise, the Citationand Notification ofPenalty
becomes a final order ofthe Appeals Board not subject to review by any court or agency. An informal
conference with the Division does not constitute an appeal and does not stay the 15 working day appeal
period. Ifyou have any questions concerning your appeal rights, call the Appeals Board, (916) 274-5751
or (877) 252-1987.
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APPENDIX C-27PENALTY PAYMENT OPTIONS
Penalties are due within 15 working days of receipt of this Citation and Notification of Penalty unless
contested. Ifyou are appealing any item ofthe citation, remittance is still due on all items that are not
appealed. Enclosed for your use is a Penalty Remittance Form for payment.
Ifyou are paying by credit card (MasterCard and Visa), please have the Penalty Remittance Form on-
hand when you are ready to make our payment. The company name, index code, reporting ID, and
Citation number(s) will be required in order to ensure that the payment is accurately posted to your
account. Please go to www.diLca.gov/dosh to access the secure payment processing site.
Ifyou are paying by check, return one copy ofthe Citation, along with the Notice ofProposed Penalties
Sheet and the Penalty Remittance Form and mail to:
Department ofIndustrial Relations
Cashier, Accounting Office
P. O. Box 420603
San Francisco, CA 94142-0603
CALIOSHA does not agree to any restrictions, conditions or endorsements put on any check or money
order for less than the full amount due, and will cash the check or money order as ifthese restrictions,
conditions, or endorsements do not exist.
NOTIFICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION
For violations which you do not contest, you should notify the Division of Occupational Safety and
Healthpromptly by letter that you have taken appropriate corrective action within the time frame set forth
on this Citation and Notification ofPenalty. Please inform the District Office listed on the Citation by
submitting the CAL/OSHA Form 160 and/or 161 with the abatement steps you have taken and the date
the violationwas abated, together with adequate supporting documentation, e.g., drawings orphotographs
ofcorrected conditions, purchase/work orders related to abatement actions, air sampling results, etc. The
adjusted penalty for serious and general violations has already been reduced by 50% on the presumption
that the employer will correct the violations by the abatement date. Ifthe CAL/OSHA Form161 is not
received in the District Office within 10 days following the abatement date, the abatement credit is
revoked, causing the penalty to double.
Note: Return the CALIOSHA Form 1601161 to the District Office listed on the Citation and as shown
below:
Division ofOccupational Safety and Health
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550
Concord, CA 94520
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APPENDIX C-28EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
Employ~rDiscrimination Unlawful - The law prohibits discrimination by an employer against
an employee for filing a complaint or for exercising any rights under Labor Code Section 6310 or 6311.
An employee who believes that he/she has been discriminated against may file a complaint no laterthan
six (6) months after the discrimination occurred with the Division ofLabor Standards Enforcement.
Employee Appeals,.. Anemployee or authorized employee'-8 representative may, within15 working days
of the issuance of a citation, special order,or order to take specialaction, appeal to the Occupational
Safety and Health Appeals Board the reasonableness of the period of time fixed by the Division of
Occupational Safety and Health (Division) for abatement. An employee appeal may be filed with the
Appeals Board or with the Division. No particular format is necessary to initiate the appeal, but the
notice of appeal must be in writing.
Ifan Employee Appeal is filed with the Division, the Division shall note on the face ofthe document the
date of receipt, include any envelope or other proof of the date of mailing, and promptly transmit the
document to the Appeals Board. The Division shall, no later than 10 working days from receipt ofthe
Employee Appeal, file with the Appeals Board and serve on each party a clear and concise statement of
the reasons why the abatement period prescribed by it is reasonable.
Employee Appeal Forms are available from the Appeals Board, or from a District Office ofthe Division.
Employees Participation in Informal Conference. Affected employees or their representatives may
notify the District Manager that they wish to attend the informal conference. If the employer objects,
a separate informal conference will be held.
DISABILITY ACCOMMODATION
Disability accommodation is available upon request. Any person with a disability reqmrmg an
accommodation, auxiliary aid or service, or a modification ofpolicies or procedures to ensure effective
I
communication and access to the programs of the Division of Occupational Safety and Health, should
contact the Disability Accommodation Coordinator at the local district office or the Statewide Disability
Accommodation Coordinator at 1-866-326-1616 (toll free). The Statewide Coordinator can also be
reached through the California Relay Service, by dialing 711 or 1-800-735-2929 (TTY) or 1-800-855-
3000 (TTY-Spanish).
Accommodations can include modifications ofpolicies or procedures or provision of auxiliary aids or
services. Accommodations include, but are not limited to, an Assistive Listening System (ALS), a
Computer-Aided Transcription System or Communication Access Realtime Translation (CART), a sign-
language interpreter, documents in Braille, large printor on computer disk, and audio cassette recording.
Accommodation requests should be made as soon as possible. Requests for an ALS or CART should be
made no later than five (5) days before the hearing or conference.
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APPENDIX C-29State of California Inspection Number: 314332370
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/3012012-01/30/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663; 4037Jssuance Date: 0113012013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: T6126
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 001-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
~ Inspection Sit~:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 CHEVRON WAY, RJ:CHlylQND, CA 94801
Citation 1 Item 1 Type of Violation: Serious
T8CCR2395.78. Bonding in Hazardous Locations.
Regardless ofthe voltage ofthe electrical system, the electrical continuity of metal noncurrent-carrying parts of
equipment, raceways, and other enclosures in any hazardous location as defined in Article 59 ofthese Orders
shall be assured by any ofthe methods specified for services that are approved for the wiring method used.
On or before 08/30/12 the employer failed to assure the electrical continuity ofelectrical systems installed
within hazardous locations throughout the refining plant. The following instances were not corrected as ofthe
dates indicated below:
1. An electrical conduit and connection fitting installed under the first deck ofJet Stripper C-732, located in
North ISOMAX adjacent to turbine pump 737, were completely separated from the conduit junction body. As
ofSeptember 20, 2012, the vertically mounted rigid metal conduit (RMC) and exposed wiring remained
unrepaired.
2. A bonding jumper was completely detached from a fixed grounding lug that was securely threaded to the
connector on the end ofa Liquid-Tight Flexible Metal Conduit (LFMC). As ofSeptember 27, 2012, the loose
bonding wire remained disconnected from the electrical conduit serving controller #FV415 and associated
equipment operating within D&R, Plant 37.
3. Two sections offlexible metallic conduit (FMC) at ground level in front oftubes #33 and #66 on the fourth
deck ofSouth ISOMAX, F-350, A-Cell/A-Train, sustained physical damage that left the interlocked helical
coiling strips separated and stretched to the point where their bonding and grounding capabilities were
significantly impaired. As of October 19, 2012, the damaged conduit and exposed wiring remained unrepaired.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/0412013
$ 6750.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for infonnation on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-30State of California Inspection Number: 314332370
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/30/2012-01130/2013
CallOSHA Process Safety Management (0950663; 4037Jssuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: T6126
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 001-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 CHEVRON WAY, RICHMOND,CA 94801
Citation 2 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious
T8CCR2473.1(b). Conductors Entering Boxes, Cabinets, or Fittings.
(a) Conductors entering cutout boxes, cabinets, or fittings shall be protected from abrasion, and openings
through which conductors enter shall be effectively closed.
(b) Unused openings in cabinets, boxes, and fittings shall be effectively closed.
On or before,October 27, 2012 the Employer failed to effectively plug an unused opening on the end ofa Rigid
Metal Conduit (RMC) fitting installed within a hazardous location at D&R, Plant 37, feed to temperature
controller #38TI091B, C590 tray #1.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/0412013
$ 6750.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-31I
Stateof California Inspection Number: 314332370
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/3012012 -0113012013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663; 4037Jssuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: T6126
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 001-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 CHEVRON WAY, RICHMOND, CA 94801
Citation 3 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious
T8CCR2473.2(a). Covers and Canopies.
All pull boxes, junction boxes, and fittings shall be provided with covers identified for the purpose. Ifmetal
covers are used, they shall be grounded. In completed installations, each outlet box shall have a cover,
faceplate, or fixture canopy. Covers of outlet boxes having holes through which flexible cord pendants pass
shall be provided with bushings designed for the purpose or shall have smooth, well-rounded surfaces on which
the cords may bear.
On or before August 30, 2012, the Employer failed to provide covers on electrical conduit bodies installed in
hazardous locations throughout the refining plant. The following instances were not corrected as ofthe dates
indicated below.
1. As of 09/19/12, the Employer failed to replace a missing cover on a rigid conduit body installed in a
hazardous location containing natural/methane gas on the fourth floor deck ofSouth ISOMAX, Furnace 305,
C-CELL.
2. As of09127/12, the Employer failed to replace a missing cover on a rigid conduit body installed in a
hazardous location at the Distillation and Refining unit, located 15 feet above the ground next t6 furnace #F-
447.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/04/2013
$ 6750.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for infonnation on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-32State of California Inspection Number: 314332370
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/30!2012-01l30/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663; 4037'ssuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: T6126
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 001-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection.Site: ..
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
84LCHEVRON WAY, RlCHMOND, CA. 94801
Citation 4 Item 1 Type of Violation: Serious
T8CCR5162(a). Emergency Eyewash and Shower Equipment.
5162 (a) Plumbed or self-contained eyewash or eye/facewash equipment which meets the requirements of
sections 5, 7, or 9 of ANSI Z358.1-1981, Emergency Eyewash and Shower Equipment, incorporated herein by
this reference, shall be provided at all work areas where, during routine operations or foreseeable emergencies,
the eyes of an employee may come into contact with a substance which can cause corrosion, severe irritation or
permanent tissue damage or which is toxic by absorption.
As ofSeptember 26, 2012, an eyewash/shower station located near V2606 in SRU, where exposure to
corrosive or severely irritating liquids is possible, had been painted dark green, the same color as surrounding
beams, making it difficult for an injured worker with corrosive or irritating material is in his\her eyes to access
the eyewash.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
, Proposed Penalty:
03/0412013
$ 6750.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for infonnation on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-33State of California Inspection Number: 314332370
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/30/2012-01/30/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663; 4037Jssuance Date: 01/30/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: T6126
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 001-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification ofPenalty
Company Name:
..InspectionSite:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 CHEVRON WAY, RICHMOND, CA 94801
Citation 5 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious
T8CCR5189G)(3). Process Safety Management ofAcutely Hazardous Materials.
Equipment deficiencies. The employer shall correct deficiencies in equipment which are outside acceptable
limits defined by the process safety information in subsection (d) before further use, or in a safe and timely
manner provided means are taken to assure safe operation.
On or before 08/30112 the Employer failed to ensure that every broken or damaged electrical conduit, fitting,
receptacle, or vapor prooflight fixture installed at each processing unit in the refining plant was effectively
repaired or replaced in a timely manner.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/0412013
$ 6750.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-34State of California Inspection Number: 314332370
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/30/2012-01130/2013
CallOSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: T6126
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 001-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 CHEVRONWAY,RICHMOND, CA 94801
Citation 6 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Willful Serious
T8CCR5189(1).Process Safety Management ofAcutely Hazardous Materials.
(1) The employer shall establish and implement written procedures to manage changes (except for "replacement
in kind") to process chemicals, technology, and equipment, and changes to facilities.
(2) The procedures shall assure that the following are addressed prior to any change:
(A) The technical basis for the proposed change;
(B) Impact of change on safety and health;
(C) Modifications to operating procedures;
(D) Necessary time period for the change; and,
(E) Authorization requirements for the proposed change.
As ofthe September 2012 dates indicated below, the Employer had not implemented its written procedures
with regard to (A) Technical basis for the change, and (D) Necessary time period for the change, for the
following three changes to its facilities.
1. As ofSeptember 12, 2012, MOC (Management of Change) number 16210, an injection fitting seal ofa leak
in a 3 inch block valve controlling flow at the east natural gas split at furnace F-305C on the 4th deck in South
Isomax was in place 13 months beyond its MOC expiration date. The necessary time period for the change
was not implemented.
2. As ofSeptember 27, 2012, MOC number 18408, a globe valve injection fitting on the 1SIC to 2 SIC on a
400 degree hydrocarbon line in the D&R 4 Crude plant was 2 years and 7 months beyond its MOC expiration
date. The necessary time period for the change was not implemented.
3. As ofSeptember 27, 2012, MOC number 21513, an injection fitting for valve packing on a motor operated
valve controlling the flow of600 psi flammable product at the base of V-4030A in the D&R PenHex area had
been in place since January, 2010. It was not replaced, as recommended in the MOC, at the next opportunity.
In the technical basis for the change, the maximum time period before replacement was stated to be 5 years.
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-35State of California Inspection Number: 314332370
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/3012012 -01/30/2013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663;4037)Issuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ill: T6126
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: '001-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
1341 CHEVRON WAY, RICHMOND, CA 94801
But it was not replaced at the turnaround in January 2011 and was given until December 31, 2017, a period of
8 years. Neither the maximum time period of5 years, nor the instruction to replace "at the next opportunity,"
was implemented.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/04/2013
$ 70000.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-36State of California Inspection Number: 314332370
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/30/2012-0113012013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663; 4037Jssuance Date: 01130/2013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: T6126
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 001-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
84lCHEYRON WAY, RICHMOND, CA 94801
Citation 7 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Serious
T8CCR6773(b). Fire Protection and Fire Fighting Equipment.
(b) Fire protection and fire fighting equipment shall be inspected, tested and maintained in serviceable
condition. A record shall be kept showing the date when fire extinguishers and hose lines were last inspected,
tested, repaired, or renewed. Fire protection and fire fighting equipment after any use shall promptly be made
serviceable and restored to its proper location.
On or before 08/30/2012, the Employer failed to inspect, test, and maintain a section of an exposed fire service
main, thus leaving it in a non-serviceable condition. Fire protection systems served by this fire service main \
include onsite fire hydrants and fixed monitor nozzles strategically placed to provide fire protection in the
following areas: Flare gas recovery compressor, C-730 and associated furnace, north and south flare areas,
cooling water tower, and the east side ofTKN and RLOP plants.
As ofSeptember 20, 2012, the fire service main remained in a non-serviceable condition.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03/04/2013
$ 6750.00
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for infolTIlation on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-37State of California Inspection Number: 314332370
Division of Occupational Safety and Health InspectionDates:08/30/2012-0113012013
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663; 4037:Jssuance Date: 0113012013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: T6126
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 001-13
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Inspection Site:
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 CHEVRONWAY, RICHMOND, CA. 94801
Citation 8 Item 1 Type ofViolation: Willful Serious
T8CCR6845(a). Piping, Fittings, and Valves.
(a) The design, fabrication, and assembly ofpiping systems installed prior to July 26, 2006, shall comply with
General Industry Safety Orders and ASME B31.3- 1990, Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping herein
incorporated by reference. The design, fabrication, and assembly ofpiping systems installed on or after July
26, 2006, and the testing, inspection, and repair of all piping systems shall comply with Article 146 ofthe
General Industry Safety Orders; API 570, Piping Inspection Code, Second Edition, October 1998, Addendum
3, August 2003; and ASME B31.3-2002, Process Piping; herein incorporated by reference.
As ofSeptember, 2012, dates indicated, a total ofnine temporary nonwelding repairs identified below were not
removed at the most recent turnaround:
1. MOC number 20968, a clamp covering two flanges and a valve at the outlet offurnace F-340 in South
Isomax., conveying hot (>600 deg F) natural gas. As ofSeptember 12, 2012, this was in place 2 years and 6
months past its last turnaround.
2. MOC number 18856, a valve packing injection fitting for a valve conveying natural gas'to furnace F305 in
South Isomax. As ofSeptember 18, 2012, this had been in place 30 months past its last turnaround.
3. MOC number 16210, an injection fitting in a block valve for the F 305 east split in
South Isomax, conveying hot (>600 deg F) natural gas. As ofSeptember 12, and 18, 2012. It had been in
place for 6 years and was 30 months beyond the last turnaround.
4. MOC number 17395, a clamp covering the mating surface edge oftwo flanges for a feed gas orafice for
furnace F 305 in South Isomax, conveying natural gas. As of September 12, 2012, it was still in place more
than 5 years later and 30 months past the last turnaround.
5. MOC number 19758, a clamp enclosing an elbow at Stanchion A6 overhead in the TKN plant of North
Isomax, conveying nitrogen at up to 200 psi. As ofSeptember 20, 2012. was still in place 2 years and 7
months past the last turnaround.
See pages 1 through 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-38State of California loopection Nnmber, 314332370
Division ofOccupational Safety and Health InspectiollDates:08/3012012-01/3012013 ..... "".. .
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management (0950663; 4037:lssuance Date: 0113012013
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 CSHO ID: T6126
Concord, CA 94520 Optional Inspection Nbr: 001-13
Phone, (925) 602-2665 Fa,,, (925) 602-2668
Citation and Notification of Penalty
Company Name:
Jnspection Site: _
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 CHEVRON WAY, RlCHMOND, CA .94801.
6. MOe number 21513, an injection fitting in a valve on a 6 inch line conveying flammable liquid/vapor at the
base of V-4030A in D & R PenHex. As ofSeptember 27, 2012, was still present 11 months beyond the last
turnaround maintenance opportunity.
7. MOe number 21434,a valve packing injection fitting at 40 MOV inlet block valve for drier V4030A in D&
R, PenHex, conveying hydrogen. As ofSeptember 27, 2012, this was still present 11 months beyond the last
turnaround maintenance opportunity.
8. MOC number 18408, a globe valve injection fitting at on the 1 SIC to 2 SIC on the D-308312 line in D&R
unit, 4 Crude plant, conveying hydrocarbon at 400 deg F. 300 psi. As ofSeptember 27. 2012, this fitting was
in place for 4 years, 5 months and was still present 11 months past the most recent turnaround.
9. MOe number 15197. consisting of3 injection fittings, two for packing and one for a flange, on LT 92 top
block valve to V4090. conveying Cl to C5 hydrocarbons and and chlorine. M ofSeptember 27, 2012, these
three injection fittings were still present, 7 years later, and 1 year and 8 months past the most recent
turnaround.
Date By Which Violation Must be Abated:
Proposed Penalty:
03104/2013
$ 70000.00
Phone, (9 ) 6 -2665 Fal" (925) 602-2668 .
Compliance Officer/District Manager
See pages 1 lhrough 4 of this Citation and Notification of Penalty for information on employer and employee rights and responsibilities.
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APPENDIX C-39State of California
Division of Occupational Safety and Health
Cal/OSHA Process Safety Management District Office
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550 (Index Code 4037)
Concord, CA 94520-7996
Phone: (925) 602-2665 Fax: (925) 602-2668
(925) 602-2665
NOTICE OF PROPOSED PENALTIES
Colllpany N"ame:
Inspection Site:
Mailing Address:
Issuance Date:
Reporting ID:
Index Code-
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 CHEVRON WAY, RICHMOND, CA 94801
841 CHEVRON WAY, RICHMOND, CA 94801
01130/2013
0950663
4037
Summary ofPenalties for Inspection Number 314332370
Citation 1, Serious = $ 6750.00
Citation 2, Serious = $ 6750.00
Citation 3, Serious = $ 6750.00
Citation 4, Serious = $ 6750.00
Citation 5, Serious = $ 6750.00
Citation 6, Willful = $ 70000.00
Citation 7, Serious = $ 6750.00
Citation 8, Willful = $ 70000.00
TOTAL PROPOSED PENALTIES = $ 180500.00
Penalties are due within 15 working days ofreceipt ofthis notification unless contested. Ifyou are appealing any
item ofthis citation, remittance is still due on all items that are not appealed. Enclosed for your use is a Penalty
Remittance Form.
Ifyou are paying by credit card (MasterCard and Visa): Please have this form on-hand when you are ready to
make your payment. The company name, index code, reporting ID and Citation number(s) will be required to
ensure that the payment is accurately posted to your account. Please go to www.dir.ca.gov/dosh to access the
secure payment processing site.
Ifyou are paying by check: Mail this Notice ofProposed Penalties, the Penalty Remittance Form, along with a
copy ofthe Citation and Notification ofPenalty to:
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
CASIDER, ACCOUNTING OFFICE
P. O. BOX 420603
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94142-0603
1
APPENDIX C-40CALIOSHA does not agree to any restrictions, conditions or endorsements put on any check or money order for
less than the full amount due, and will cash the check or money order as if these restrictions, conditions or
endorsements do not exist.
2
~~---_...._--_.._--------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'
APPENDIX C-41DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH - CAL/OSHA
Cashier, Accounting Office
P.O. Box 420603
San Francisco, CA 94142-0603
Phone (415) 703-4291 or (415) 703-4295 FAX (415) 703-3037
PENALTY REMITTANCE FORM
CIVIL PENALTY INFORMATION INSPECTION NUMBER 314332370 REPORTINGill 0950663 INDEX CODE 4037
ESTABLISHMENT NAME Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
CONTACT PERSON
PHONE NO.
SITE ADDRESS
MAILING ADDRESS
FAX NO. _
841 CHEVRON WAY. RICHMOND
841 CHEVRON WAY. RICHMOND. CA. 94801
CITATION INFORMATION (penalties are due within 15 working days of receipt ofthis notification unless contested. Ifyou are appealing any
item ofthis citation, remittance is still due on all items that are not appealed.)
Payment is for the following Citation Items: e.g. Citation 1, Items 1-5; Citation 3
TYPE OF PAYMENT ENCLOSED
CHECK OR MONEY ORDER INFORMATION
CHECK ENCLOSED IN THE AMOUNT OF $
MONEY ORDER ENCLOSED IN THE AMOUNT OF $
(please make check or money order payable to CAL/OSHA and mail to the Cashier, Accounting Office, at the above address. Reference the
Inspection Number on the "memo" portion ofyour check or money order.)
Go to www.dir.ca.gov/dosh to access the on-line third party secure payment processing site.
OR Complete this section and fax to (415) 703-3037
CREDIT CARD INFORMATION
VISA OR MASTERCARD CREDIT CARD NO. EXPIRATION DATE
CREDIT CARD SECURITY CODE (last 3 digits on back of card)
NAME OF CARDHOLDER SIGNATURE
CARDHOLDER PHONE NO. FAX NO.
AMOUNT OF PAYMENT $
-------------------------------------------------- FOR OFFICE USE ONLY --------------------------------------------------
AUTHORIZATION NO. DATE PROCESSED
PROCESSED BY
Please call (415) 703-4291 or 703-4295 or complete the information above and fax to (415) 703-3037
CallOSHA-2 PRF Rev 7/08
APPENDIX C-42State of California
Department of Industrial Relations
Division of Occupational Safety and Health
NORTH PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT OFFICE
1450 Enea Circle, Suite 550
Concord, CA 94520-7996
Tel: 925-602-2667
Fax: 925-602-2667
EMPLOYER'S SIGNED STATEMENT OF ABATEMENT OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS
2. EMPLOYER: CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.
dba CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.
ADDRESS: 841 CHEVRON WAY
RICHMOND, CA 94801 Street
City State
3. The law requires that violations observed during the inspection/investigation completed on, _
ofthe place of employment located at 841 CHEVRON WAy RICHMOND CA 94801
corrected within the time limit specified. Labor Code 6320(b), requires that yo submit this signed statement under penalty
o(pei"jury which describes fhell1easures fb(abating each citation INhich- alleges a serious violation. Ifthesigned statement
is not received within 10 working days after the end ofthe period fixed for abatement, the Division will be required to
revoke any adjustments to the civil penalty based upon the assumption that you will abate the violation. This action
will result in a doubling ofthe civil penalty for serious violations. Ifyou have filed a timely appeal WIth reference to a
particular citation, the abatement date is stayed during the appeal process and the Signed Statement need not be submitted at
this time. In addition, ifthere are problems beyond your control that prevent meeting a specified abatement date, contact the
Division early so that a request for extension can be considered.
Zip
be
4. THIS FORM MUST BE RECEIVED AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS ON OR BEFORE:
************************
This signed statement shall be posted
for three (3) working days at or near
each place the serious violation
referred to in the citation occured.
5. DESCRIBE AND LIST THE SPECIFIC MEASURES TAKEN TO ABATE EACH SERIOUS VIOLATION
Citation Number of Abatement
Number Instances Measures Taken to Abate Serious Violation Date
[ 1Continued on additional page
6. All affected employees and their representatives have been informed about statement activities referenced in this document
in conformance with 8CCR Section 340.4(g). DYES D NO
7. I have reviewed the foregoing statement and declare under penalty of perjury that it is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and all submitted abatement information is accureate.
Executed at -->. California, by
Signature: _
Name: _
Date: _
Title: _
8.
9.
OFFICE USE ONLY
Safety Engineer/Industrial Hygienist: Date:
District Manager: Date:
[ ] Close/Comments
Region 6 District 3 Inspection No. 314332370 Identification No. T6126 Cal/OSHA Rpt. No. 001 Fiscal Year --!.L
10. Date mailed or Delivered:26 Ju12011 Cal/OSHA 161 (09/01/00)
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In reply, please refer to: 
2012-03-I-CA-R9 thru R14 
The Honorable Edmund G.  Brown, Jr.,  Governor 
The Honorable Gavin Newsom, Lieutenant Governor 
The Honorable Darrell Steinberg, President pro Tempore of the Senate 
The Honorable John A.  Perez, Speaker of the Assembly 
Sacramento, CA,  95814 
Dear Sirs:  MAY  0 7 2013 
The u.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) recently issued its 
interim report on the August 6, 2012 incident at the Chevron Refinery in  Richmond, 
California. On that date, the refinery experienced a catastrophic pipe failure in a crude 
unit, causing the release of flammable hydrocarbon process fluid which partially 
vaporized into a large vapor cloud. Nineteen Chevron employees engulfed by the vapor 
cloud escaped, narrowly avoiding serious injury.  The ignition and subsequent continued 
burning of the hydrocarbon process fluid resulted in a large plume of unknown and 
quantified particulates and vapor. Approximately 15,000  people from the surrounding 
area sought medical treatment in the weeks following the incident. 
The CSB's investigation found that the pipe failure was caused by sulfidation corrosion, 
a damage mechanism that causes piping walls to thin over time.  The Richmond 
Refinery conducted a Process Hazard Analysis of the crude unit as required by 
California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 5189, Process Safety Management of 
Acutely Hazardous Materials (PSM), however, this regulation does not require the 
conducting of formal damage mechanism hazard reviews.  Despite Chevron's extensive 
knowledge of sulfidation corrosion at the corporate level, the CSB's investigation found 
that the PHA team for the crude unit at the Richmond refinery did not identify this 
damage mechanism as a potential cause of a leak or rupture in the piping. 
The CSB also found that the California PSM regulation does not require the use of a 
recognized methodology for making an objective determination of the effectiveness of 
safeguards in  place to prevent a hazardous consequence from occurring. A more 
detailed safeguard analysis which required sufficient consideration of the principles of 
inherently safer technology and to driving risks As Low as Reasonably Practicable 
(ALARP) could have identified the need to upgrade the metallurgy of the piping to a 
material less susceptible to sulfidation corrosion.  The CSB concluded that the 
systematic and documented consideration of inherently safer systems and the hierarchy 
of controls to the greatest extent feasible by Chevron and other process plants during 
PHAs, Management of Change analyses, prior to new construction, rebuilds, and 
repairs, and in the development of corrective actions from incident investigation 
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recommendations would provide a more adequate degree of protection from incidents 
like the one that occurred on August 6,2012. 
The CSB also concluded that reporting of leading and lagging process safety indicators 
to the relevant regulators would be an important driver for continual improvement of 
refinery operations in the state of California. Reporting of indicators and additional 
information related to activities such as mechanism hazard reviews and maintenance-
related shutdowns promotes greater transparency and facilitates increased collaboration 
between regulators and industry in chemical accident prevention. 
Based on these findings, the CSB issued six recommendations to the California State 
Legislature and the Governor, as follows: 
Recommendation No. 2012-03·)·CA·R9: 
Revise the California Code of  Regulations,  Title  8,  Section 5189, Process Safety 
Management of  Acutely Hazardous Materials, to require improvements to mechanical 
integrity and process hazard analysis programs for all California oil refineries. These 
improvements shall include engaging a diverse team of  qualified personnel to perform a 
documented damage mechanism hazard review.  This review shall be an integral part of 
the Process Hazard Analysis cycle and shall be conducted on all PSM-covered process 
piping circuits and process equipment. The damage mechanism hazard review shall 
identify potential process damage mechanisms and consequences of  failure, and shall 
ensure safeguards are in place to control hazards presented by those damage 
mechanisms. Require the analysis and incorporation of  applicable industry best 
practices and inherently safety systems to the greatest extent feasible into this review. 
Recommendation No. 2012·03·)·CA·R10: 
For all California oil refineries,  identify and require the reporting of  leading and lagging 
process safety indicators, such as the action item completion status of  recommendations 
from damage mechanism hazard reviews, to state and local regulatory agencies that 
have chemical release prevention authority. These indicators shall be used to ensure 
that requirements described in 2012-03-I-CA-R9 are effective at improving mechanical 
integrity and process hazard analysis performance at all California oil refineries and 
preventing major chemical incidents. 
Recommendation No. 2012.03.).CA.R11:  1 
Establish a multi-agency process safety regulatory program for all California oil refineries 
to improve the public accountability, transparency, and performance of  chemical 
accident prevention and mechanical integrity programs.  This program shall: 
1.  Establish a system to report to the regulator the recognized methodologies, 
findings, conclusions and corrective actions related to refinery mechanical 
integrity inspection and repair work arising from Process Hazard Analyses, 
California oil refinery turnarounds and maintenance-related shutdowns; 
1 The Board also issued recommendations to The Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County, 
the Mayor and City Council of Richmond, The California Air Quality Management Divisions, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the California Environmental Protection agency to 
participate in the regulatory program described in Recommendation No. 2012.03-I-CA-R11. 
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2.  Require reporting of  information such as damage mechanism hazard reviews, 
notice of  upcoming maintenance-related shutdowns, records related to proposed 
and completed mechanical integrity work lists, and the technical rationale for any 
delay in work proposed but not yet completed; 
3.  Establish procedures for greater workforce and public participation including the 
public reporting of  information; and 
4.  Provide mechanisms for federal, state and local agency operational coordination, 
sharing of data (including safety indicator data), and  joint accident prevention 
activities. The  California Department of  Industrial Relations will be designated as 
the lead state agency for establishing a repository of  joint investigative and 
inspection data,  coordinating the sharing of  data and joint accident prevention 
activities. 
Recommendation No. 2012·03·I·CA·R12: 
Require that Process Hazard Analyses required under California Code of Regulations, 
Title 8,  Section 5189 Section (e) include documentation ofthe recognized 
methodologies, rationale and conclusions used to claim that safeguards intended to 
control hazards will be effective.  This process shall use established qualitative, 
quantitative, and/or semi-quantitative methods such as Layers of  Protection Analysis 
(LOPA). 
Recommendation No. 2012,03·I·CA·R13: 
Require the documented use of  inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of 
controls to the greatest extent feasible in establishing safeguards for identified process 
hazards. The goal shall be to drive the risk of  major accidents to As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP). Include requirements for inherently safer systems analysis to be 
automatically triggered for all Management of Change and Process Hazard Analysis 
reviews, prior to the construction of  new process, process unit rebuilds, significant 
process repairs and in the development of  corrective actions from incident investigation 
recommendations. 
Recommendation No. 2012·03·I·CA·R14: 
Monitor and confirm the effective implementation of the damage mechanism hazard 
review program (2012-03-I-CA-R9 and 2012-03-I-CA-R10), so that all necessary 
mechanical integrity work at all California Chevron Refineries is identified and 
recommendations are completed in a timely way. 
A more detailed rationale for these recommendations is available in the enclosed interim 
report, which can also be downloaded from our website at www.csb.gov. 
The CSB's Office of Recommendations tracks the implementation of the agency's 
recommendations, and the Board votes to assign a status to its recommendations 
depending on the action(s) proposed and taken by recipients. The status of all 
recommendations is posted on the CSB website (www.csb.gov), where more information 
about our processes/procedures relative to issued recommendations is also available 
(see "Frequently Asked Questions" under the Recommendations tab on the web page ). 
Per our policies and procedures, Ms. Christina Morgan, Recommendations Specialist, 
will need to correspond with staff from your offices, or with other authorized personnel, to 
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discuss California's implementation of these recommendations and obtain 
documentation of relevant actions taken. We would appreciate a response within 60 
days detailing the state's plans for implementation of these recommendations and 
indicating the person(s) authorized to correspond with the CSB on this matter. 
If you have any questions or need further information, please contact Ms.  Morgan at 
(202) 261-7642, or Christina.Morgan@csb.gov. In all future correspondence pertaining 
to these recommendations, please refer to the recommendation numbers 2012-3-I-CA-
R9 through R14, and copy Ms.  Morgan. 
Sincerely, 
1l~~~~/r?Mt 
Rafael Moure-Eraso, PhD,  CIH 
Chairperson 
CC:  David Lanier, Legislative Director, Office of the Governor 
Marty Morgenstern, Secretary, California Labor & Workforce Development Agency 
Christine Baker, Director, Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) 
Ellen Widess, Chief, Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) 
Garrett D. Brown, Special Assistant to the Chief, Cal/OSHA 
Manuel Gomez, Director, Office of Recommendations, CSB 
Bill Hoyle, Senior Investigator, Office of Investigations, CSB 
Don Holmstrom, Director, Western Regional Office, CSB 
Christina Morgan, Recommendations Specialist, CSB 
APPENDIX D-4Summary of Chemical Safety Board’s  
Investigations of Petroleum Refineries 
 
There are five completed investigations of petroleum refineries and four current investigations at 
petroleum refineries. Listed below is a summary of each. 
 
Completed Investigations of Petroleum Refineries 
 
1.  Valero Refinery Propane Fire 
Location: Sunray, TX 
Accident Occurred On: 02/16/2007 
Final Report Released On: 07/09/2008 
Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion 
Company Name: Valero 
 
  Summary of Incident 
 
  On February 16, 2007, a propane fire erupted at the Valero McKee Refinery in Sunray, Texas, 
north of Amarillo. Three workers suffered serious burns, and the refinery was forced to shut 
down. The fire began following a leak in the propane de-asphalting unit and spread quickly, in 
part because of the rapid collapse of a major pipe rack carrying flammable hydrocarbons. Some 
of the rack's support columns had not been fireproofed. 
 
2.  BP America Refinery Explosion 
Location: Texas City, TX 
Accident Occurred On: 03/23/2005 
Final Report Released On: 03/20/2007 
Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion 
Company Name: BP 
 
Summary of Incident 
 
  At approximately 1:20 p.m. on March 23, 2005, a series of explosions occurred at the BP Texas 
City refinery during the restarting of a hydrocarbon isomerization unit. Fifteen workers were 
killed and 180 others were injured. Many of the victims were in or around work trailers located 
near an atmospheric vent stack. The explosions occurred when a distillation tower flooded with 
hydrocarbons and was overpressurized, causing a geyser-like release from the vent stack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D-53.  Giant Industries Refinery Explosions and Fire 
Location: Gallup, NM 
Accident Occurred On: 04/08/2004 
Final Report Released On: 10/26/2005 
Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion 
Company Name: Giant Industries 
 
  Summary of Incident 
 
  On April 8, 2004, four workers were seriously injured when highly flammable gasoline 
components were released and ignited at the Giant Industries Ciniza refinery, east of Gallup, New 
Mexico. The release occurred as maintenance workers were removing a malfunctioning pump 
from the refinery's hydrofluoric acid (HF) alkylation unit. Unknown to personnel, a shut-off valve 
connecting the pump to a distillation column was apparently in the open position, leading to the 
release and subsequent explosions. 
 
4.  Motiva Enterprises Sulfuric Acid Tank Explosion 
Location: Delaware City, DE 
Accident Occurred On: 07/17/2001 
Final Report Released On: 08/28/2002 
Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion 
Company Name: Motiva Enterprises 
 
  Summary of Incident 
 
  On July 17, 2001, an explosion occurred at the Motiva Enterprises refinery in Delaware City, 
Delaware. A work crew had been repairing a catwalk above a sulfuric acid storage tank farm 
when a spark from their hot work ignited flammable vapors in one of the tanks. This tank had 
holes in its roof and shell due to corrosion. The tank collapsed, and one the contract workers was 
killed; eight others were injured. A significant volume of sulfuric acid was released to the 
environment. 
 
5.  Tosco Avon Refinery Petroleum Naphtha Fire 
Location: Martinez, CA 
Accident Occurred On: 02/23/1999 
Final Report Released On: 03/21/2001 
Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion 
Company Name: Tosco Corporation 
 
  Summary of Incident 
 
  On February 23, 1999, a fire occurred in the crude unit at Tosco Corporation. Avon Oil Refinery 
in Martinez, California. Workers were attempting to replace piping attached to a 150-foot-tall 
fractionator tower while the process unit was in operation. During removal of the piping, naphtha 
was released onto the hot fractionator and ignited. The flames engulfed five workers located at 
different heights on the tower. Four men were killed, and one sustained serious injuries. 
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1.  Chevron Refinery Fire 
Location: Richmond, CA 
Accident Occurred On: 08/06/2012 
Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion 
Company Name: Chevron 
 
  Summary of Incident 
 
  An August 6, 2012, release of flammable vapor led to a fire at the Chevron Refinery in 
Richmond, California. 
 
2.  Tesoro Refinery Fatal Explosion and Fire  
Location: Anacortes, WA 
Accident Occurred On: 04/02/2010 
Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion 
Company Name: Tesoro 
 
  Summary of Incident 
 
  An explosion and fire led to the fatal injury of seven employees when a nearly forty-year-old heat 
exchanger catastrophically failed during a maintenance operation to switch a process stream 
between two parallel banks of exchangers at the Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, Washington. 
 
3.  Silver Eagle Refinery Flash Fire and Explosion and Catastrophic Pipe Explosion  
Location: Woods Cross, UT 
Accident Occurred On: 01/12/2009 
Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion 
Company Name: Silver Eagle Refinery  
 
  Summary of Incident 
 
  On the evening of January 12, 2009, 2 refinery operators and 2 contractors suffered serious burns 
resulting from a flash fire at the Silver Eagle Refinery in Woods Cross, Utah. The accident 
occurred when a large flammable vapor cloud was released from an atmospheric storage tank, 
known as tank 105, which contained an estimated 440,000 gallons of light naphtha. The vapor 
cloud found an ignition source and the ensuing flash fire spread up to 230 feet west of the tank 
farm. On November 4, 2009, a second accident occurred at the Silver Eagle Refinery in Woods 
Cross, Utah, when a powerful blast wave - - caused by the failure of a 10 inch pipe - damaged 
nearby homes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D-74.  BP America Refinery Ultracracker Explosion  
Location: Texas City, TX 
Accident Occurred On: 01/14/2008 
Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion 
Company Name: BP 
 
  Summary of Incident 
 
  On January 14, 2008, a worker was fatally injured when the top of a large steel filter housing 
suddenly blew off in the refinery's ultracracker unit. This unit is across a roadway from the ISOM 
unit, where a 2005 accident killed 15 workers and injured 180 others. 
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CHEVRON RICHMOND REFINERY  
RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA 
AUGUST 6, 2012 
KEY ISSUES 
•  INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN 
•  DAMAGE MECHANISM HAZARD REVIEW 
•  EFFECTIVE ANALYSIS OF PROCESS SAFEGUARDS IN PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS 
APPENDIX D-9APPENDIX D-10Summary 
On August 6, 2012, the Chevron U.S.A. Inc. Refinery in Richmond, California, experienced a 
catastrophic pipe failure in the #4 Crude Unit.  The pipe ruptured, releasing flammable, hydrocarbon 
process fluid which partially vaporized into a large vapor cloud that engulfed nineteen Chevron 
employees.  All of the employees escaped, narrowly avoiding serious injury.  The flammable portion of 
the vapor cloud ignited just over two minutes after the pipe ruptured.  The ignition and subsequent 
continued burning of the hydrocarbon process fluid resulted in a large plume of unknown and 
unquantified particulates and vapor traveling across the Richmond, California, area.  In the weeks 
following the incident, approximately 15,000 people from the surrounding area sought medical treatment 
due to the release.  Testing commissioned by the CSB and the California Division of Occupational Safety 
and Health (Cal/OSHA) determined that the pipe failed due to thinning caused by sulfidation corrosion, a 
common damage mechanism in refineries.  As a result of the incident, the Chevron Richmond Refinery 
crude unit remains out of commission over eight months later.  In addition, Cal/OSHA issued the refinery 
17 citations related to the incident and eight additional citations, with a total proposed fine of nearly one 
million dollars.  In this interim report, the CSB is issuing recommendations to Chevron, the City of 
Richmond, Contra Costa County, Cal/OSHA, the State of California, and the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, addressing the need for inherently safer design, rigorous and 
documented damage mechanism hazard reviews, and thorough analyses of process safeguards.   
This interim investigation report contains detailed analyses of and makes recommendations to Chevron 
and regulatory bodies at the local, state, and federal level.  The CSB believes the findings and 
recommendations presented in this report can be applied to refineries, chemical plants, and other 
industries nationwide to improve process safety.   
The CSB plans to release a comprehensive Final Investigation Report later in 2013 that will include 
analyses and recommendations relating to technical and regulatory investigation findings which are not 
included in this interim report.  The Final Investigation Report will cover topics including: the importance 
of having a competent, well-funded regulator and an adaptable regulatory regime; Chevron safety culture; 
process safety indicator data collection and reporting; emergency planning and response; stop work 
authority; and recommendations for improvement of petroleum industry standards and recommended 
practices.  Some of these issues are previewed at the end of this interim report under Additional Issues 
Currently Under Investigation. 
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APPENDIX D-13Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ALARP  As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
API    American Petroleum Institute 
ASTM    American Society for Testing and Materials 
BIN    Business Improvement Network 
bpd    Barrels Per Day 
BPTC    BP Texas City 
CAA    Clean Air Act 
Cal/OSHA  California Division of Occupational Safety and Health 
CCPS    Center for Chemical Process Safety 
CCR     California Code of Regulations 
Chevron ETC  Chevron Energy Technology Company 
CML    Corrosion Monitoring Locations 
CSHO    Compliance Safety and Health Officers 
CWS    Community Warning System 
EPA    Environmental Protection Agency 
°F    degree Fahrenheit 
HSE    Health and Safety Executive 
ISO    Industrial Safety Ordinance 
ISS    Inherently Safer Systems 
IST    Inherently Safer Technology 
KPI    Key Process Indicator 
APPENDIX D-14LEPC    Local Emergency Planning Committee 
LOPA    Layers of Protection Analysis 
MOC    Management of Change 
NEP    National Emphasis Program 
OSHA    Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
P&P    Policy and Procedures 
PHA    Process Hazard Analysis 
PMI    Positive Materials Identification 
psig    Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge 
PSM    Process Safety Management 
RLOP    Richmond Lube Oil Project 
RMP    Risk Management Plan 
TML    Thickness Monitoring Locations 
UK    United Kingdom 
USW    United Steelworker International Union 
wt. %    Weight Percent 
   
APPENDIX D-15Background and Findings 
1.  On August 6, 2012, the Chevron U.S.A. Inc. Refinery in Richmond, California (Chevron 
Richmond Refinery), experienced a catastrophic pipe rupture in the #4 Crude Unit (crude unit). 
The ruptured pipe released a flammable hydrocarbon process fluid which then partially 
vaporized into a large vapor cloud that engulfed nineteen Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (Chevron) 
employees.  At 6:33 pm, approximately two minutes after the release, the flammable portion of 
the vapor cloud ignited.
i
i Surveillance footage provided by Chevron. Chevron clarified to CSB that video time is approximately 5 minutes 
out of sync.  The video can be found at 
  Eighteen of the employees safely escaped from the cloud just before 
ignition; one employee was inside a fire engine that caught fire when the vapor cloud ignited 
(Figure 1).  Because he was wearing full body fire-fighting protective equipment, he was able to 
make his way to safety.  Six Chevron employees suffered minor injuries during the incident and 
subsequent emergency response efforts.  
http://www.csb.gov/videoroom/detail.aspx?VID=69 (accessed February 8, 
2013).  
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Figure 1. The burned remains of the fire truck that was consumed by the fire.  A firefighter 
was in the cab when the vapor cloud ignited.  The fire truck was positioned approximately 
65 feet from the leak location. 
 
APPENDIX D-172.  The ignition and subsequent continued burning of the hydrocarbon process fluid resulted in a 
large plume of unknown and unquantified particulates and vapor traveling across the Richmond, 
California, area (Figure 2 and Figure 3).  This resulted in a Community Warning System (CWS) 
Level 3 alert
i and a shelter-in-place
ii was issued at 6:38 pm
1
 
 for the cities of Richmond, San 
Pablo, and North Richmond.  It was lifted later that night at 11:12 pm after the fire was fully 
under control.  In the weeks following the incident, nearby medical facilities received over 
15,000 members of the public seeking treatment for ailments including breathing problems, 
chest pain, shortness of breath, sore throat, and headaches.  Approximately 20 people were 
admitted to local hospitals as inpatients for treatment. 
Figure 2. Vapor cloud (white) over Richmond area and smoke (black) from Chevron 
Richmond Refinery fire as seen from San Rafael in Marin County.
2
i A Community Warning System Level 3 alert indicates that a facility within Contra Costa County has had a release 
that has offsite impact and is categorized by any of the following: 
 
1.  Off-site impact that may cause eye, skin, nose and/or respiratory irritation to the general population. 
2.  Fire, explosion, heat, or smoke with an off-site impact. Example: On a process unit/storage tank where 
mutual aid is requested to mitigate the event and the fire will last longer than 15 minutes. 
3.  Hazardous material or fire incident where the incident commander or unified command, through 
consultation with the Contra Costa Health Services Hazardous Material Incident Response Team, requests 
that sirens should be sounded.   
See http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/incident_notification_policy.pdf (accessed April 9, 2013). 
ii Contra Costa County considers a shelter-in-place to include going inside a home or nearest building, closing doors 
and windows, and turning off heating, ventilation, and air conditioning.  See http://cchealth.org/emergencies/shelter-
in-place.php (accessed February 6, 2013).  
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Figure 3. Initial vapor cloud formation (white cloud) and subsequent ignition (black smoke) 
as seen from a pier in San Francisco, California.  
3.  The incident occurred from the piping referred to as the “4-sidecut” stream, one of several 
process streams exiting the C-1100 Crude Unit Atmospheric Column (Figure 4).
i  A plot plan of 
the crude unit shows the leak location relative to C-1100 (Figure 5).  As shown in Figure 6, light 
gas oil (the crude unit 4-sidecut process fluid) exits the atmospheric column via a 20-inch nozzle 
and is split into a 12-inch line and an 8-inch line.  The August 6, 2012, pipe rupture (Figure 7) 
occurred on a 52-inch long component
ii of the 4-sidecut 8-inch line (the 52-inch component). 
The line operated at a temperature of 640 degrees Fahrenheit (°F)
iii
i The atmospheric column separates crude oil feed into different streams through distillation.  These streams are 
further processed in other units in the refinery. 
 and had an operating 
pressure of approximately 55 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) at the rupture location.  At the 
ii The term “component” refers to a portion of piping between welds or flanges.  It includes straight run piping and 
pipe fittings.  
iii The auto-ignition temperature for this process, the temperature at which a material will combust in the presence of 
sufficient oxygen without an ignition source, was also 640 °F.  This number is based on the Chevron Light Gas Oil 
Material Safety Data Sheet. Chemical testing of 4-sidecut samples after the incident indicated lower auto-ignition 
temperatures; however, these samples may not have been representative of typical 4-sidecut process fluid.     
APPENDIX D-19time of the incident, light gas oil was flowing through the 8-inch line at a rate of approximately 
10,800 barrels per day (bpd).
i
 
  
Figure 4. C-1100 Crude Unit Atmospheric Column and Upstream Process Equipment 
 
   
i This is the equivalent of 315 gallons per minute (gpm).  A barrel equals 42 gallons.   
APPENDIX D-20 
Figure 5. Overhead view of the equipment in the #4 Crude Unit showing the leak location, commonly 
referred to as a plot plan. 
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Figure 6. 4-sidecut line configuration and rupture location 
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4.  The CSB commissioned Anamet, Inc., a materials engineering and laboratory testing company, 
to conduct testing of the 4-sidecut pipe, including the failed 52-inch component.  The testing 
concluded that the rupture was due to pipe wall thinning caused by sulfidation corrosion,
3
5.  Anamet’s metallurgical analysis found that the 52-inch component where the rupture occurred 
had experienced extreme thinning; the average wall thickness near the rupture location was 
approximately 40 percent thinner than a dime
 which 
is discussed below. 
i (the thinnest American coin).  Between 1976 and 
2012, the 52-inch piping component had lost, on average, 90 percent of its original wall 
thickness in the area near the rupture.
  The piping had an initial nominal wall thickness of 0.322-
inch
ii
 
 when it was installed in 1976.  
Figure 7. Photo of rupture on 4-sidecut 52-inch component  
 
i The U.S. Mint reports that a dime has a thickness of 1.35 mm, or 0.053 inches. Information can be found at 
http://www.usmint.gov/about_the_mint/?action=coin_specifications (accessed February 14, 2013).  
ii This portion of the 4-sidecut line was constructed of 8-inch Schedule 40 carbon steel piping.   
APPENDIX D-23Sulfidation Corrosion 
6.  Sulfidation corrosion is a damage mechanism
i that is well understood in the refining industry. 
The sulfidation corrosion industry guidance document, American Petroleum Institute (API) 
Recommended Practice (RP) 939-C Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion 
Failures in Oil Refineries
ii
[Sulfidation] …is not a new phenomenon, but was first observed in the 
late 1800s in a pipe still (crude separation) unit, due to the naturally 
occurring sulfur compounds found in crude oil. When heated for 
separation, the various fractions in the crude were found to contain sulfur 
compounds that corroded the steel equipment.
 notes:  
4
7.  Sulfidation corrosion, also known as sulfidic corrosion,
 
5 is a damage mechanism that causes 
thinning in iron-containing materials, such as steel, due to the reaction between sulfur 
compounds and iron at temperatures ranging from 450 °F to 800 °F.
6  This damage mechanism 
causes pipe walls to gradually thin over time.  Sulfidation corrosion is common in crude oil 
distillation
iii where naturally occurring sulfur and sulfur compounds found in crude oil feed, such 
as hydrogen sulfide,
iv
8.  The reaction between sulfur and iron produces a layer of iron sulfide scale
 are available to react with steel piping and equipment.  Process variables 
that affect corrosion rates include the total sulfur content of the oil, the sulfur species present, 
flow conditions, and the temperature of the system.  Virtually all crude oil feeds contain sulfur 
compounds and, as a result, sulfidation corrosion is a damage mechanism present at every 
refinery that processes crude oil.  Sulfidation corrosion can cause thinning to the point of pipe 
failure when not properly monitored and controlled.   
v on the inside surface 
of piping.
7
i Piping damage mechanisms are any type of deterioration encountered in the refining and chemical process industry 
that can result in flaws/defects that can affect the integrity of piping (e.g. corrosion, cracking, erosion, dents, and 
other mechanical, physical or chemical impacts). See API 570. "Piping Inspection Code: In-Service Inspection, 
Rating, Repair, and Alteration of Piping Systems." 3
rd ed., Section 3.1.1.5, November 2009. 
  This reaction can be compared to that of oxygen and iron which also produces a 
scale, commonly known as rust.  The type of scale formed by sulfidation corrosion is dependent 
upon the components contained in the steel.  Certain scales formed are protective and actually 
ii API RP 939-C is one of several relevant American Petroleum Institute recommended practices and standards under 
evaluation by the CSB as part of this investigation.  To the casual observer API RP 939-C appears to obligate the 
industry to take significant actions.  However, the CSB concluded it was written to be permissive so that industry 
compliance with specific provisions would not be required.  The complete findings from this evaluation will be 
included in the CSB’s Final Report.  
iii Distillation separates mixtures into broad categories of its components by heating the mixture in a distillation 
column where different products boil off and are recovered at different temperatures. See 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6970 (accessed April 4, 2013). 
iv Hydrogen sulfide is the most aggressive sulfur compound that causes sulfidation corrosion.   
v Scale is a nonmetallic layer on the surface of metals and is often a result of corrosion. 
APPENDIX D-24reduce the reaction rate between sulfur compounds and iron, minimizing sulfidation corrosion 
rates.  For instance, sulfidation corrosion affecting steel alloys containing greater than two 
weight percent (wt. %) chromium produces a protective scale that inhibits the reaction between 
the iron and sulfur compounds, thereby reducing corrosion rates.
i   With increasing percentages 
of chromium, the reaction is further slowed, greatly diminishing corrosion rates.
8,ii  For example, 
stainless steel (an 18 wt. % chromium alloy) is nearly 15 times more resistant to sulfidation 
corrosion than 9-Chrome (a 9 wt. % chromium alloy).
9  Conversely, sulfidation corrosion rates 
are significantly higher in steels containing very little chromium.  Carbon steel, the Chevron 4-
sidecut line material of construction, was manufactured with a maximum concentration of 0.40 
% chromium.
10  The scale formed on carbon steel is less protective and allows continued 
reaction between the sulfur compounds and iron.
11
9.  In addition to its inherently faster rate of sulfidation corrosion when compared with higher 
chromium steels, carbon steel also experiences significant variation in corrosion rates due to 
variances in silicon content, a component used in the steel manufacturing process.  Carbon steel 
piping containing silicon content less than 0.10 wt. % can corrode at accelerated rates,
  Thus, carbon steel corrodes at a rate that is 
significantly faster than other materials of construction, such as high chromium steels.   
12
i At greater than two wt. % chromium, sulfur compounds react with the steel to form FeCr2S4 scale.  This scale 
provides more protection than the FeS scale that forms on carbon steel piping. See Niccolls, E. H., J. M. 
Stankiewicz, J. E. McLaughlin, and K. Yamamoto. "High Temperature Sulfidation Corrosion in Refining." 17th 
International Corrosion Congress. Las Vegas: NACE International, 2008. 
 up to 
sixteen times faster than carbon steel piping containing higher percentages of silicon as shown in 
Figure 8.  This figure shows how carbon steel corrosion rates can greatly vary depending on 
silicon content.   
ii It has also been found that chromium “poisons” the decomposition of sulfur compounds to hydrogen sulfide which 
also slows down the sulfidation corrosion rate.  See Couper, A.S. “High Temperature Mercaptan Corrosion of 
Steels.” 19
th Annual Conference of the National Association of Corrosion Engineers. Pages 396t-401t, New York: 
March 1963.   
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Figure 8. This graph shows how corrosion rates increase in carbon steel containing 
decreasing percentages of silicon.  This information can be found in Annex C of API RP 939-
C.
i
10. The refining industry has been aware of increased rates of sulfidation corrosion in low-silicon 
carbon steel piping since as early as 1974,
   
13
Sulfidation corrosion has caused severe fires and fatalities in the refining 
industry, primarily because it causes corrosion over a relatively large 
area, so failures tend to involve ruptures or large leaks rather than 
pinhole leaks.  It can be insidious in that moderately high corrosion rates 
can go undetected for years before failure.  Finally, process changes that 
 nearly 40 years before the August 6, 2012, incident 
and two years before the Chevron crude unit was constructed.  Prior to the incident, Chevron 
documented its understanding of the significant consequences of sulfidation corrosion.  This is 
reflected in Chevron’s Corrosion Prevention and Metallurgy Manual, which states: 
i The y-axis of this figure is in units of mils per year (mpy). A “mil” is 1/1000 inch. 
Silicon Content (Weight %)  
APPENDIX D-26increase the temperature or sulfur content can creep up over time and 
multiply corrosion rates so that what was thought to be a low corrosion 
rate system becomes corrosive enough to fail before the increased 
corrosion rate is recognized. 
11. Carbon steel piping is manufactured to meet certain specifications, including American Society 
for Testing and Materials (ASTM) A53B,
14 ASTM A106,
15 and API 5L.
16  ASTM A53B and 
API 5L do not contain minimum silicon content requirements for carbon steel piping,
17
12. In the mid 1980s, pipe manufacturers began to simultaneously comply with all three 
manufacturing specifications (ASTM A53B, ASTM A106, and API 5L) when manufacturing 
carbon steel piping.  The majority of carbon steel piping purchased following this time period 
likely has a minimum of 0.10 wt. % silicon content.  However, piping purchased and installed 
prior to the mid-1980s could still contain low silicon components that are susceptible to high, 
variable sulfidation corrosion rates.  
 while 
ASTM A106 requires the piping to be manufactured with a minimum silicon content of 0.10 
wt. %.  As a result, manufacturers have used different levels of silicon in the carbon steel pipe 
manufacturing process.  Thus, depending on the manufacturing specification for carbon steel 
susceptible to sulfidation corrosion, corrosion rates could vary depending on the silicon content 
within the steel.  
13. Over 95 percent of the 144 refineries in operation in the U.S., including the Chevron Richmond 
Refinery,
i were built before 1985,
18
14. The Chevron Richmond Refinery 4-sidecut piping circuit containing the 52-inch component that 
failed was constructed of ASTM A53B carbon steel, which had no minimum specification for 
silicon content.  Post-incident testing of samples of the 4-sidecut piping from the Chevron 
Richmond Refinery identified silicon content ranging from 0.01 wt. % to 0.2 wt. %.  Of twelve 
samples taken from the 8-inch and 12-inch 4-sidecut line, six had a silicon concentration of less 
than 0.10 wt. %.  The 52-inch pipe component that ruptured on the day of the incident, had a 
silicon content of only 0.01 wt. %.  The elbow component directly upstream of the 52-inch 
component that failed had a silicon concentration of 0.16 wt. % and showed considerably less 
thinning (Figure 9). 
 and thus before piping manufacturers began producing 
carbon steel in compliance with all three manufacturing specifications.  Therefore, the original 
carbon steel piping in these refineries is likely to contain varying percentages of silicon content 
and may experience highly variable sulfidation corrosion rates.  
i The Chevron Richmond Refinery was constructed in 1902. 
APPENDIX D-27 
Figure 9. 4-sidecut piping sample (E-017-8) analyzed by Anamet Labs showing the relative 
thickness of low silicon piping on the left and the high silicon piping on the right.  The 
ruptured pipe component (left) contained 0.01 % silicon and the upstream elbow component 
(right) contained 0.16 % silicon.
19
 
  The initial nominal thickness of this piping was 0.322-
inch. 
APPENDIX D-28Sulfidation Corrosion Inspection Techniques 
15. As evidenced by the chemical analysis performed on the Chevron 4-sidecut piping post-incident, 
carbon steel piping components within a single circuit
i can contain varying percentages of 
silicon, resulting in a large variation in sulfidation corrosion rates by component.  Historically, 
sulfidation corrosion monitoring techniques required the measurement of pipe thickness at only 
a minimal number of permanent Condition Monitoring Locations (CMLs)
ii along the piping.  
These CMLs are most frequently placed on elbows and fittings.
iii  However, due to details of the 
manufacturing process, carbon steel pipe fittings generally contain high percentages of silicon.
20 
When measurements are only taken at high-silicon containing fittings, the measurements can fail 
to identify high corrosion rates within a pipe circuit caused by low-silicon components.  At the 
Chevron Richmond Refinery, the 4-sidecut piping had a total of 24 CMLs
iv
16. Determining silicon content in existing carbon steel piping and equipment in the field is a 
difficult undertaking.  To properly characterize the silicon content in each component in a piping 
circuit, every component must be inspected.  This is known as 100 percent component 
inspection.  Two techniques are currently used to determine silicon content in existing carbon 
steel piping circuits with unknown chemical composition:  chemical analysis and pipe wall 
thickness measurements of every component.   
 on piping and 
fittings.  The CSB found that there were no CMLs placed on the low silicon piping component 
that failed.  Chevron identified accelerated corrosion in the 52-inch component in a 2002 
inspection.  However, no CML was added to ensure future monitoring, and the 52-inch 
component was not inspected again.  Instead, the CSB found that Chevron relied on inspection 
data gained primarily from high silicon pipe-fitting components, such as elbow components.  
This inspection data did not reflect the corrosion rates of the lower-silicon components of the 4-
sidecut piping.  Relying on the limited inspection data from the CMLs on the high silicon 
components, Chevron management denied multiple recommendations to replace the 4-sidecut 
line.  As illustrated by the Chevron incident, inspection techniques alone may not accurately 
identify the most aggressive corrosion rates throughout an entire circuit of carbon steel piping.  
Low-silicon components can remain uninspected and unidentified until failures such as the 
August 6, 2012, Chevron incident occur.  As will be discussed below, upgrading metallurgy is a 
more effective means of managing sulfidation corrosion. 
i A piping circuit is a length of pipe and the fittings associated with a particular process service and operating at 
similar conditions.  A circuit usually begins and ends at either a branch or a piece of process equipment such as a 
vessel or a pump.  Reference to piping by circuits allows piping to be grouped conveniently by proximity and 
operating service.  Piping circuits may also be referred to as piping runs. 
ii A condition monitoring location (CML) is a designated area where periodic thickness examinations are conducted. 
Each CML represents as many as four inspection locations located circumferentially around the pipe.  CMLs are 
also referred to as thickness monitoring locations (TMLs).   
iii A fitting is a piping component usually associated with a change in direction or diameter.   
iv Many of these CMLs were added during the 2011 turnaround.   
APPENDIX D-2917. Many field-portable instruments used for positive material identification cannot adequately 
identify silicon content.
21  If original manufacturing quality assurance data
i are not available, as 
is generally the case with older plants, then chemical verification requires destructive testing. 
Metal shavings must be taken from each carbon steel piping component for chemical analysis in 
a laboratory.
22
18. Carbon steel components containing low concentrations of silicon can also potentially be 
identified by performing thickness measurements of every component within a carbon steel 
circuit.
  This method requires that the insulation be removed for access to the piping so 
that each individual piping component can be sampled and verified.  
23  This practice is only useful if the piping circuit has been exposed to sulfidation 
corrosion for a long enough time period so that variances in corrosion rate caused by differences 
in silicon content may be detected.  Chemical analysis is therefore the most accurate technique 
to identify low-silicon carbon steel components.  As with chemical analysis, the thickness 
measurement method requires that each individual piping component be identified by removing 
insulation (so every weld seam can be located), a time consuming and costly undertaking, or by 
using non-destructive examination techniques.  Thickness measurements on high temperature 
piping typically can only be done accurately and safely during unit turnarounds.
ii
19. API Recommended Practice 939-C Guidelines for Avoiding Sulfidation (Sulfidic) Corrosion 
Failures in Oil Refineries describes the challenges faced when attempting to thoroughly inspect 
carbon steel lines susceptible to sulfidation corrosion.  The recommended practice states that 
older ASTM A53 piping, such as the Chevron piping that failed on August 6
th creates a “major 
inspection challenge”
  Although 
these various methods were available to detect the location of the field welds, Chevron had not 
used them to identify the 4-sidecut pipe segment locations.     
24 and that “unless the refinery is fortunate enough to have located an 
inspection point on that particular [low silicon] section of pipe or fitting, it is very difficult to 
detect the thinning component.”
25  It states that in some applications, carbon steel will appear to 
be adequate based on measured corrosion rates until failure occurs at some undocumented or 
unidentified low-silicon component.
26
20. Unlike silicon concentration, the chromium concentration of steel can easily be verified in the 
field using portable positive material identification instruments.  In addition, steel alloys 
containing at least 9 wt. % chromium are more resistant to sulfidation corrosion and do not run 
the risk of extreme variations in corrosion rates within components in the same piping circuit.
  
iii
i Manufacturing quality assurance data, also known as mill data, provides the chemical composition of the steel. 
 
ii A “turnaround” is a scheduled shutdown of a process unit to perform maintenance, repairs, upgrades, and 
inspection of process equipment.   
iii The protective scale, FeCr2S4, begins to be the dominant scale formed in steels containing a chromium content of 
five wt. %.  The 5Cr steel alloy can be manufactured to contain anywhere from 4% to 6% chromium.  Thus, “the 
sulfidation corrosion rate can vary dramatically in 5Cr steels even in the same operating environment.”  See 
Niccolls, E. H., J. M. Stankiewicz, J. E. McLaughlin, and K. Yamamoto. "High Temperature Sulfidation Corrosion 
in Refining." 17th International Corrosion Congress. Las Vegas: NACE International, 2008. 
APPENDIX D-30This makes alloys with higher chromium content an inherently safer choice in high temperature 
sulfidation corrosion environments.
i  As shown in the Modified McConomy Curves
ii (Figure 10) 
from API RP 939-C, 9-Chrome
iii corrodes 15 times faster than stainless steel,
iv and carbon steel
v 
corrodes 125 times faster than stainless steel.
27
 
  
Figure 10. Modified McConomy Curves from API RP 939-C.   
i Steels with higher chromium content are inherently safer than carbon steel with respect to sulfidation corrosion. 
However, analysis is still required to ensure that the best material of construction is selected. 
ii  Modified McConomy Curves are the set of curves API RP 939-C uses to predict sulfidation corrosion rates versus 
temperature for several steel alloys. 
iii 9-Chrome contains 9 wt. % chromium. 
iv Stainless steel contains 18 wt. % chromium. 
v ASTM A53B carbon steel contains a maximum of 0.40 wt. % chromium. 
100.0 
APPENDIX D-31Chevron Sulfidation Corrosion Knowledge and Expertise 
21. Figure 11 shows a timeline of Chevron’s key sulfidation events.  Chevron technical staff has 
considerable knowledge and expertise regarding sulfidation corrosion, specifically with respect to 
corrosion rate variations caused by differing silicon concentration in carbon steel piping.  Chevron 
employees have authored industry papers on sulfidation corrosion and had significant influence in 
the development of the industry sulfidation corrosion recommended practice, API RP 939-C.  This 
recommended practice, first published in 2009, was developed under Chevron leadership.  At the 
approximate time of publication of API RP 939-C, Chevron Energy Technology Company 
(Chevron ETC)
i  created an internal document on the subject of sulfidation corrosion.  Chevron 
ETC metallurgists released a formal report dated September 30, 2009 (nearly 3 years prior to the 
incident) to Chevron refinery-based reliability managers and chief inspectors titled Updated 
Inspection Strategies for Preventing Sulfidation Corrosion Failures in Chevron Refineries.
  In the 
Chevron ETC report, sulfidation experts acknowledged that, “Until now, Chevron has not directly 
addressed the risk of low Si[licon] carbon steel…”
ii
i The Chevron Energy Technology Company is a separate business unit within the Chevron Corporation that 
provides technology solutions and technical expertise for Chevron operations worldwide.  See 
  This report specifically recommends that 
inspectors perform 100 percent component inspection on high temperature carbon steel piping 
susceptible to sulfidation corrosion.  However, this recommendation was not implemented at the 
Richmond refinery prior to the August 6, 2012, incident. 
http://richmond.chevron.com/home/aboutchevronrichmond.aspx (accessed April 4, 2013) 
ii A 2003 corporate technical newsletter recommended 100 percent component inspection of carbon steel piping 
susceptible to sulfidation corrosion following a 2002 Chevron Salt Lake City sulfidation corrosion incident. 
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Figure 11. Chevron’s key sulfidation events between 1974 and 2013. 
22. The Chevron ETC 2009 report states: “The current program seeks to close these gaps and to 
maximize the effectiveness of our inspection.”  The report clearly indicates that Chevron 
understood both the potential consequence and the high likelihood of a rupture or catastrophic 
failure from sulfidation corrosion and the report calls out Chevron’s need for action: 
Sulfidation corrosion failures are not common in Chevron or in the 
industry but they are of great concern because of the comparatively high 
likelihood of blowout or catastrophic failure […] .  This can happen 
because corrosion occurs at a relatively uniform rate over a broad area so 
a pipe can get progressively thinner until it actually bursts rather than 
leaking at a pit or local thin area.  In addition the process fluid is often 
above its autoignition temperature.  The combination of these factors 
means that sulfidation corrosion failures frequently result in large fires.  
[…] [S]everal case histories of sulfidation corrosion failures that have 
occurred in Chevron or in the industry several of which are blowouts. 
This Chevron ETC report specifically recommends that inspectors perform 100 percent component 
inspection on high temperature carbon steel piping susceptible to sulfidation corrosion.  However, 
this 100 percent component inspection program was not implemented at the Richmond refinery 
APPENDIX D-33prior to the August 6, 2012 incident.  The Chevron ETC report defines a priority ranking system to 
help focus the inspection implementation efforts.  The process conditions of the 4-sidecut stream 
placed it in the highest priority for inspection. 
23. Chevron ETC technical experts issued a corporate newsletter in 2010 that again warned of the 
potential consequence of sulfidation failures.  In this newsletter, the 100 percent component 
inspection recommendation from the 2009 report was reiterated for piping systems such as the 
crude unit 4-sidecut piping.  The newsletter states:  
Sulfidation corrosion failures … are of great concern because of the 
comparatively high likelihood of “blowout” or catastrophic failure.  This 
typically happens because corrosion occurs at a relatively uniform rate 
over a broad area, so a pipe can get progressively thinner until it actually 
bursts rather than leaking at a pit or local thin area.  In addition, the 
process fluid is often above its autoignition temperature.  The 
combination of these factors means that sulfidation corrosion failures 
frequently result in large fires.  Chevron and the industry have 
experienced numerous failures from this mechanism and recent incidents 
have reinforced the need for revised inspection strategies and a robust 
PMI (Positive Materials Identification) program.  
The Chevron ETC 100 percent component inspection recommendation for high risk piping systems, 
established in 2009, was not implemented at Richmond; therefore, the thin-walled low silicon 4-
sidecut piping component remained in service until it catastrophically failed on August 6, 2012. 
24. Chevron and Chevron ETC metallurgists, materials engineers, and piping inspectors had expertise 
regarding sulfidation corrosion.  They educated personnel and advocated for identification and 
control of damage mechanisms, including sulfidation corrosion.  However, they had limited 
practical influence to implement their recommendations.  These individuals did not participate in 
the crude unit Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)
i and did not affect decisions concerning control of 
sulfidation corrosion during the crude unit turnaround process.
ii
i A process hazard analysis is a hazard evaluation used to identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in a 
process.  Facilities that process a threshold quantity of hazardous materials, such as the Chevron Richmond refinery, 
are required to conduct a process hazard analysis per the California Code of Regulations Title 8 Section 5189: 
Process Safety Management of Acutely Hazardous Materials (1992). 
    
ii The turnaround process includes both the planning stage prior to the shutdown and the activities staged during the 
shutdown. 
APPENDIX D-34Other Significant Sulfidation Occurrences  
25. The refining industry has experienced numerous sulfidation corrosion failures, primarily in 
piping.
28  API RP 939-C identifies 45 sulfidation corrosion failures, one third of which were 
found to have occurred in carbon steel piping containing low levels of silicon.
29
26. The August 6, 2012, Chevron Richmond Refinery 4-sidecut pipe rupture was not the first 
sulfidation corrosion-related incident to occur at a Chevron refinery. In 1988, a low silicon 
carbon steel (0.02 wt. % silicon) piping component failed at the Chevron’s former El Paso 
Refinery
  
i
27. In 2002, the Chevron Salt Lake City Refinery experienced a fire when process piping failed as a 
result of sulfidation corrosion in a low silicon ASTM A53 carbon steel piping component. 
Chevron communicated the incident throughout the company in a technical newsletter.  Chevron 
experts found that despite regular monitoring of the line for 30 years in compliance with industry 
standards, their inspection program failed to prevent the failure.  Corrosion rates at the 
unmonitored failure location were found to be five times greater than corrosion rates at the 
monitored piping locations.  The monitored locations were constructed of high silicon ASTM 
A106 piping (Figure 12).  Chevron also found that in the years preceding the failure, both the 
temperature
 in El Paso, Texas.  In addition, two sulfidation corrosion incidents occurred at the 
Chevron Pascagoula refinery in Pascagoula, Mississippi: one in 1993 and one in 1988 on a low-
silicon carbon steel component.
  
ii
i The El Paso Refinery is now owned by Western Refining. 
 and hydrogen sulfide concentration in the process had been increasing. Each of 
these factors increased corrosion rates and contributed to the failure.  In 2003, following this 
incident, Chevron experts recommended that refineries inspect every piping component (100 % 
component inspection) in all high-risk piping systems: those operating above 550 °F and 
containing hydrogen sulfide. 
ii The temperature in the line had been increased by over 170 °F throughout the life of the unit.  During the two years 
prior to failure, temperatures of the line exceeded the measurement capabilities of the temperature measurement 
device and so the actual temperature increase cannot be determined.    
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Figure 12. Schematic of failed piping from the Chevron Salt Lake Refinery.  Similar to the 
Chevron Richmond Refinery incident, the failed piping contained low amounts of silicon and 
corroded significantly faster than adjacent piping components. 
28. In January 2007, a failure due to sulfidation corrosion caused a serious fire in the Chevron 
Richmond Refinery crude unit resulting in a CWS Level 3 alert, initiating a shelter-in-place for 
the surrounding community.  A carbon steel piping spool
i
i A piping spool is a small, removable section of piping.  In some cases, a pipe spool is installed or removed in order 
to provide a temporary connection or complete disconnection between two piping circuits. 
 failed catastrophically during 
operation (Figure 13).  The carbon steel piping contained a low percentage of silicon (<0.005 
wt. %).  The process fluid ignited, injuring a nearby worker.  Chevron informed Contra Costa 
County in a letter that the metallurgy had been upgraded following this incident as an inherently 
safer solution.  However, the CSB learned that this upgrade was limited to only the immediate 
piping spool that failed.  The inherently safer, more corrosion resistant metallurgy was not 
implemented more broadly in crude unit high temperature service as a result of this incident. 
APPENDIX D-36 
Figure 13. Failed piping component that resulted in the 2007 Richmond crude unit fire.  This 
carbon steel piping was found to contain less than 0.005 percent silicon. 
29. Following the August 6, 2012, incident, personnel at the Chevron El Segundo, California, 
refinery, a near duplicate of the Richmond refinery, inspected their refinery’s crude unit 4-
sidecut piping.  Significant thinning was discovered in the line; the piping from the atmospheric 
crude column to the pumps was removed and substituted with 9-Chrome, an upgraded and 
inherently safer material of construction.  
30. On November 9, 2009, the Silver Eagle refinery in Woods Cross, Utah, experienced a 
catastrophic piping failure due to sulfidation corrosion in a 10-inch pipe, while conducting a 
temporary operation at higher than normal operating temperature. The pipe was located on the 
APPENDIX D-37bottom of a reactor in the de-waxing unit.  The failed pipe released hydrogen which 
subsequently exploded, damaging over 100 homes in the nearby neighborhood.  
31. On October 6, 2011, an explosion and fire resulted from a catastrophic piping failure at a 
Canadian refinery in Regina, Saskatchewan, injuring 52 workers.  The piping component that 
failed was substantially thinner than neighboring components.  Prior to the incident, the 
company’s inspection data indicated that wall thickness in the overall piping system was within 
acceptable limits.  However, the specific component that failed was not inspected. Although 
Canadian authorities are still investigating, metallurgical testing has indicated that hydrogen 
sulfide corrosion contributed to the catastrophic failure. 
32. In February 2012, the BP refinery crude unit in Cherry Point, Washington, suffered a failure due 
to sulfidation corrosion, causing a large fire.  This incident demonstrates that even when 
applying inherently safer concepts to reduce the potential for major hazards, it is still vital to 
fully understand all processes and piping configurations and incorporate a rigorous inspection 
program.  The piping that failed was constructed of 9-Chrome.  The line was used only during 
start-up operations and otherwise remained in-service and non-flowing.  Such lines that do not 
have regular process flow yet remain in contact with process fluids are commonly referred to as 
“dead legs.”  The failure location was a high-point in the piping connected to the top of an 
operating process line.  Hydrogen sulfide evolved from the process fluid and collected in the 9-
Chrome piping.  The concentrated vapor-phase hydrogen sulfide severely corroded the 9-
Chrome, causing the failure.  CMLs were located on adjacent elbow components; however, no 
CMLs were placed on the straight-run piping component where the failure occurred.  The Cherry 
Point sulfidation failure demonstrates that even with more corrosion-resistant, inherently safer 
metallurgy, failure from sulfidation corrosion still may occur if piping is not effectively 
inspected or piping configurations are not adequately evaluated.  In addition it is important to 
conduct a thorough analysis to determine the best material of construction for the process 
conditions.   
APPENDIX D-38Process Hazard Analysis 
33. Chevron personnel analyze numerous deviations
i for each portion of a process when conducting 
a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA).
ii
34. Despite Chevron knowledge and expertise of potential damage mechanisms (such as sulfidation 
corrosion), the CSB found these hazards are only identified in a PHA if the participants 
conducting the PHA happen to have personal knowledge of the relevant mechanism.  The 
Chevron PHA teams do not typically seek assistance from corrosion experts.
  These include conditions such as changes in flow and 
temperature and pressure extremes.  Specifically of interest, one of the deviations analyzed was 
“leak/rupture” of the particular vessel or pipe.  For each deviation, the team was tasked to 
identify causes, consequences, safeguards, and recommendations.  The 4-sidecut line was 
analyzed in the most recent crude unit PHA.  Corrosion was not identified as a potential cause of 
a leak/rupture in the piping.  
iii  The inclusion of 
a damage mechanism hazard review as part of the PHA is not required by the state of California, 
the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA), Contra Costa County, 
the City of Richmond, or Chevron standards.  Sometimes referred to as a corrosion review, a 
damage mechanism hazard review analyzes risks presented by all process failure mechanisms 
such as corrosion and cracking.  Common process failure mechanisms are described in API 571: 
Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining and Petrochemical Industries.
30
35. During a hazard analysis process such as a PHA, the evaluation team has to determine the 
likelihood of a hazardous consequence occurring.  Then the team must identify safeguards which 
will reduce the risk of the hazard to an acceptable level.  A recognized methodology for 
  
Such a review ensures that potential hazards caused by process conditions, process materials, 
and external mechanisms are properly identified, analyzed, and systems are put in place to 
control or eliminate the hazard.  Because Chevron does not conduct, and is not required to 
conduct, a formal damage mechanism hazard review, damage mechanisms are only identified 
when the PHA team happens to have some knowledge of the mechanism.  As a result, many 
damage mechanisms which occur in various processes are not properly addressed.    
i Deviations using guide words (such as no, more, less, as well as) and process parameters (such as flow, pressure, 
temperature) are analyzed in PHAs. See Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). “Guidelines for Hazard 
Evaluation Procedures.” 2nd ed., Page 132, 1992.    
ii A process hazard analysis is a hazard evaluation to identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in a 
process.  Facilities that process a threshold quantity of hazardous materials, such as the Chevron Richmond refinery, 
are required to conduct a process hazard analysis per the California Code of Regulations Title 8 Section 5189. 
Process Safety Management of Acutely Hazardous Materials.  PHAs are also required by the California Accidental 
Release Prevention Program and the federal EPA Risk Management Program (1992). 
iii The Crude Unit Business Improvement Network (BIN) Leader, a crude unit expert, reviews portions of the PHA 
with the PHA team.  However, this review did not identify the potential for sulfidation corrosion failures in the 4-
sidecut piping.  A rigorous review of corrosion and damage mechanisms present in the crude unit was not performed 
during the PHA process.   
APPENDIX D-39consistently and objectively making these determinations could include the use of quantitative, 
semi-quantitative, or qualitative tools.
31  Chevron does not employ a prescribed methodology for 
determining the likelihood that an incident will occur or whether a safeguard will be effective.  
Instead, Chevron relies upon the judgment of the people on the PHA team, who base their 
conclusions upon their collective experiences, beliefs, and areas of expertise.
  In its 2009 crude 
unit PHA, Chevron simply cited non-specific, judgment-based qualitative safeguards such as: 
utilizing metallurgy to minimize corrosion, having effective maintenance and inspection 
programs, and providing pipe wall corrosion allowances.
i
36. Following the August 6
th incident, Cal/OSHA inspected the Chevron facility and issued 
citations.  Only one citation related to PHAs, and it was not associated with evaluating the 
effectiveness of safeguards.  Rather, the emphasis was that Chevron’s PHA did not adequately 
account for hazards caused by other units associated with the Crude Unit.  The citation stated 
“The Employer [Chevron] failed to perform an effective Process Hazard Analysis [PHA] of the 
Crude Unit.  Specifically, it failed to identify, evaluate and control potential hazards caused by 
upstream and downstream units that provide and receive feed from the Crude Unit.”
  The effectiveness of these safeguards 
was neither evaluated nor documented; instead the safeguards were merely listed in the PHA.  
Had the adequacy of these safeguards been verified, improved safeguards intended to protect 
against sulfidation-induced failure of carbon steel piping could have been recommended.  
32
i Corrosion allowance refers to extra wall thickness added as a safety factor to the design of a piece of equipment 
beyond that needed solely for mechanical considerations such as design temperature and pressure.  This extra 
thickness is provided to accommodate for expected loss of wall thickness due to corrosion over the life of the 
equipment. 
  Had the 
Cal/OSHA regulation required documentation of the effectiveness of safeguards, Chevron would 
have been obligated to conduct this analysis and Cal/OSHA inspectors could rely on the 
regulation for support during inspections.    
APPENDIX D-40Operational Changes 
37. The original design of the 4-sidecut circuit included equipment which had the effect of removing 
dissolved hydrogen sulfide, the most aggressive sulfur compound associated with sulfidation 
corrosion, from the 4-sidecut light gas oil process fluid.  As a result, the 4-sidecut equipment 
was effective in reducing the sulfidation corrosion rate.  This allowed the 4-sidecut equipment to 
be constructed of carbon steel.  In 1991, this 4-sidecut equipment was taken out of service. No 
management of change
i
38. API RP 939-C states that refinery feed stock changes reduce the relevance of past inspection 
data when predicting future corrosion rates:  
 (MOC) was performed to analyze the effect of the elimination of this 
hydrogen sulfide-removing equipment on 4-sidecut corrosion rates.  Such an MOC would have 
ensured that the increase in sulfur concentration on the carbon steel 4-sidecut piping was 
reviewed prior to removing the equipment. 
Oil refineries that processed a consistent diet of a particular crude oil or 
crude blend could often base future predictions on past experience. 
However, over the past 20+ years, global economics have resulted in 
many refineries processing tens of different crudes in any given year; 
thus, minimizing the accuracy, or even feasibility, of predictions based 
on historical data.  Additionally, the verification of the actual corrosion 
rate experienced while processing a specific crude oil is very difficult.
33
39. Crude oil feedstock used at the Chevron Richmond Refinery is obtained from a variety of 
different sources that are blended before processing.  These various crudes have different 
compositions, such as varying sulfur compounds and concentrations.  These crudes can have 
differing corrosion effects on process equipment and piping.  There is an increasing trend in 
crude oil refining to process less expensive “opportunity crudes” because they can provide 
significant cost savings to the company.
 
ii  However, these crudes may contain more undesirable 
characteristics such as high sulfur content, high naphthenic acid content, or very heavy 
hydrocarbons
34
i Management of change requires that employers have procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, 
technology, equipment, and procedures.  The procedures must address the technical basis for the change, the impact 
on safety and health, and training required for employees affected by the change. 
 that a refinery may not have been originally designed to process.  Refinery 
equipment may not be the proper material of construction to achieve the design life of the 
equipment when exposed to the different operating conditions.  Additional mitigation may be 
needed to reduce risk.  In 1984, the Chevron Richmond Refinery crude oil feed contained 
approximately 85 volume %  Alaskan North Slope (1 wt. %) crude oil.  As the refinery began 
ii Crude oil costs can account for up to 90% of the operating costs in a refinery.  See Qu, Dingrong, Xiaohui Liu, Xiu 
Jiang, Zhenggui Lan, and Guangbin Shan. “Setting Critical Operational TAN and Sulfur Level for Crude Distillation 
Units.” Corrosion 2011 Conference & Expo. Paper No. 11362. NACE International, 2011.    
APPENDIX D-41running more high-sulfur content crudes, the sulfur content in the 4-sidecut line steadily 
increased (Figure 14), as discussed below.  
 
Figure 14. Graph shows the percentage increase from 1984 values of the sulfur content in 
the 4-sidecut.  
40. When Chevron introduces a new crude, an MOC is generated to evaluate the potential impact on 
the refinery.
i
41. The CSB found that increased Chevron Richmond usage of non-domestic crude feed stock over 
time resulted in higher sulfur content in the process fluid passing through the 4-sidecut piping.  
Specifically, the percentage of sulfur in the Richmond refinery crudes increased nearly 85% 
   While Chevron stayed under its established crude unit design basis for total wt. % 
sulfur of the blended feed to the crude unit, the sulfur composition significantly increased over 
time.  This increase in sulfur composition likely increased corrosion rates in the 4-sidecut line. 
Chevron did not conduct an MOC analyzing the impact that increases in sulfur composition 
would have on corrosion in the crude unit.  Chevron also did not change its corrosion monitoring 
programs in response to the increased sulfur content.   
i Chevron MOCs on new crudes considered general operational issues but did not analyze corrosion effects from 
sulfidation corrosion.   
APPENDIX D-42between 1984 and 2012, including a significant jump of 32% from 1998 to 1999.  This increase 
in sulfur content corresponded with a simultaneous increase in the usage of non-domestic crude 
feed at the Richmond refinery.  
42. Sulfidation corrosion rates increase in piping circuits as temperature and sulfur content increase. 
Accordingly, the 4-sidecut sulfidation corrosion rate increased between 1984 and 2012 due to 
the increase in sulfur content in the line.  The CSB found that for the 26-year period from the 
installation of the piping in 1976 through 2002, the 52-inch 4-sidecut component had lost 
approximately 33 percent of its wall thickness.  From the single inspection of the 52-inch 
component in 2002 to the incident in 2012 – just ten years – an additional 57 percent of the 
original component nominal wall thickness was lost near the rupture location due to sulfidation 
corrosion.
i
43. API 570 Piping Inspection Code: In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration of Piping 
Systems, the API standard for inspecting piping, recommends companies to incorporate process 
changes into inspection programs.  The standard states:  
   In addition to the sulfur content increase, the 4-sidecut draw temperature increased 
from 625 °F in 1992 to 680 °F in 2002.  Corrosion rates and remaining life calculations based on 
past sulfur content and temperatures may not accurately reflect current corrosion rates if process 
conditions have changed.  Inspection based on historical corrosion rates may be too infrequent to 
detect an increase in corrosion caused by adverse changes in process conditions, potentially 
leading to equipment failure.  
The owner/user is … responsible for implementing an effective MOC 
process that will review and control changes to the process and to the 
hardware.  An effective MOC process is vital to the success of any 
piping integrity management program in order that the inspection group 
will be able to anticipate changes in corrosion or other deterioration 
variables and alter the inspection plan to account for those changes.  The 
MOC process shall include the appropriate materials/corrosion 
experience and expertise in order to effectively forecast what changes 
might affect piping integrity.  The inspection group shall be involved in 
the approval process for changes that may affect piping integrity. 
Changes to the hardware and the process shall be included in the MOC 
process to ensure its effectiveness [emphasis added].
35
Chevron failed to comply with the requirements of API 570 when it did not conduct an 
MOC to thoroughly evaluate the change of increasing sulfur weight percentage in crude 
oil feed and to assess how it might affect corrosion rates within the 4-sidecut piping 
circuit.  After the August 6, 2012, incident, Cal/OSHA inspected the Chevron 
  
i The 4-sidecut 52-inch component had an original wall thickness of 0.322 inches.  Metallurgical analysis found the 
thinnest portion of the 52-inch 4-sidecut component was 0.03 inches.   
APPENDIX D-43Richmond Refinery and issued citations.
i
Chevron Sulfidation Corrosion Inspection and Mitigation 
  However, Cal/OSHA did not issue any 
citations for failing to perform an MOC when sulfur composition in the crude oil feed 
was increased. 
44. In the ten years prior to the incident, a small number of Chevron personnel with knowledge and 
understanding of sulfidation corrosion made at least six recommendations (listed in the 
following six paragraphs and included in Figure 15) to increase inspection or upgrade the 
metallurgy in the 4-sidecut piping.  The recommendations made by these personnel were not 
implemented by Chevron management.  
  
Figure 15. Key events at the Richmond refinery between 1998 and 2013. 
45. In August 2002, a Chevron Richmond Refinery employee performed a study analyzing 
sulfidation corrosion rates in the crude unit and identifying potentially vulnerable areas.  The 
employee discovered that the 4-sidecut operating temperature had been increased and concluded 
that this increase would cause more hydrogen sulfide to evolve, leading to increased sulfidation 
i Cal/OSHA citations issued January 30, 2013. 
APPENDIX D-44corrosion rates.  As a result of these findings, the employee recommended increased inspection 
of the 4-sidecut piping and noted that this piping might need to be upgraded from carbon steel to 
5-Chrome, a steel alloy that is more resistant to sulfidation corrosion.  In 2002, proactively 
following up on this study, the crude unit inspector conducted additional piping inspection and 
identified accelerated corrosion in the 52-inch 4-sidecut component.  The inspector 
recommended upgrading this piping during the next shutdown in 2007.  In the inspector’s 2002 
accomplishments, Chevron management acknowledged this effort to prevent a significant 
incident; it was characterized as “a save.”  However, during the 2007 turnaround the 
recommendation was not implemented, and because a CML was not added to the inspection 
program, the 52-inch component was not inspected after 2002. 
46. In February 2006, a team consisting of a materials and corrosion engineer, an inspector, a 
process engineer, a metallurgist, and a design engineer issued a Corrosion Mitigation Plan for 
the Chevron Richmond Refinery crude unit.  The report specifically identified the 4-sidecut 
piping to be at risk for high temperature sulfidation corrosion.  The report described that low 
silicon carbon steel can corrode faster than carbon steel manufactured with higher silicon 
content, and recommended that 100 percent inspection be performed on the 4-sidecut line using 
continuous monitoring technology.  During the 2007 crude unit turnaround, continuous 
monitoring probes were only installed on a segment of the 4-sidecut line that did not include the 
52-inch component that ultimately failed.  The 100 percent inspection recommended in the 2006 
Corrosion Mitigation Plan was not performed. 
47. During the 2007 turnaround, the crude unit inspector recommended that the refinery upgrade the 
entire 4-sidecut piping with 5-Chrome.  The recommendation was based on findings obtained 
during the 2002 crude unit turnaround, where the crude unit inspector found that the 52-inch 4-
sidecut component had lost one-third of its wall thickness due to corrosion.  However, after 
evaluation, this recommendation was not accepted by the turnaround planning team.  Basing its 
decision on limited inspection data, Chevron determined that the 8-inch portion of the 4-sidecut 
piping that ran from the atmospheric column to the pump, the portion which included the 52-
inch component, had sufficient wall thickness to last to the next turnaround scheduled for Fall 
2011.
i
i This decision was made without reinspecting or evaluating the thickness of the thinned 52-inch component 
identified in 2002 that prompted the recommendation.  
  The piping downstream of the pump, which operates at a higher pressure, was 
determined not to have sufficient wall thickness to last to the next turnaround.  This piping was 
removed and replaced with 9-Chrome, an upgraded and inherently safer metallurgy.  The 52-
inch component of the 8-inch piping between the atmospheric column and the pump was not 
replaced during the 2007 turnaround even though it had been identified as thinned in 2002. 
Furthermore, a permanent CML was not placed on the 52-inch component, and it was not 
entered into the inspection database.  As a result, the component was not inspected again. 
APPENDIX D-4548. In September 2009, Chevron ETC corrosion experts released a formal technical report 
discussing sulfidation corrosion and the specific issues associated with carbon steel, including 
the potential for high corrosion rates in carbon steel piping containing low percentages of 
silicon.  In its report, Chevron ETC issued recommendations for inspection and provided 
guidelines for prioritizing piping circuits susceptible to sulfidation corrosion so that high-risk 
lines could be evaluated first.  It was recommended that 100 percent component thickness testing 
be completed on all high priority lines one time to identify thin, low-silicon components to 
establish a baseline of corrosion rate and risk for failure.  Following the release of the report, the 
Chevron Richmond Refinery materials group completed the risk-ranking of the carbon steel 
piping in the Richmond Lube Oil Project (RLOP) and in the crude unit, two units known to be 
susceptible to sulfidation corrosion.  The group identified the crude unit 4-sidecut line as a high 
risk line per the report ranking guidance.  Instead of completing the 100 percent component 
inspection, the 4-sidecut was recommended for replacement with 9-Chrome.  However, the 
replacement recommendation was denied because the available, limited inspection data indicated 
the piping would last until the next turnaround.  Subsequently, the alternative 100 percent 
component inspection was also never performed.  
49.  Chevron conducts “Intensive Process Reviews” prior to turnarounds.  This process involves 
knowledgeable individuals including Business Improvement Network leaders, process engineers, 
metallurgical engineers, design engineers, and turnaround planners.  The purpose of the review is 
to identify key unit issues that should be addressed and repaired during the unit turnaround.  Prior 
to the 2011 crude unit turnaround, Chevron personnel conducted an Intensive Process Review of 
the crude unit and specifically recommended that the 4-sidecut carbon steel piping “should be 
upgraded to 5 Cr [5-Chrome]… due to sulfidation.”  Although the Intensive Process Review 
identified sulfidation problems in the 4-sidecut line, this activity was ineffective.  The 4-sidecut 
piping was not upgraded during the 2011 crude unit turnaround.    
50. In preparation of the work list for the 2011 crude unit turnaround, the crude unit inspector and 
crude unit metallurgist recommended that the 4-sidecut line be replaced with an upgraded 
metallurgy, 9-chrome, the metallurgy recommended in the Chevron new construction guidelines 
for piping in high temperature and high sulfur service.  The recommendation was based on the 
high priority ranking of the 4-sidecut line, corrosion history, and both Chevron and industry 
recommended best practice.  However, the turnaround management team determined that the 
inspection data available for the 4-sidecut piping, from CMLs on elbow components which are 
less prone to sulfidation corrosion, did not support a material upgrade during the 2011 
turnaround.
i, i
i This decision was made without reinspecting or evaluating the thickness of the 52-inch component identified in 
2002.  
  The lack of data on the more susceptible 4-sidecut straight-run piping components 
was not considered.   
APPENDIX D-46Inherently Safer Systems 
51. The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) is a corporate membership organization that 
identifies and addresses process safety needs within the chemical, pharmaceutical, and 
petroleum industries.
36  Chevron is a corporate member of CCPS.
37  The CCPS book Inherently 
Safer Chemical Processes, 2
nd ed. defines inherently safer design as the process of identifying 
and implementing inherent safety in a specific context that is permanent and inseparable.
38 In the 
book Guidelines for Engineering Design for Process Safety, 2
nd ed., CCPS states “inherently 
safer design solutions eliminate or mitigate the hazard by using materials and process conditions 
that are less hazardous.”
39
52. Inherently safer technologies are relative; a technology can only be described as inherently safer 
when compared to a different technology with regard to a specific hazard or risk.
 
40  A 
technology may be inherently safer with respect to one risk but not safer from another risk.  For 
this reason, it is important to carry out a comprehensive, documented hazard analysis to 
determine the individual and overall risks in a process and assess how the risks can be 
effectively minimized to control hazards.  An inherently safer systems review details a list of 
choices offering various degrees of inherently safer implementation.  The review should include 
risks of personal injury, environmental harm, and lost production, as well as evaluating 
economic feasibility.
41
53. It is simpler, less expensive, and more effective to introduce inherently safer features during the 
design process of a facility rather than after the process is already operating.
 
42
54. After a 2007 incident caused by a pipe failure in the Richmond refinery crude unit, Chevron 
implemented an “Inherently Safer Solution” by upgrading the piping to metallurgy that was less 
susceptible to sulfidation corrosion.  However, the change was implemented intuitively without 
a supporting inherent safety review or failure mechanism hazard review to provide a detailed 
documented technical rationale for the metallurgy selection.  Without such a review, the material 
selected cannot be analyzed to determine if it is the best inherently safer solution for the process 
in order to minimize risk.     
  Process upgrades, 
rebuilds, and repairs are additional opportunities to implement inherent safety concepts.
  
Conducting a comprehensive hazard review to determine risks and identify ways to eliminate or 
reduce risks is an important step in implementing an inherently safer process.  Chevron training 
programs on inherently safer systems reflect this approach, stating “we have the greatest 
opportunity to eliminate or minimize hazards during the development phase of new projects or 
major revamps of existing facilities.”  
i A portion of the 4-sidecut 12-inch line was replaced during the 2011 turnaround with carbon steel due to thinning 
caused by sulfidation corrosion. 
APPENDIX D-4755. Following the August 6, 2012, incident, the 4-sidecut piping circuit at the Richmond refinery 
was upgraded from carbon steel to 9-Chrome.
i  However, Chevron did not produce a 
documented inherently safer hazard review before commencing the rebuild of the crude unit. 
The crude unit at the Chevron El Segundo refinery is nearly identical in construction and design 
to the Richmond refinery crude unit.  Chevron informed the CSB that piping downstream of the 
4-sidecut pumps in the 4-sidecut piping circuit at the El Segundo refinery was upgraded in 2001
ii
56. An effectiveness ranking of techniques used to control hazards and the risk they represent can be 
described as a hierarchy of controls.  The further up the hierarchy, the more effective the risk 
reduction achieved (Figure 16).  All concepts in the hierarchy of controls should be included in 
the process of risk assessment and reduction.  Upgrading metallurgy to a more corrosion 
resistant material may be a high ranking, inherently safer choice for certain corrosion 
mechanisms, such as sulfidation corrosion.  Holding other variables constant, upgrading the 
material of construction may reduce the severity of corrosion and the likelihood of a failure. 
 
from carbon steel to stainless steel.  As stated previously, after the August 6, 2012, Richmond 
incident, the 4-sidecut piping upstream of the 4-sidecut pumps at the El Segundo refinery was 
upgraded from carbon steel to 9-Chrome.  Had a comprehensive inherently safer systems review 
been conducted at the Richmond refinery following the August 6
th incident, a different 
metallurgy, such as stainless steel which was installed at the Chevron El Segundo Refinery, may 
have been identified as inherently safer than 9-Chrome with respect to sulfidation corrosion.  
 
Figure 16. Hierarchy of controls.  The boxes reflect inherently safer controls from left to 
right, based on Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer Design Second Edition; 
Kletz, Trevor Amyotte, Paul; CRC Press 2010. 
57. Chevron employees have recommended implementing inherently safer designs through the 
MOC process, incident investigations, technical reports, and recommendations from employees 
in the past.  However, the CSB has not identified any documented, thorough analysis of the 
proposed inherently safer solutions.  In addition, Chevron has repeatedly failed to implement 
proposed inherently safer recommendations.  For example, following the discovery of significant 
4-sidecut piping sulfidation corrosion in 2002, a Chevron inspector issued the following 
recommendation to replace the piping in the 2007 turnaround: 
i After the 2012 incident, the Richmond refinery stated that stainless steel was susceptible to chloride stress 
corrosion cracking and should not be used. 
ii Chevron verbal estimate for date of piping installation. No MOC was conducted to review and document this 
change. 
APPENDIX D-48The #4 sidecut piping from C-1100 to P-1149/A to E-1113 was RT (x-
ray) inspected for hot H2S [sulfidation] corrosion.  The piping is actively 
corroding, particularly on the section on the discharge line from the 
pumps near the exchanger; the line upstream of the P-1149/A pumps is 
corroding as well.  Corrosion rates indicate that the piping has 4 years of 
remaining life until the refinery throwaway thickness of 0.14” [inch] is 
reached.  The carbon steel piping is currently running at temperatures 
between 650 °F on the pump suction line to 641 °F on the line just before 
E1113; the upper limit for carbon steel piping in this service is 550 °F.  A 
materials upgrade to 5 chrome would raise the upper limit to between 
650-750 °F.  Additionally, the ABCR piping loop from the same sidecut 
draw line off of the column to P-1148/A to E-1111 is also carbon steel 
and operates at the same temperatures, rendering the ABCR piping 
system to E-1111 susceptible to hot H2S corrosion as well. 
INFORMATION 
Replace the existing #4 sidecut piping noted above from C-1100 through 
P-1149/A to E1113 and P-1148/A to E-1111 (approximately 700’[feet] 
of 12”, 10”, 8” and 6”piping, plus some 4”and 3” at the P-1149/P-1148 
suction/discharge headers).  Upgrade the pipe material from carbon steel 
to 5 chrome.  
Recommendation 
To implement this recommendation, Chevron initiated an MOC in 2006 to replace the piping 
during the 2007 Turnaround.   However, the MOC supporting documents had a narrowed scope 
to only replace the section of piping from P-1149/A pumps to the E-1113 heat exchanger 
because Chevron reduced the work scope during the 2007 turnaround planning process.  The 
Description of Change in the MOC stated:  
Existing line is carbon steel in a hot service that operates in the range 
where high temperature sulfadation [sic] occurs.  The line has been ut
i 
inspected and found to be nearing tmin
ii
i UT is an abbreviation used to indicate ultrasonic thickness testing inspection technique. 
 requiring replacement.   Due to 
the higher temperature 9CR [9-Chrome] would be the prefered [sic] 
material. 
ii Tmin is an abbreviation used to indicate minimum required piping wall thickness. 
APPENDIX D-49Contradicting this Description of Change detailing a replacement of the entire 4-sidecut piping 
circuit, the MOC Summary Review and attached documentation only authorized replacement of 
the piping from the P-1149’s to E-1113.  The MOC states: 
4 S/C piping has been operating hotter in recent years.  The hotter 
temperatures 550 °F are in the high temperature sulfadation [sic] range. 
Additionally the section of 4 S/C piping from P-1149' s to E-1113 has 
been found to be nearing tmin. 
The section of pipng [sic] from P-1149’s to E-1113 will be replaced with 
9 Cr [9-Chrome] piping. 
As a result, the portion of the piping containing the 52-inch component that failed on August 6
th 
remained in service.  Although the recommendation was intended to more broadly apply 
inherently safer materials of construction, the final implementation by the MOC limited the 
application of this more corrosion resistant metallurgy.
i
58. In 2007, the Chevron Richmond Refinery conducted training to teach employees about the 
importance of complying with the City of Richmond’s Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO)
  Again, the inherently safer, more 
corrosion resistant, metallurgy was not implemented more broadly in crude unit high 
temperature service.  Other examples are discussed above in the section entitled Chevron 
Sulfidation Corrosion Inspection and Mitigation. 
ii 
inherent safety guidance.  The training states “we should always strive to implement inherently 
safer strategies to the greatest extent feasible.”  However, Chevron did not regularly or 
rigorously
iii apply inherently safer design strategies in opportunities including PHAs, MOCs, 
incident investigation recommendations, and during turnarounds.
iv
59. Chevron uses an inherently safer design checklist
  
v
i As discussed earlier, only the section of piping downstream of the pumps was replaced with 9-Chrome. 
 for PHAs to meet inherently safer systems 
analysis requirements of the Contra Costa County and the City of Richmond ISO.  The checklist, 
provided by Contra Costa County, is intended to aid identification of opportunities to implement 
inherently safer design during the PHA process.  The checklist was intended to stimulate 
discussion and analysis of potential opportunities to implement inherently safer design.  Contra 
ii See the “Regulatory Coverage” section in this report. 
iii Chevron does not utilize inherent safety guidewords or checklists during the MOC or incident investigation 
process.  Inherently safer guidewords help direct the inherently safer review process.  Examples of guidewords 
include minimization, substitution, moderation, and simplification.  These words may be applied to materials, 
product inventory, process controls, process piping, and siting, among others. See Center for Chemical Process 
Safety (CCPS). “Inherently Safer Chemical Processes – A Life Cycle Approach.” 2
nd ed., Table 8.3, 2009.   
iv As stated in the Regulatory Oversight section below, Chevron is only required to conduct inherently safer design 
strategies during PHAs and for the construction of new processes.    
v The Contra Costa County inherently safer systems checklist is provided as a tool by Contra Costa County which 
can be used during the PHA process, but the actual use of the checklist is not required.   
APPENDIX D-50Costa County’s guidance on the IST checklist states that some items may need to be reviewed by 
a team that is outside the PHA team in order to involve people with the required expertise.  
Chevron utilized the Contra Costa County inherently safer technologies checklist (IST 
Checklist) during the 2009 crude unit PHA.  However, only three permissively worded
i 
inherently safer system recommendations were made, none of which addressed sulfidation 
corrosion or piping metallurgy.   In addition, Chevron performed the checklist analysis using the 
same individuals who conducted the PHA despite Contra Costa County’s guidance to involve 
other personnel with additional expertise.  Performing a superficial analysis, Chevron failed to 
adequately consider inherently safer systems like improved metallurgy for corrosion resistance.  
For instance, the checklist prompted: “Use corrosion resistant material?” In response, Chevron 
stated that “vessel specifications and piping classifications include a conservative wall thickness 
and an appropriate corrosion allowance for each service.”
  No mention is given to improving 
metallurgy to reduce corrosion.  There is also no documented analysis regarding potential 
materials with enhanced corrosion resistance.  There was no documentation of the inherently 
safer technologies analysis, and no inherently safer alternatives were documented.  The checklist 
as applied by Chevron was a “check-the-box” exercise.  Chevron Richmond PHAs were thus not 
an effective means of driving inherent safety.  The table below gives a sample of the IST 
checklist questions along with the associated Chevron responses.
ii
Contra Costa County Checklist Question 
      
Chevron IST Analysis 
Use smallest diameter piping? 
Piping sizes are the smallest possible for the capacity 
of the unit. 
Substitute less hazardous raw materials?  Raw materials in use are of minimal hazard. 
Dilute hazardous raw materials?  Raw materials currently dilute where applicable. 
Minimize off-site impacts? 
#4 Crude Unit is located at a distance from public 
areas. 
Easy operation of valves designed to prevent 
inadvertent error? 
In general, valves are arranged in a logical manner. 
Increasing wall strength? 
Piping classifications include a conservative wall 
thickness and an appropriate corrosion allowance for 
each service. 
 
i All began with “consider” and two began with “consider evaluating” which does not require any action by 
Chevron. 
ii The comprehensive list of IST checklist questions and Chevron’s corresponding answers are provided separately 
on the CSB website.   
APPENDIX D-5160. Contra Costa County inspected the Chevron Richmond Refinery in 2011, auditing Chevron’s 
implementation of the county’s inherently safer systems analysis requirements in the PHA 
process.   The inspectors determined that Chevron’s PHAs “follows the requirements specified 
by … ISS [inherent safety systems] guidelines.”  This approval by Contra Costa County 
conveyed to Chevron that the regulator considered that Chevron’s minimal analysis of 
opportunities to implement inherently safer design, its “check-the-box” exercise, was sufficient.  
61. Effectively implementing inherently safer technology provides an opportunity for preventing 
major chemical incidents.  The August 6, 2012, incident at Chevron and other incidents
43
62. It is essential that MOCs incorporate hazard analyses and the assessment of opportunities to 
implement inherently safer systems.  This process can be assisted through the use of guidewords 
to trigger the thought process.  CCPS states that “by including inherent safety guidewords in a 
management of change program, the MOC protocol recognizes inherent safety as both a driving 
force for - and as an opportunity during - implementation.”
 
throughout the refining industry highlight the difficulty in preventing failure caused by 
sulfidation corrosion in low silicon carbon steel piping solely through inspection, a procedural 
safeguard that is low on the hierarchy of controls.  Using inherently safer design concepts to 
avoid issues such as variation in corrosion rate in carbon steel piping due to hard-to-determine 
silicon content will reduce future similar failures in refineries.  Chevron and other process 
plants’ implementation of inherently safer systems to the greatest extent feasible would provide 
a higher degree of protection from incidents like the one that occurred on August 6, 2012.  
44
63. Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a well-recognized hazard analysis methodology that is 
intended to determine if a sufficient number of safeguards or layers of protection exist to protect 
against a particular hazard or accident scenario.
  
45  As the potential consequence of a particular 
scenario increases, the number of safeguards or protection layers must increase to reduce the risk 
of the scenario to what is considered an acceptable or tolerable level.
46  LOPA can be used to 
help an organization decide if the risk of a scenario or hazard has been reduced to a level that is 
“as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP).
47  ALARP is a risk reduction goal, where risk 
reduction efforts are continued until the incremental effort to further reduce risk becomes grossly 
disproportionate to the level of additional risk reduction.
48  By rigorously reviewing accident or 
hazard scenarios, evaluating the potential consequence of the scenario, and identifying the 
safeguards or layers of protection necessary to drive risk to as low as reasonably practicable, 
LOPA becomes an effective organizational tool for implementing a Process Safety Management 
(PSM) mechanical integrity program.
49  LOPA also helps an organization decide which 
safeguards to focus on during operation, maintenance, and training.
50  In addition, the LOPA 
APPENDIX D-52methodology includes provisions allowing an organization to determine the availability
i and 
effectiveness of a safeguard or layer of protection in reducing the risk of a potential scenario.
 51
i The probability that a system will be able to perform its designated function when required for use. Another term 
frequently used is Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD).  Availability = 1 - PFD. See Center for Chemical 
Process Safety (CCPS), Guidelines for Safe Automation of Chemical Processes, 1993; p.XIX. 
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64. The Contra Costa County Industrial Safety Ordinance (Contra Costa County ISO) requires that 
regulated facilities
i
65.  The purpose of the Contra Costa County ISO is to “prevent accidental release of hazardous 
chemicals; improve accident prevention by soliciting participation from industry and the 
community; require industry to submit a Safety Plan; and conduct audits of the plan and 
inspections of the industrial plants.”
 within the county implement safety programs to prevent chemical incidents. 
Since the inception of the ISO in 1998, Contra Costa County has continued to make 
improvements to the implementation of the prevention program’s elements. 
52
66. The City of Richmond is in Contra Costa County, but the county does not have jurisdiction 
within the city limits.  Thus, the county ordinances, such as the Contra Costa County ISO, are 
not enforceable within the city.  Instead, in 2001, the City of Richmond adopted an ISO that is 
almost identical to the Contra Costa County ISO.
 
53,ii  The City of Richmond ISO covers the 
Chevron Richmond Refinery and General Chemical West Richmond Works.
54  However, the 
Contra Costa County Hazardous Materials Program team inspects these two facilities and 
implements the City of Richmond ISO pursuant to an agreement between the two parties.
55
67. Both the Contra Costa County ISO and City of Richmond ISO contain identical provisions that 
address the use of inherent safety concepts.  The Contra Costa County and Richmond ISOs 
define inherently safer systems as “feasible alternative equipment, processes, materials, lay-outs, 
and procedures meant to eliminate, minimize, or reduce the risk of a major chemical accident or 
release by modifying a process rather than adding external layers of protection.”
  
56
For all covered processes, the stationary source shall consider the use of 
inherently safer systems in the development and analysis of mitigation 
items resulting from a process hazard analysis and in the design and 
review of new processes and facilities.  The stationary source shall select 
and implement inherently safer systems to the greatest extent feasible.  If 
a stationary source concludes that an inherently safer system is not 
  The Contra 
Costa County ISO and the City of Richmond ISO also both require that:  
i The Contra Costa County ISO applies to oil refineries and chemical plants within the county jurisdiction that are 
required to submit a Risk Management Plan to EPA and are program level 3 stationary sources as defined by the 
California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) Program There are seven facilities covered by the Contra Costa 
County ISO, five of which are refineries. 
ii At the time of the August 6
th incident the City of Richmond ISO did not include amendments made to the Contra 
Costa County ISO in 2006.  The 2006 amendments required an expansion of human factors programs, expanded 
management of organizational change reviews, security vulnerability analyses, and safety culture assessments.  
These amendments were subsequently adopted by the City of Richmond in February 2013. See 
http://cchealth.org/hazmat/iso/  (accessed on April 9, 2013). 
APPENDIX D-54feasible, the basis for this conclusion shall be documented in meaningful 
detail.
57
68. The apparent intent of the Contra Costa County and the City of Richmond ISO regulations is to 
require companies to evaluate their processes in order to identify opportunities to implement 
inherently safer systems.  However, the plain language contained within these regulations 
conflicts with this intent.  Both the Contra Costa County and the City of Richmond ISO 
regulations contain the following permissive language: “the stationary source shall consider the 
use of inherently safer systems…”
 
58
69. The language within the Contra Costa County and the City of Richmond ISO regulations also 
requires effective action to implement inherently safer systems “to the greatest extent feasible.”
  This language does not require companies to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis and implement inherently safer systems even where feasible. It only 
requires such an analysis be considered.  The regulations allow companies to merely engage in 
an activity contemplating the potential use of inherently safer systems.  
59 
If an inherently safer system is not implemented, the regulations require that the basis for this 
decision be “documented in meaningful detail.”
 60  However, the regulation does not require 
documentation supporting the adequacy of existing “inherently safer”
 61
70. The inherently safer systems requirements of the Contra Costa County and the City of Richmond 
ISOs are only triggered by the conduct of a PHA or the construction of a new process.
 
 claims.  Chevron’s 
compliance with this regulation is indicative of this deficiency.  In its inherently safer systems 
checklist, Chevron simply concluded that its systems were inherently safer to the extent that no 
modifications were necessary.  However, the company offered no documentation to substantiate 
these claims.  Had the ISO required analysis of inherently safer systems regardless of what the 
site already had in place, Chevron may have implemented the inherently safer recommendations 
made by technical staff to replace the 4-sidecut with an inherently safer metallurgy.   
62
71. The Contra Costa County PHA guidance document presents four categories of risk reduction:
 
Rebuilds, repairs, MOCs, and the implementation of incident investigation corrective actions do 
not require the analysis and application of inherently safer systems.  
i 
inherent, passive, active, and procedural (Figure 15).
ii  It states that all four categories should be 
used in the development of recommendations from process hazard analyses.
63
i The guidance document uses CCPS definitions for the identified categories of risk reduction. 
  It reiterates the 
CCPS statement that all may contribute to the overall safety of a process, but that inherent safety 
ii Inherent risk reduction involves eliminating the hazard by using materials and process conditions that are non-
hazardous.  Passive risk reduction is defined as minimizing the hazard through process and equipment design 
features that reduce the frequency or consequence of the hazard without active functioning of any device.  Active 
risk reduction includes using controls, alarms, safety instrumented systems, and mitigation systems to detect and 
respond to process deviations from normal operation.  Procedural risk reduction achieves the lowest level of risk 
reduction and involves using policies, operating procedures, training, administrative means, emergency response, 
and management approaches to prevent incidents and minimize the effects of an incident. 
APPENDIX D-55is the most effective.
64  It goes on to state “The inherent and passive categories should be 
implemented when feasible for new processes and facilities and used during the review of 
Inherently Safer Systems for existing processes if these processes could cause incidents that 
could result in a Major Chemical Accident or Release.” 
65
72. The California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) has jurisdiction over 
employee safety in California.
  This wording in the guidance 
document demonstrates the importance Contra Costa County places on risk reduction and 
prevention such as metallurgy upgrades; however, as a guidance document, it is non-mandatory. 
The regulation only requires inherently safer systems reviews during PHAs and for construction 
of new facilities and processes.  The ISO does not encourage the application of both the 
hierarchy of controls and the use of inherently safer strategies in other circumstances.  
66  Cal/OSHA is a division of the California Department of 
Industrial Relations and has operated a state plan industrial health and safety program since 1973 
under a delegation from the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 
Cal/OSHA conducts inspections of California workplaces in response to industrial accidents, 
safety complaints, or as part of an inspection program targeting specific industries.
67 
Consideration of inherently safer processes is not currently a required component of any 
Cal/OSHA (or federal OSHA) standard or regulation.
i
73. The State of California has promulgated process safety regulations similar to OSHA
 
68 for the 
prevention or minimization of the consequences of the accidental release of acutely hazardous 
chemicals.
69  These regulations require that covered employers perform a PHA to identify, 
evaluate and control hazards involved in the process using recognized methodologies.
70
74. California regulations, however, do not provide for a specific review of the effectiveness of the 
proposed safeguards to control the hazards identified in the PHA using recognized 
methodologies such as Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA).
  
71
75. The United Kingdom’s (UK) Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the industry regulator in the 
UK, provides guidance on damage mechanism hazard reviews in the UK’s offshore 
petrochemical industry.  The HSE guidance states that effective management of corrosion will 
contribute towards equipment integrity and reduce risk from safety and environmental hazards.
  Additionally, California 
regulations do not have any requirements for the use of inherently safer systems analysis and the 
hierarchy of controls for establishing safeguards for identified process hazards.  Cal/OSHA, like 
federal OSHA, also does not require damage mechanism hazard reviews as part of the PHA 
process.  
72 
Damage mechanism hazard reviews should provide a structured framework for identifying risks 
associated with corrosion and developing suitable risk reduction measures.
73
i This is also the case for US EPA Risk Management Program and the California Accidental Release Prevention 
Program regulations. 
  These reviews 
should cover failure mechanisms including but not limited to corrosion, environmental cracking, 
APPENDIX D-56erosion, and mechanical damage such as vibration induced fatigue.
74  Corrosion risk assessment 
allows threats and their potential consequences to be identified and to quantify the risk they 
present.
75  HSE guidance states that a formal, documented quantitative and logic based 
assessment should be used when conducting corrosion reviews.
76  The HSE guidance states that 
during the design of a process, a corrosion review can be used to eliminate risks and achieve 
inherent safety.
77
76. Under a rule issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
  After the design stage, risk reduction measures can be chosen and 
implemented to lower risk to an acceptable level. 
78 a facility with a 
tank, drum, pipe, or other process
i that contains an extremely hazardous toxic or flammable 
substance listed at 40 CFR §68.130 in an amount above the “threshold quantity” specified for 
that substance, is required to conduct a hazard assessment as well as develop a prevention 
program and an emergency response program.  These requirements are documented in a Risk 
Management Plan (RMP) that is submitted to EPA.  Covered facilities must implement the RMP 
and update their RMPs periodically or when certain changes occur.  The goal of EPA’s Risk 
Management Program is to prevent accidental releases of substances that can cause serious harm 
to the public and the environment from short-term exposures, and to mitigate the severity of 
releases that do occur.
79
77. The EPA RMP program provisions build on the planning and preparedness groundwork laid by 
the  Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA).  EPCRA 
establishes requirements for federal, state, and local governments, as well as industry, regarding 
emergency planning and “Community Right-to-Know” reporting on hazardous toxic chemicals.  
EPCRA “help[s] increase the public’s knowledge and access to information on chemicals at 
individual facilities, their uses, and releases into the environment.”
  
80
Both EPCRA and the CAA [Clean Air Act] section 112(r) Risk 
Management Program encourage communication between facilities and 
the surrounding communities about chemical safety and chemical risks.  
Regulatory requirements, by themselves, will not guarantee safety from 
chemical accidents.  Information about hazards in a community will 
allow local emergency officials and the public to work with industry to 
prevent accidents.
  According to the Chemical 
Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office, transparency between industry and the public 
will improve community safety: 
81
The CCPS also notes that governments and advocacy organizations have been 
successful in driving performance improvement by using public disclosure to 
make safety information available to the public.
 
82
i “Process” means “any activity involving a regulated substance including any use, storage, manufacturing, handling, 
or on-site movement of such substances, or combination of these activities…”  40 CFR §68.3 (1997).  
 
APPENDIX D-5778. Under the RMP program’s hazard assessment requirement, a facility must prepare a worst-case 
release scenario analysis
83 and complete a five-year accident history.
84  A covered facility must 
also develop and implement an emergency response program that includes procedures for 
informing the public and local agencies about accidental releases and procedures and measures 
for emergency response after an accidental release.
85
79. Workforce involvement is a key element of process safety and effective chemical accident 
prevention.  In the Center for Chemical Process Safety publication, Guidelines for Risk Based 
Process Safety, it lists workforce involvement as one of 20 essential management systems 
necessary to reduce process safety risks and prevent chemical accidents.
  Officials and the public, including local 
emergency planning committees (LEPCs) can use this information to understand the chemical 
hazards in the community and then work with industry to address and mitigate those 
hazards.   With both EPCRA and the Risk Management Program, the regulatory purpose and 
substantive provisions emphasize the importance of transparency, sharing of process safety data, 
and public participation to prevent chemical accidents.  The CSB notes that post-incident during 
the decision-making related to piping repairs to the Crude Unit, the public, worker 
representatives, regulators and governmental bodies played a key role driving transparency, 
accountability and improved risk reduction.   
86
…workers are potentially the most knowledgeable people with respect to 
the day-to-day details of operating the process and maintaining the 
equipment and facilities and may be the sole source for some types of 
knowledge gained through their unique experiences.  Workforce 
involvement provides management a mechanism for tapping into this 
valuable expertise.
  CCPS states that: 
87
This CCPS publication discusses general areas of workforce involvement in risk assessments, 
inspections, audits, and performance reviews.  The CCPS notes that participation leads to 
empowerment, management responsiveness, and process safety performance improvement.
 
 
88  
The OSHA PSM Standard emphasizes the importance of participation by workers and their 
representatives.  It requires employers to develop a written plan of action, consult with 
employees, and make available all process safety information.
 89  In previous investigation 
reports, the CSB has identified that workers and their representatives play a very important role 
in major incident prevention.  For example, in the BP Texas City oil refinery investigation 
report, the CSB recommended that BP and the United Steelworkers International Union (USW) 
establish a joint program to report incidents and near misses, and to ensure that 
recommendations made during investigations were implemented.  The CSB also recommended 
APPENDIX D-58that API and the USW work together to develop a safety standard addressing leading and 
lagging process safety indicators.
 i
80. In July 2012, the CSB held a public hearing on process safety indicators to explore how 
companies and regulators use process safety metrics to manage risks and drive continuous safety 
improvements.  The CSB stated that, following the 2005 BP Texas City accident, both the CSB 
and Baker Panel
 
ii
81. Process safety management systems are critical for reducing process safety incidents.  Process 
safety indicators are a significant element of these systems.  Indicators measure the strengths and 
weaknesses of process safety management systems, to achieve and maintain safe and reliable 
operations.
 
 reports noted the lack of focus by BP on process safety and inadequate 
performance measurement indicators.  The CSB also noted that one goal of process safety 
indicators is to drive continuous process safety improvement, and that regulators can utilize 
these indicators to focus inspections, audits, and investigations.   
90  Properly selected and managed indicators will identify the successes and point out 
the flaws of the system.
91
82. In 2008, the CCPS published a guidance document for the development of leading
 
iii and 
lagging
iv process safety indicators to assist industry in avoiding catastrophic chemical 
incidents.
92  While process safety indicators are an important tool for major accident prevention, 
the simple activity of identifying and recording process safety metrics will not drive process 
safety improvement.  CCPS notes that these metrics must be “collected, analyzed, 
communicated, understood, and acted upon.”
93
83. The UK HSE has published a guidance document to help chemical and major hazard industries 
develop process safety indicators.  HSE states that:  
   
Most systems and procedures deteriorate over time, and system 
failures discovered following a major incident frequently 
surprise senior managers, who sincerely believed that the 
i Process safety indicators are also referred to as safety performance indicators, metrics, key process indicators 
(KPI), performance measures, indicators, etc… 
ii See http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/SP/STAGING/local_assets/assets/pdf
s/Baker_panel_report.pdf (accessed April 12, 2013). 
iii Leading indicators are measurements that predict future performance to ensure that safety protection layers and 
operating discipline are being maintained, including unsafe behaviors or insufficient operating discipline equipment 
selection, engineering design, specification of inspection frequency, and technique.  See Center for Chemical 
Process Safety (CCPS), Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics, Page 20. 2010. 
iv Lagging indicators are facts about previous events, such as process safety incidents, that meet the threshold of 
severity and should be reported as part of the process safety metric.  See Center for Chemical Process Safety 
(CCPS), “Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics,” 2010; Page 20. 
 
APPENDIX D-59controls were functioning as designed. Used effectively, process 
safety indicators can provide an early warning, before 
catastrophic failure, that critical controls have deteriorated to an 
unacceptable level.
 94
84. The public can play an important role in monitoring safety management systems.  In its recent 
guidelines, the CCPS promoted the sharing of process safety indicators with the public: 
 
Sharing performance metrics and results broadly can engage the 
public as a partner in holding the organization accountable for 
process safety performance.  Making metrics and performance 
public can be an especially powerful way of maintaining upper 
management commitment since it will likely be the CEO or other 
senior managers who will be called to account by the public if 
goals are not met or performance declines.  Communicating 
process safety successes also demonstrates to employees and the 
public that positive change can be, and are being, made within an 
organization.
 95
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Under 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(6)(C)(ii), the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board is charged 
with “recommending measures to reduce the likelihood or the consequences of incidental releases and 
proposing corrective steps to make chemical production, processing, handling and storage as safe and free 
from risk of injury as possible ….”  The CSB makes recommendations based on the findings and 
conclusions of the investigation.  Recommendations are made to parties that can affect change to prevent 
future incidents, which may include the company, contractors, industry organizations responsible for 
developing good practice guidelines, regulatory bodies, and/or organizations that have the ability to 
broadly communicate lessons learned from the incident, such as trade associations or professional 
societies. 
Chevron U.S.A (Urgent) 
2012-03-I-CA-R1 
At all Chevron U.S. refineries, engage a diverse team of qualified personnel to perform a documented 
damage mechanism hazard review.  This review shall be an integral part of the Process Hazard Analysis 
cycle and shall be conducted on all PSM-covered process piping circuits and process equipment.  The 
damage mechanism hazard review shall identify potential process damage mechanisms and consequences 
of failure, and shall ensure safeguards are in place to control hazards presented by those damage 
mechanisms.  Analyze and incorporate into this review applicable industry best practices, Chevron 
Energy Technology Company findings and recommendations, and inherently safer systems to the greatest 
extent feasible.      
2012-03-I-CA-R2 
At all California Chevron U.S. refineries, report leading and lagging process safety indicators, such as the 
action item completion status of recommendations from damage mechanism hazard reviews, to the 
federal, state, and local regulatory agencies that have chemical release prevention authority. 
 
Mayor and City Council,  
City of Richmond, California 
2012-03-I-CA-R3 
Revise the Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) to require that Process Hazard Analyses include 
documentation of the recognized methodologies, rationale and conclusions used to claim that safeguards 
APPENDIX D-61intended to control hazards will be effective.  This process shall use established qualitative, quantitative, 
and/or semi-quantitative methods such as Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA).     
2012-03-I-CA-R4 
Revise the Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) to require the documented use of inherently safer systems 
analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible in establishing safeguards for 
identified process hazards.  The goal shall be to drive the risk of major accidents to As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).  Include requirements for inherently safer systems analysis to be 
automatically triggered for all Management of Change and  Process Hazard Analysis reviews, prior to the 
construction of new processes, process unit rebuilds, significant process repairs, and in the development 
of corrective actions from incident investigation recommendations. 
2012-03-I-CA-R5 
Periodically monitor and confirm the effective implementation of the damage mechanism hazard review 
program (2012-03-I-CA-R1), so that needed mechanical integrity work at the Chevron Richmond 
Refinery is identified and completed in a timely way.  
Board of Supervisors 
Contra Costa County, California 
2012-03-I-CA-R6 
Add language to the Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) requiring that Process Hazard Analyses include 
documentation of the recognized methodologies, rationale and conclusions used to claim that safeguards 
intended to control hazards will be effective.  This process shall use established qualitative, quantitative, 
and/or semi-quantitative methods such as Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA).     
2012-03-I-CA-R7 
Require the documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the 
greatest extent feasible in establishing safeguards for identified process hazards.  The goal shall be to 
drive the risk of major accidents to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).  Include requirements 
for inherently safer systems analysis to be automatically triggered for all Management of Change and 
Process Hazard Analysis reviews, prior to the construction of new processes, process unit rebuilds, 
significant process repairs and in the development of corrective actions from incident investigation 
recommendations. 
APPENDIX D-62California State Legislature,  
Governor of California 
2012-03-I-CA-R8 
Revise the California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 5189, Process Safety Management of Acutely 
Hazardous Materials, to require improvements to mechanical integrity and process hazard analysis 
programs for all California oil refineries.  These improvements shall include engaging a diverse team of 
qualified personnel to perform a documented damage mechanism hazard review.  This review shall be an 
integral part of the Process Hazard Analysis cycle and shall be conducted on all PSM-covered process 
piping circuits and process equipment.  The damage mechanism hazard review shall identify potential 
process damage mechanisms and consequences of failure, and shall ensure safeguards are in place to 
control hazards presented by those damage mechanisms.  Require the analysis and incorporation of 
applicable industry best practices and inherently safety systems to the greatest extent feasible into this 
review.   
2012-03-I-CA-R9 
For all California oil refineries, identify and require the reporting of leading and lagging process safety 
indicators, such as the action item completion status of recommendations from damage mechanism hazard 
reviews, to state and local regulatory agencies that have chemical release prevention authority.  These 
indicators shall be used to ensure that requirements described in 2012-03-I-CA-R8 are effective at 
improving mechanical integrity and process hazard analysis performance at all California oil refineries 
and preventing major chemical incidents.   
 
2012-03-I-R-10 
Establish a multi-agency process safety regulatory program for all California oil refineries to improve the 
public accountability, transparency, and performance of chemical accident prevention and mechanical 
integrity programs.  This program shall: 
1.  Establish a system to report to the regulator the recognized methodologies, findings, conclusions 
and corrective actions related to refinery mechanical integrity inspection and repair work arising 
from Process Hazard Analyses, California oil refinery turnarounds and maintenance-related 
shutdowns; 
2.  Require reporting of information such as damage mechanism hazard reviews, notice of upcoming 
maintenance-related shutdowns, records related to proposed and completed mechanical integrity 
work lists, and the technical rationale for any delay in work proposed but not yet completed;  
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of  information; and 
4.  Provide mechanisms for federal, state and local agency operational coordination, sharing of data 
(including safety indicator data), and joint accident prevention activities.  The California 
Department of Industrial Relations will be designated as the lead state agency for establishing a 
repository of joint investigative and inspection data, coordinating the sharing of data and joint 
accident prevention activities. 
2012-03-I-CA-R11 
Require that Process Hazard Analyses required under California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 
5189 Section (e) include documentation of the recognized methodologies, rationale and conclusions used 
to claim that safeguards intended to control hazards will be effective.  This process shall use established 
qualitative, quantitative, and/or semi-quantitative methods such as Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA).     
2012-03-I-CA-R12 
Require the documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the 
greatest extent feasible in establishing safeguards for identified process hazards.  The goal shall be to 
drive the risk of major accidents to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).  Include requirements 
for inherently safer systems analysis to be automatically triggered for all Management of Change and 
Process Hazard Analysis reviews, prior to the construction of new process, process unit rebuilds, 
significant process repairs and in the development of corrective actions from incident investigation 
recommendations. 
2012-03-I-CA-R13 
Monitor and confirm the effective implementation of the damage mechanism hazard review program 
(2012-03-I-CA-R1 and 2012-03-I-CA-R2), so that needed mechanical integrity work at all California 
Chevron Refineries is identified and completed in a timely manner.    
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2012-03-I-CA-R14 
Jointly plan and conduct inspections with Cal/OSHA, California EPA and other state and local regulatory 
agencies with chemical accident prevention responsibilities to monitor the effective implementation of the 
damage mechanism hazard review and disclosure requirements under 2012-03-I-CA-R8 and 9 above.  
 
The Board of Supervisors, Contra Costa County, California, 2012-03-I-CA-R15;  
The Mayor and City Council, City of Richmond, California, 2012-03-I-CA-R16;  
The California Air Quality Management Divisions, 2012-03-I-CA-R17;  
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2012-03-I-CA-R18; and 
The California Environmental Protection Agency, 2012-03-I-CA-R19; 
 
Participate in the joint regulatory program described in recommendation 2012-03-I-CA-R10.  This 
participation shall include contributing relevant data to the repository of investigation and inspection data 
created by the California Department of Industrial Relations and jointly coordinating activities,   
   
APPENDIX D-65Additional Issues Currently Under Investigation 
The following section highlights additional issues which the CSB has identified to date in its investigation 
of the Chevron Richmond Refinery fire and major hydrocarbon release that occurred on August 6, 2012. 
These issues relate to the ongoing CSB investigation of the management and regulation of health and 
safety at refineries.  The CSB will present detailed findings and analyses in a final report on the incident, 
to be released later in 2013.  
Regulatory Oversight 
The CSB noted in its BP Texas City (BPTC) Final Investigation Report (issued in March 2007) the 
importance of having a well-resourced, competent regulator consisting of individuals with the necessary 
training, education, and experience to conduct planned comprehensive and robust inspections of facilities 
with the goal of preventing catastrophic accidents.  In a 1992 compliance directive
i the federal 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) stated that the primary enforcement model for 
the Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (PSM) standard would be planned, 
comprehensive, and resource-intensive Program Quality Verification (PQV) inspections to help prevent 
catastrophic accidents.
96
Spurred in part by the CSB’s recommendations, OSHA issued the Petroleum Refinery Process Safety 
Management National Emphasis Program (NEP) on June 7, 2007.
  However, the CSB report noted that for the 10-year period prior to the Texas 
City incident, federal OSHA had conducted no planned PQV inspections in oil refineries.  Regular 
planned inspections appropriately emphasize the prevention of accidents that are potentially catastrophic. 
Issuing fines and prosecuting companies post-incident are not acceptable substitutes for prevention.  As a 
result, CSB recommended in its report that OSHA strengthen the planned enforcement of the OSHA 
Process Safety Management (PSM) standard by developing more highly trained and experienced 
inspectors to conduct more comprehensive inspections similar to those under OSHA’s PQV program at 
facilities presenting the greatest risk of a catastrophic accident.  
ii  The NEP was a federal program that 
established guidelines for inspecting petroleum refineries to assure compliance with the PSM standard, 29 
CFR §1910.119.
97  Unlike the PQV approach to inspections, which “employs a broad, open-ended 
inspection strategy and uses a more global approach to identify compliance deficiencies…,”
98 the NEP 
“provide[d] a specific tool to evaluate compliance with the [PSM] standard…[which] identifies a 
particular set of requirements from the PSM standard from which CSHOs [Compliance Safety and Health 
Officers] are to review documents, interview employees, and verify implementation for specific 
processes, equipment, and procedures.”
99
i Compliance directives are the main method OSHA uses to communicate plans, inspection methods, and 
compliance expectations to their Compliance Safety and Health Officers (CSHOs) for enforcing a new regulation.  
  While the CSB called for an ongoing comprehensive inspection 
ii Originally Directive Number CPL 03-00-004.  Extended August 18, 2099 as Directive Number CPL 03-00-010 to 
allow more time to complete NEP inspections under the original CPL 03-00-004.  
APPENDIX D-66program, inspections being conducted pursuant to the NEP were terminated in 2011. The CSB 
recommendation to OSHA remains Open.
i
OSHA State Plan States
 
ii were strongly encouraged but not required to implement the NEP.  California’s 
Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) did not adopt the NEP “because of its dedicated 
PSM Unit.”
100  Cal/OSHA informed the CSB that federal OSHA approved this decision in 2007.  In lieu 
of conducting NEP inspections, Cal/OSHA’s PSM has conducted and continues to conduct a full range of 
programmed, accident, complaint, and referral inspections of PSM-covered facilities in the state of 
California pursuant to the California Labor Code, Title 8 regulations, and Cal/OSHA’s Policy and 
Procedures (P&P) Manual C-17 “Process Safety Management,”
iii
Between 2006 and August 6, 2012, Cal/OSHA conducted three planned inspections of the Chevron 
Richmond facility, totaling only 150 inspector hours of effort.  None of these inspections resulted in 
citations or fines.  In contrast, according to statistics provided by OSHA, federal NEP refinery inspections 
conducted between 2007 and the end of 2011 lasted roughly 1,000 inspector hours each and resulted in an 
average of 11.2 violations and $76,821 in penalties per inspection.  OSHA noted that hours spent on a 
typical federal refinery NEP inspection were 40 times greater than the average OSHA inspection.  These 
numbers indicate a major disparity in thoroughness and comprehensiveness between the planned 
inspections conducted by Cal/OSHA and the NEP inspections conducted by OSHA and other OSHA 
State Plan States. 
 to ensure these facilities are complying 
with PSM requirements.  
The safety case is a rigorous prescriptive and goal-setting regulatory regime that is highlighted by its 
adaptability and requirements for continuous improvements in risk reduction for high hazard industrial 
facilities.  The approach is used widely overseas but not used currently for U.S. process industries.  The 
CSB is currently examining whether the implementation of the safety case regime could be a more 
effective regulatory tool for Cal/OSHA in its effort to ensure that California refineries are identifying and 
controlling hazards and ultimately driving risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).  Utilizing 
the safety case requires effective implementation by an independent, competent, well-funded regulator.   
Experience and competence of the regulator in technical areas such as chemical engineering, human 
factors, and process safety are necessary to provide effective auditing and regulatory oversight for 
prevention.  To ensure effective implementation of the safety case, industry standards and guidelines must 
be rigorous and up-to-date as well.  The CSB notes that relevant and applicable industry standards and 
guidelines – such as API RP 939-C – currently contain voluntary and permissive language.  The CSB will 
i Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a 
substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff 
recommendation of status. 
ii Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 encourages States to develop and operate their own 
job safety and health programs, referred to informally as an OSHA State Plan.  OSHA approves and monitors State 
plans and provides up to 50 percent of an approved plan's operating costs. 
iii Issued June 6, 1994. Revised August 1, 1994 and May 19, 2007.  
APPENDIX D-67be examining the need for more effective good practice standards and guidelines containing the necessary 
requirements to prevent catastrophic accidents.  
In addition to the issues discussed above, the CSB will also be examining the need for and effectiveness 
of the reporting and use by the regulator of leading and lagging process safety indicators; workforce and 
stakeholder involvement in regulatory oversight of refineries; and the thoroughness of  Contra Costa 
County’s safety auditing of the Chevron facility.  
Emergency Planning and Reporting 
According to information provided by Contra Costa Emergency Medical Services, 15,213 individuals 
sought emergency medical attention between August 6 and August 23, 2012, due to the Chevron refinery 
major hydrocarbon release and fire.   
CSB Investigation Team members visited local hospitals the week of the incident to better understand the 
impact on the surrounding community.  Officials at Doctor’s Medical Center (DMC) in San Pablo, 
California, informed the CSB that in the days following the incident they were inundated with emergency 
room visits and found it difficult to handle the influx due to a lack of funding and staffing.  Officials at 
both DMC and Kaiser Permanente Hospital (KP) in Richmond told the CSB that they lacked specific 
knowledge of the chemicals released as a result of the incident, complicating efforts to evaluate and treat 
individuals.   
The California Code of Regulations (CCR) requires that owners and operators of hazardous waste 
facilities make “arrangements to familiarize local hospitals with the properties of hazardous waste 
handled at the facility and the types of injuries or illnesses which could results from fires, explosions, or 
releases at the facility.”
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Following the incident, Contra Costa County’s Community Warning System (CWS) notified the 
surrounding community of a hazardous material incident and ordered a Shelter-in-Place (SIP).  The CWS 
uses sirens, the news media, and phone calls to residents in order to initiate the SIP.  Contra Costa County 
issued the SIP on August 6, 2012, at 6:38 pm for the cities of Richmond, San Pablo, and North 
Richmond, California, and lifted the SIP later that evening at 11:12 pm.  However, the CSB has learned 
that some phone calls notifying residents of the SIP did not occur until over four hours after the release.  
  The CSB is currently evaluating ways to ensure that hospitals have the 
information necessary to properly evaluate and treat individuals that may be exposed to releases from 
facilities in Contra Costa County.   
It is essential that responders, community residents and hospitals in the areas surrounding industrial 
facilities be aware of what hazardous materials exist at these facilities, what specific chemicals are 
released into the community in the event of an incident, and what is known about the potential acute and 
chronic health impacts.  The CSB will be analyzing ways to strengthen current regulations and policies to 
APPENDIX D-68ensure there is proper emergency planning and reporting for industrial facilities in Contra Costa County 
and the State of California.  
Emergency Response 
OSHA provides guidance on emergency response in its Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency 
Response standard, known as HAZWOPER, under 29 CFR §1910.120 (p) and (q). Under 29 CFR 
§1910.120(q)(6), the HAZWOPER standard contains requirements for training and qualification of all 
individuals involved in emergency response related to their roles and responsibilities.  
Good safety practice dictates that individuals responding to emergencies should have the technical 
knowledge to give input into shutdown decisions, set up an incident command structure, establish 
boundary limits, and evaluate the “hot zone.”  Access to the hot zone must be strictly limited to personnel 
with higher degrees of specific training, experience, and appropriate personal protective equipment—all 
others must be removed to a safe location away from chemical hazards.  Hot zone boundaries must be 
established to anticipate the possible escalation of releases and the positioning of firefighting equipment 
such as fire trucks.  
The CSB will be looking at the sufficiency of regulatory requirements and guidance, industry standards 
and good practices in addition to evaluating emergency response decision-making such as unit shutdown, 
prohibitions on access to hazardous areas and the training and qualifications of all individuals who 
responded to the leak and subsequent piping rupture, major hydrocarbon release and fire and whether 
improved requirements and guidance are needed in this area.  
Safety Culture 
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) defines process safety culture as the “combination of 
group values and behaviors that determines the manner in which process safety is managed.”
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The CSB notes that on August 6, 2012, following discovery of the leak on the 4-sidecut piping, Chevron 
hoped to forestall a shutdown by installing a leak repair clamp.
  As the 
CSB noted in its BP Texas City Report, safety culture can be influenced by management changes, 
historical events, and economic pressures.  After reviewing evidence and decisions made relating to 
materials of construction and mechanical integrity within the crude unit at the Chevron refinery, as well 
as the response to the leak on August 6, 2012, the CSB has determined that issues relating to safety 
culture are relevant to this incident.  The CSB will examine the Chevron Richmond Refinery’s approach 
to safety, its safety culture and any organizational deficiencies, to determine how to best prevent future 
incidents. 
i
i Chevron’s leak repair clamp vendor was called out to the scene of the leak to help determine potential clamping 
options. 
  Chevron’s mechanical integrity 
APPENDIX D-69management system has not been fully successful in detecting and replacing deteriorated piping 
components prior to failure, resulting in the company’s frequent use of leak repair clamps
i to externally 
stop process fluid leaks.  Chevron’s reliance on such clamps to mitigate process piping component leaks 
identifies serious questions about its mechanical integrity program.  The CSB determined that Chevron 
has more than 100 clamps on hydrocarbon and other process piping components at the Richmond 
refinery.  The leak repair clamp is typically relied upon to prevent further leaking until the next unit 
turnaround, when the deteriorated piping component can be repaired.  However, Cal/OSHA citations 
following the August 6, 2012, fire in the crude unit identified that Chevron has not always replaced these 
clamps during unit turnarounds and these devices then remain in service significantly longer than 
originally intended.  The CSB determined that Chevron has leak repair clamps in place on piping 
components containing hazardous flammable process fluids including applications where the process 
material is above the autoignition temperature.  Some of these leak repair clamp applications are in 
locations where a permanent repair would not have required a unit shutdown.  The CSB will further 
evaluate the frequent use of leak repair clamps by Chevron and the potential that the deviance of a weak 
mechanical integrity management system has been normalized.
ii
 
 
i Leak repair clamps are mechanical devices designed and installed to stop a leak from a piping component such as 
piping, valves, flanges, and instrumentation.  These devices are typically intended to provide a temporary repair 
while a process continues operation until a plant shutdown takes place and a permanent repair can be made. 
ii Normalization of deviance is a long-term phenomenon in which individuals or work teams gradually accept a 
lower standard of performance until the lower standard becomes the norm.  It is typically the result of conditions 
slowly changing and eroding over time.  See Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Recognizing Catastrophic 
Incident Warning Signs in the Process Industries, Page 4. 2012. 
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Chair Murray, Ranking Member Isakson, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to join 
you this morning for this necessary conversation about worker safety in our nation's energy production 
industries. This issue has most recently been brought to the public's attention in the most tragic way possible, 
with deaths of eleven workers, and injuries to 17 others as the result of the April 20th explosion on the 
Deepwater Horizon offshore oil drilling platform. The Deepwater Horizon disaster occurred even as OSHA 
continues to deal with the ramifications of the 2005 fire and explosion at BP's Texas City refinery that killed 15 
workers and injured more than 170 others, and to help our Washington State Plan partners investigate the 
April explosion at a Tesoro refinery that left seven more workers dead. 
 
What have we learned from these tragic events? Certainly we have learned that in our nation's energy 
producing industry, the status quo is not working. In the past four months alone, at least 58 workers have died 
in explosions, fires and collapses at refineries, coal mines, an oil drilling rig, and a natural-gas-fired power plant 
construction site. Not all of these tragedies are within OSHA's jurisdiction; the Deepwater Horizon was an 
offshore drilling facility, technically a "vessel" not subject to OSHA requirements, while mine safety is within the 
purview of OSHA's sister agency, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Nevertheless, the toll of 
worker deaths and injuries on the job is sounding an alarm about a major problem throughout the energy 
industries - a problem that OSHA must help address. 
 
Secretary Hilda Solis' vision for the Department of Labor is "good jobs for everyone." Good jobs are safe jobs 
and we must do more to ensure that all of our nation's workers, including those in the energy industries can go 
home safely when their work is done. 
 
OSHA's Experience with refineries illustrates widespread problems 
 
In the wake of the Texas City explosion, OSHA initiated a National Emphasis Program (NEP) with the goal of 
inspecting the process safety management programs of almost all of the nation's oil refineries. We adopted this 
saturation program partly because conventional methods of assessing workplace safety, such as injury and 
illness rates, are not adequate indicators of the risk of fires, explosions, or other catastrophic accidents, nor do 
they account for the fact that at many refineries, much of the most dangerous work is contracted out and 
injuries to the contract workers do not show up in the refinery operators' injury rates. 
 
I am sorry to report that the results of this NEP are deeply troubling. Not only are we finding a significant lack 
of compliance during our inspections, but time and again, our inspectors are finding the same violations in 
multiple refineries, including those with common ownership, and sometimes even in different units in the same 
refinery. This is a clear indication that essential safety lessons are not being communicated within the industry, 
and often not even within a single corporation or facility. The old adage that those who do not learn from the 
past are doomed to repeat it is as true in the refinery industry as it is elsewhere. So we are particularly 
disturbed to find even refineries that have already suffered serious incidents or received major OSHA citations 
making the same mistakes again. 
 
For example, because BP Texas City had failed to abate many of the problems that it agreed to address after 
15 workers were killed in the 2005 explosion, and also failed to address a number of related hazards, late last 
year OSHA proposed additional penalties of $87 million at that refinery. Only a few months after that, OSHA 
APPENDIX F-1found similar violations at the BP-Husky refinery in Toledo, Ohio, for which we proposed an additional $3 
million in penalties for egregious willful violations. That refinery had also been inspected a few years earlier, 
and numerous violations identified. Although BP fixed the specific violations at the Toledo facility that OSHA 
had identified in the first inspection, we found the exact same problems in other units in the plant. 
 
This failure to learn from earlier mishaps has exacted an alarming toll in human lives and suffering. In the last 
five years alone, OSHA has counted over 20 serious incidents, many resulting in deaths and injuries in 
refineries across the country. The Tesoro Anacortes explosion in Washington State that killed seven workers 
last April was one of these. 
 
What do all of these incidents have in common? None resulted from unique technical causes. Each one 
repeated a lesson that should already have been learned by the industry. For example, last year, OSHA 
completed an investigation of a naphtha piping failure and release at the Delek Refinery in Tyler, Texas, in 
which the resulting explosion and fire seriously injured three workers and killed two other workers. One of 
these two workers was killed in the explosion, while the other struggled for 13 days in the hospital before 
dying from severe burns. But the saddest part of this story is that the naphtha pipe that exploded had already 
ruptured once before within the past few years. 
 
This cycle of workers being hurt or killed because their employers failed to implement well-known safety 
measures points out major deficiencies in chemical process safety management in the nation's refineries and, 
quite possibly, to systemic safety and health problems in the entire petrochemical industry. 
 
Chemical process safety management 
 
Refineries, chemical plants, and other facilities that routinely handle large quantities of highly hazardous 
chemicals are not like conventional workplaces; the consequences of a single system failure anywhere in the 
system can be catastrophic. Safety professionals have long been aware that reliance on a safety approach that 
only addresses problems after they manifest themselves as obvious hazards is wholly inadequate to ensure 
safety in such workplaces. 
 
For that reason, OSHA, in the wake of a disastrous chemical release in Bhopal, India and several other 
significant chemical accidents, issued its Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals standard 
nearly 20 years ago. That standard, embodying a comprehensive, systematic management approach to 
process safety, was one of OSHA's earliest attempts to create the kind of Plan / Prevent / Protect regimen that 
the Department is now working to implement in a much broader way. As an early effort, the standard has 
many strengths, but it is far from perfect. As I will describe below, we are seeing similar violations in too many 
of the refineries we inspect. 
 
The standard, among other things, requires employers to compile process safety information and make hazard 
information and training available to employees and contractors; to develop and communicate written process 
hazard analyses (PHAs) that identify potential system failures; and to address and remediate risks identified by 
PHAs as well as risks identified in other ways, such as routine inspections or investigation of significant 
incidents. Employers must take extra steps to maintain the mechanical integrity of critical process components 
such as pressure vessels and relief systems. It is a key process safety management requirement that 
employers must timely address and resolve all identified safety issues, and must communicate the resulting 
safety information and recommendations to all affected personnel, which includes management, employees 
and contractors. 
 
Consistently throughout the course of the Refinery NEP, we have found that more than 70 percent of the 
violations we are finding involve failures to comply with the same four essential requirements: 
 
Process Safety Information: Frequent process safety information violations include failure to document 
compliance with Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices, (or RAGAGEP, which consists 
primarily of industry technical guidance on safe engineering, operating, or maintenance activities); failure to 
keep process safety information up to date; and failure to document the design of emergency pressure relief 
systems. 
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Process Hazards Analysis: We are finding many failures to conduct complete process hazards analyses. 
Often, there are significant shortcomings in attention to human factors and facility siting, and in many cases 
employers have failed to address Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) findings and recommendations in a timely 
manner, or, even to address them at all. 
 
Operating Procedures: Operating procedures citations are for failure to establish and follow procedures for 
key operating phases, such as start-ups and emergency shutdowns, and for using inaccurate or out-of-date 
procedures. 
 
Mechanical Integrity: This is a particular concern given the aging of refineries in the United States. 
Violations found by OSHA typically include failure to perform inspections and tests, and failure to correct 
deficiencies in a timely manner. In the Delek Refinery case mentioned above, for example, OSHA discovered 
multiple substandard pipes being operated, and the naphtha pipe whose explosion killed two workers and 
hospitalized three others had already ruptured once within the past few years. 
 
I have been deeply frustrated by these results. Over a year ago, we sent a letter to every petroleum refinery 
manager in the country, informing them of these frequently cited hazards. Yet, a year later, our inspectors are 
still finding the same problems in too many facilities. Clearly, much more work must be done to ensure 
effective chemical process safety. OSHA has identified three important concepts to guide that work. 
 
Concept Number One: Effective process safety management systems and workplace safety 
culture are critical for success in preventing catastrophic events. 
 
In addition to effective process safety management systems, organizational culture is also a critical component 
to preventing workplace injuries, illnesses, and deaths. To paraphrase Professor Andrew Hopkins of the 
Australian National University and author of "Failure to Learn: The BP Texas City Refinery Disaster", workplace 
culture is not just an educational program that gets everyone to be more risk aware and think "safety first." It 
means establishing a set of practices that define the organization and influence the individuals who make up 
the organization. It's not how people think, it's what companies do. 
 
And it may seem obvious, but it bears emphasizing: Organizational safety culture must start at the top. It is 
vitally important for corporate leadership to create an environment within the workplace where workers feel 
they can report safety and health concerns without repercussions. Since OSHA inspectors cannot visit more 
than a fraction of the nation's workplaces, we rely on the eyes and ears of workers to help identify workplace 
hazards. To this end, OSHA must protect whistleblowers from retaliation or discrimination. The need for 
effective whistleblower protection is especially important in process safety management, because PSM systems 
rely upon effective communication of hazard information to and from workers involved in these hazardous 
operations. We applaud the Subcommittee's work on the Protecting America's Workers Act to strengthen and 
expand protections for worker voice in the workplace. 
 
Concept Number Two: The oil and gas industry must learn from its mistakes. 
 
As discussed earlier, inspections under OSHA's Refinery NEP have found that over 70 percent of violations are 
of the same four PSM standard provisions. Almost all of the catastrophic incidents that have killed so many 
workers were caused by failures that industry executives and facility managers knew how to prevent. They 
were repeats of earlier mishaps, from which lessons should have been learned. 
 
Industry must do a better job of institutionalizing systems for learning from mistakes, so it does not continue 
to repeat the same mistakes at the expense of workers' lives. Reform in the management systems of 
companies that own, operate, or provide services to petrochemical operations is needed, and is needed now. 
 
Concept Number Three: Conventional injury and illness rates are not adequate indicators of the 
risk of fires, explosions, or other catastrophic accidents, and companies need to develop better 
leading indicators to assess risks in their workplaces 
 
APPENDIX F-3To ensure strong PSM systems, we need to do a better job of identifying useful leading indicators of potential 
catastrophic hazards. The warning that "past performance is no guarantee of future success" applies with 
particular force to the low-frequency, high-impact events that process safety programs are intended to guard 
against. 
 
One of the most important challenges in trying to measure performance is determining how and what we 
measure. Companies have good tools for measuring and managing personal, or "hard hat" safety, and the 
refining and chemical sectors have generally done well in this area. Standard, OSHA-mandated injury and 
illness recording on the OSHA 300 log measures conventional hazards such as, for example, those from falls, 
broken bones and amputations, and yields rates for mishaps resulting in days away from work, restricted work 
or job transfer (the "DART rate"). Unfortunately, as we have also discovered, having good numbers on the 
OSHA 300 injury logs does not correlate with having an effective chemical process safety program. The classic 
example of this is BP-Texas City, which had very good injury and illness numbers for its own employees prior 
to the 2005 explosion. That tragedy, of course, revealed serious problems with process safety and workplace 
culture at the facility. Focusing on low DART rates alone will not protect workers or employers from disaster. 
 
Please do not misunderstand me; we need to keep reporting and tracking the illness and injury numbers - 
DART rates are useful - but we must not let those numbers lull us into a false sense of security. Looking only 
at these numbers does not warn us about pending doom from cutting corners on process safety. And to the 
extent we continue to factor DART rates into our targeting mechanism, we need to make sure that they are 
accurate. That is why we are paying special attention to incentive and discipline programs that discourage 
workers from reporting injuries and illnesses. 
 
Conclusion 
 
So where do we go from here? How do we ensure that safety conditions in the nation's refineries improve? 
OSHA will continue its efforts to intervene on behalf of workers in the nation's refinery and petrochemicals 
industries. These efforts will include both a strong and credible enforcement presence, and a concerted effort 
to enlist the cooperation of industry, labor, and other stakeholders. This cooperation is crucial to maximizing 
our impact because OSHA cannot inspect every refinery every year. 
 
You can also expect to see OSHA collaborating more with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH), Environmental Protection Agency, and other agencies to address the worker health and safety 
problems in the refinery and petrochemical industry - and in other industries as well. Together, we can develop 
a more effective system for targeting problem hazards and problem worksites, and addressing the problems 
that we have identified. I also met recently with the National Petrochemical and Refiners Association (NPRA), 
the American Petroleum Institute (API), and the United Steelworkers to reemphasize OSHA's concerns. And, in 
connection with hazards to which workers outside our jurisdiction are exposed, OSHA is actively collaborating 
with other agencies to assist in promoting worker safety. 
 
Finally, we need to pass the Protecting America's Workers Act (PAWA), which would significantly increase 
OSHA's ability to protect workers, and specifically workers in refineries and chemical plants. The Act would 
make meaningful and substantial changes to the Occupational Safety and Health Act that would increase 
OSHA's civil and criminal penalties for safety and health violations, making us much more able to issue 
significant and meaningful penalties to large oil companies before a disaster occurs. 
 
And because safe process safety depends heavily on lessons learned from close calls and near misses, workers 
need to feel that they are protected when reporting these events and exercising other health and safety rights. 
The enhanced whistleblower protections that are included in PAWA would go far toward ensuring that workers 
are protected for speaking out. Another way PAWA could strengthen workers' rights would be to clarify that 
the whistleblower provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, contained in section 11(c), prohibit 
retaliation for protected activity in connection with occupational safety and health hazards, similar to those 
aboard the Deepwater Horizon, that are regulated by other Federal agencies. 
 
Giving OSHA the ability to require abatement of hazardous conditions before contests are decided would also 
significantly enhance the safety of refineries. Ultimately, stronger OSHA enforcement and a modern 
APPENDIX F-4Occupational Safety and Health Act will save lives. 
 
Chair Murray, thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I applaud your efforts to shed light on the 
safety and health crisis in America's oil and gas industry. OSHA is committed to addressing this problem so that 
more workers do not needlessly die. As stated earlier, we also support Congress passing the Protecting 
America's Workers Act to give OSHA the tools needed to improve and expand its PSM enforcement and more 
effectively deter safety and health violations. 
 
In closing, I would also like to express my condolences to all the friends and family members whose loved ones 
have been killed on the job, especially to those of the 11 workers killed in the Deepwater Horizon explosion. 
While OSHA's coverage of safety conditions on offshore oil platforms is limited, we are nevertheless very 
concerned about the hazards that these workers face. We are also actively collaborating with the Unified 
Command to help identify the hazards that that oil spill cleanup workers are facing, and to share our expertise 
on how to protect those workers. I am happy to answer your questions. 
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About the Labor Occupational Health Program (LOHP) 
The Labor Occupational Health Program (LOHP) operates under the aegis of the Center for Occupational 
and Environmental Health (COEH) at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Public Health. LOHP 
is one of the nation’s preeminent public university outreach programs for advancing community, worker 
and environmental health. In addition to its educational programs, LOHP convenes strategic 
partnerships, conducts participatory research and technical assistance, consults on occupational health 
standards and policies, and facilitates interactions between the University and the community.  
 
COEH was established by the California Legislature in 1978 (AB 3414) to improve understanding of 
occupational and environmental health problems in California and work toward their resolution through 
research, teaching, and service.  The Northern California COEH consists of researchers and practitioners 
at the UC campuses of Berkeley, San Francisco, and Davis.   
 
In addition to research, education, and public service, COEH provides technical support for the analysis 
and development of public and environmental health policies in California and the U.S. COEH provides 
technical assistance to policymakers and the public, commissions policy‐relevant research, and 
disseminates research findings and recommendations through peer‐reviewed publications and special 
briefings. 
 
About the Summary Report 
This report was prepared in response to a January 2013 request for technical assistance by the 
Governor’s Interagency Taskforce on Refinery Safety, which was interested in hearing directly from labor 
unions, community groups, and fire agency officials on matters pertaining to the health, safety and 
environmental performance of the state’s refinery industry.  
 
  The California Department of Industrial Relations provided funding for this report.   
 
The views and recommendations expressed in the report were gathered by the author as described in 
the Methods section. The author has taken great care to accurately reflect the views of labor, 
community and fire agency participants; however, the report is not a consensus document, and final 
responsibility for its content resides with the author. The views presented here do not necessarily 
represent those of the author or the Regents of the University of California, or the University of 
California, Berkeley.  
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METHODS 
 
The author convened, participated in, and/or facilitated the following meetings: 
 
Date and location  Method  Participants 
 
November 6, 2012 
UC Berkeley 
 
 
Conference call  United Steelworkers (USW) International  
USW District 12  
USW Local 5  
 
November 15, 2012 
UC Berkeley 
In‐person meeting USW International 
USW District 12  
USW Local 5  
BlueGreen Alliance National 
BlueGreen Alliance California  
Communities for a Better Environment  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
Asian Pacific Environmental Network  
Labor Occupational Health Program  
 
December 6, 2012 
UC Berkeley 
Conference call USW District 12 
USW Local 5  
BlueGreen Alliance National 
BlueGreen Alliance California  
Communities for a Better Environment  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
Asian Pacific Environmental Network  
Labor Occupational Health Program  
 
January 2, 2013 
UC Berkeley 
In‐person meeting USW District 12 
USW Local 5  
BlueGreen Alliance National 
BlueGreen Alliance California  
Communities for a Better Environment  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
Asian Pacific Environmental Network  
Labor Occupational Health Program  
Governor’s Office 
Department of Industrial Relations 
California EPA 
Cal/OSHA 
 
January 14, 2013 
UC Berkeley 
In‐person meeting USW District 12 
USW Local 5  
BlueGreen Alliance National 
BlueGreen Alliance California  
Communities for a Better Environment  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
Asian Pacific Environmental Network  
Labor Occupational Health Program  
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January 23, 2013 
USW Local 5 Martinez, 
CA 
In‐person meeting
 
USW District 12 
USW Local 5  
BlueGreen Alliance National 
BlueGreen Alliance California  
Communities for a Better Environment  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
Asian Pacific Environmental Network  
Labor Occupational Health Program  
Governor’s Office 
Department of Industrial Relations 
California EPA 
Cal/OSHA 
U.S. Chemical Safety Board Director 
U.S. Chemical Safety Board Staff 
 
February 15, 2013 
California State Building, 
Oakland, CA 
In‐person meeting Department of Industrial Relations 
Alameda County Fire Department 
Fremont Fire Department 
Moraga‐Orinda Fire Department 
Richmond Fire Department 
El Cerrito Fire Department 
Los Angeles County Fire Department 
Office of the State Fire Marshall 
El Segundo Fire Department 
California Emergency Management Agency 
Contra Costa County Health Services Agency 
Contra Costa County Fire Department 
California EPA Air Resources Board 
 
February 27, 2013 
St. Mark’s Catholic 
Church gymnasium 
Richmond, CA 
In‐person meeting 124 members of the Richmond community 
USW District 12  
USW Local 5  
Communities for a Better Environment  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
Asian Pacific Environmental Network  
Labor Occupational Health Program  
 
March 13, 2013 
USW Local 675 
Carson, CA 
In‐person meeting Department of Industrial Relations 
USW Local 675 
USW Local 5 
USW District 12 
USW Local 675 retired 
BlueGreen Alliance National 
BlueGreen Alliance California  
Communities for a Better Environment  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
Wilmington neighborhood leaders 
UCLA Labor Occupational Safety & Health  
CSU Dominguez Hill Labor Studies 
RAND Workplace Health and Safety 
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March 15, 2013 
Richmond Progressive 
Alliance, 
Richmond, CA 
In‐person meeting Department of Industrial Relations 
USW Local 5 
IBEW Local 5 
IBEW Local 302 
BlueGreen Alliance National 
BlueGreen Alliance California  
Communities for a Better Environment 
Crockett‐Rodeo Fenceline Committee 
Global Community Monitor 
Labor Occupational Health Program 
Richmond Progressive Alliance 
West County Toxics Coalition 
Worksafe 
Asian Pacific Environmental Network 
Alliance of Californians for Community  Empowerment 
Contra Costa Labor Council 
RAND Workplace Health and Safety 
 
March 18, 2013 
RAND Corporation 
Santa Monica, CA 
 
In‐person meeting Representatives of California refineries and  refinery 
trade associations 
  
The author prepared detailed notes from each of these meetings as the basis for the findings in the 
report. These notes are available on request. To facilitate interaction, the meetings were not recorded 
and a written transcript was not produced.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
By 2050, California’s population is expected to grow 
by about 50%, from 36 to 55 million residents.  This 
expansion will be accompanied by a growing set of 
social, economic, and environmental problems 
whose magnitude will be determined in large part 
by the policy decisions California makes now and in 
coming years. In charting a course to a sustainable 
future, government will need to guide industrial 
development in such a way that it fully integrates 
matters of environmental quality and human 
health.  In practice, if California is to create a future 
characterized by improving social, environmental, 
and economic conditions, industrial development 
will need to solve, not exacerbate, the public and 
environmental health problems facing the state 
today.  
  
To move California in this direction, government 
can benefit from the support of solution‐oriented 
research and outreach efforts that organize the 
concerns and recommendations of stakeholders in 
areas of importance to California’s future. This 
report takes the first steps in serving that purpose 
in the area of refinery safety.   
 
The report summarizes issues raised and 
recommendations made by labor and community 
representatives and public fire agency officials 
regarding refinery safety and environmental 
performance. Most of the issues raised are not 
unique to the refining industry and could be applied 
to other high hazard facilities. The report is framed 
within three primary focus areas: preparedness, 
monitoring and emergency response; prevention; 
and sustainability. In each of these areas, an initial 
summary of findings is presented. These findings 
are not intended to represent an exhaustive 
treatment of the issues. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Refining oil—transforming crude petroleum into 
gasoline and other fuels—is an inherently 
dangerous process. Every week, the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) receives reports on 
process safety incidents in the U.S. refinery 
industry. The week that ended March 14, 2013 had 
26 reported incidents, including unplanned flaring 
at the Torrance, California Exxon Mobil Refinery; an 
unplanned shut‐down of the hydrocracking unit at 
Valero’s Benicia facility; and the unexplained restart 
of a major electrical unit at the Chevron Refinery in 
Richmond, California.  
 
With some exceptions, explosions, fires and 
fatalities in other countries that refine oil have led 
to substantive reductions in major refinery 
incidents, whereas the U.S. appears to be following 
the opposite trajectory. According to a 2006 report 
by Swiss Re, the world’s second‐largest reinsurer, 
the U.S. has sustained financial losses from refinery 
incidents at a rate about three times as high as the 
industry’s counterparts in the European Union. 
Swiss Re concluded that the difference is due in part 
to U.S. companies “pushing the operating 
envelope” and, among other things, flaws in 
refinery design, safety procedures and employee 
“alertness.”  
 
In a 2012 briefing to the U.S. Chemical Safety Board, 
Swiss Re officials reported that the incident gap 
between U.S. refineries and those in other parts of 
the world had widened since their 2006 report.  
 
The U.S. Chemical Safety Board, the Federal and 
California OSHA programs, the United Steelworkers, 
the U.S. EPA, the American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers, and the Contra Costa County Health 
Services Agency have all created recommendations 
for improving refinery safety. Many of these 
strategies have been adopted in California, and yet 
improvements continue to be urgently needed. 
 
The opportunity for Governor Brown and the 
California Interagency Taskforce on Refinery Safety 
is to turn these recommendations into 
requirements, informed by the improved safety 
record of many other countries that have moved 
successfully from should to shall, while retaining a 
robust and innovative refinery industry.  
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I. PREPAREDNESS, MONITORING, AND 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE  
 
Background 
 
Many oil refineries train certain employees to function 
as members of on‐site fire brigades, in addition to their 
primary, day‐to‐day responsibilities. Fire brigades may 
respond to fires, spills, rescues and other incidents that 
occur inside the plant boundaries. They will also 
respond to neighboring industrial facilities, if pre‐
arranged and requested. Some large refineries, 
including the Chevron refinery in Richmond, also 
employ full‐time firefighters, who serve as first 
responders and are supported by on‐site fire brigades.  
 
Fire brigades and on‐site fire departments provide three 
benefits to the public: (1) a rapid response to a refinery 
incident; (2) increased staffing to supplement public fire 
agencies during a refinery incident; and (3) a source of 
technical expertise for public fire agencies during an 
incident. 
 
A) On‐site fire brigades, refinery fire departments, and 
public fire agencies operate on different radio 
frequencies and are not able to communicate with 
each other. 
 
  Example: At the August 6, 2012 refinery fire in 
Richmond, fire brigades were unable to 
communicate by radio to on‐site refinery 
firefighters, who were unable to communicate 
to public fire agencies.  
 
  Implications: Communication failures impair the 
effectiveness of the response, make personnel 
accountability at an incident difficult, and 
endanger the health and safety of responders 
and the public.  
 
  Action needed: California should require that 
fire brigades and refinery fire departments 
operate with radios and frequencies that allow 
regular communication with public fire 
agencies.  
 
B) Sometimes public fire agencies are not allowed 
immediate access to a refinery when they arrive at the 
plant gate.   
 
  Example: If a member of the public calls 911 to 
report an incident at a refinery, the arrival of 
fire equipment at the plant gate can come as a 
surprise to plant personnel.  
 
  Implications: There is the potential for 
disagreement between the public agency and 
refinery personnel over jurisdiction and 
authority for ensuring public safety.  
 
  Action needed: California should put in place a 
mechanism to ensure site‐specific refinery 
training and incident pre‐planning for public fire 
agencies, with agreements established 
regarding access.  
 
C) A unified command approach is appropriate for 
most major incidents; however, in the case of large 
refinery incidents, there is an inherent conflict between 
refinery fire departments, which are accountable to 
the corporation, and public fire agencies, which are 
accountable to the public.  
 
  Example: This inherent conflict can potentially 
influence the nature of communications with 
the public and decisions about the need for 
additional fire resources. Refinery departments 
may tend to “downplay” the severity of an 
incident in both requesting additional resources 
and in communicating to the public. On August 
6, important fire resources were not requested; 
a joint information center was never 
established; and communication to the public 
and to health care providers was non‐existent 
or ineffective.  
 
  Implications: Members of the public and health 
care providers are left without adequate 
information regarding the severity of an 
incident, the potential effects of toxic materials 
released, and recommended courses of action. 
This prevents the public from taking protective 
actions, and it creates uncertainty among 
health care providers regarding health effects 
and the need for decontamination of patients 
prior to treatment.  
 
  Actions needed: California should clarify that at 
a refinery incident, the responsibility for 
requesting additional resources and 
communicating with the public rests solely with 
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the senior public fire officer on scene. “Trigger 
points” should be investigated as a mechanism 
for automatically deploying additional resources 
to a major refinery incident; technical experts in 
air monitoring should be incorporated into the 
incident command system to assist in unifying 
communications with the public.  
 
D) In responding to a major refinery incident, public 
fire agencies carry financial burdens, draw on 
neighboring agencies for mutual aid coverage, and 
leave their own jurisdictions with fewer available 
resources.  
 
  Example: A significant number of public fire 
agencies responded to the August 6 Chevron 
refinery fire, which produced wear‐and‐tear on 
equipment and reduced fire resources available 
to the public. 
 
  Implications: The public bears the cost of a 
refinery incident in both fire department 
expenses and in heightened risks associated 
with fewer available fire resources. 
 
  Actions needed: California should evaluate 
strategies for refineries to “pre‐pay” public fire 
agencies for emergency response and 
equipment costs, including payments for 
overtime to back‐fill positions for the duration 
of an incident, if necessary. When a refinery 
does not staff its own on‐site fire department, 
the refinery should support costs of public fire 
agency training and equipment.  
 
E) Insurers, employers, taxpayers, and residents carry 
the responsibility of paying for medical services 
rendered to individuals who seek medical attention as 
a consequence of a refinery fire. There is no system in 
place for tracking and documenting the health of these 
individuals in the wake of an incident. 
 
  Example: Following the August 6 fire, the cost of 
medical services for the approximately 15,000 
individuals seeking medical attention for 
respiratory distress, eye irritation, anxiety and 
other symptoms exceeded $10 million, as 
reported by Chevron, which elected to pay 
these bills. The subsequent health status of 
these individuals was not documented or 
tracked.   
 
  Implications: Payment of medical bills typically 
falls to insurers, employers, taxpayers or 
residents. The true social and financial costs of 
these incidents are unknown because the 
health status of affected individuals is not 
tracked over time. 
 
  Actions needed: California should ensure that 
procedures are in place to facilitate payment by 
refineries of costs incurred for both immediate 
and long‐term medical services related to a 
refinery incident. To do this, a system is needed 
to track and document the longer‐term health 
status of affected individuals, including those 
who seek out medical attention.  
 
F) During a refinery incident, regional air districts do 
not have sufficient capacity to monitor atmospheric 
conditions, plume travel, and real‐time emissions, nor 
are they able to communicate effectively with the 
public, including residents living in fenceline 
communities.  
 
  Example: On August 6, 2012, the Bay Area Air 
Quality Management District (BAAQMD) 
collected a very small number of samples and 
communicated to the public that the air was 
free of toxic air contaminants.  A large number 
of people, however, continued to visit health 
care facilities with complaints of respiratory 
distress, burning of the eyes, and other 
symptoms.  
 
  Implications: If the districts are not able to 
adequately assess the nature of refinery 
emissions during upset events, it is not possible 
to determine what protective actions are most 
appropriate. The public loses trust in the ability 
of government to protect public health and 
safety during a refinery incident. 
 
  Actions needed: California should ensure that 
air districts, in cooperation with the state Air 
Resources Board, have the capacity to 
effectively monitor air contaminants during 
unusual refinery events and report this 
information to the public in multiple ways. The 
districts should also establish systems to 
communicate this information to health care 
providers, emergency responders, and others. 
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The refineries should carry the costs for the 
purchase and maintenance of state‐of‐the‐art, 
real‐time air monitoring and communications 
equipment.  
 
G) During routine refinery operations, regional air 
districts do not have sufficient capacity to monitor 
toxic air contaminants, particulates, and other air 
pollutants emitted by the refineries on a daily basis, 
nor are they able to effectively communicate 
information of this nature to the public.  
 
  Example: The BAAQMD operates a small 
number of ambient air monitoring stations 
situated at various locations around the East 
Bay. These devices are not able to adequately 
capture refinery emissions.  
 
  Implications: It is not possible to adequately 
assess the health and environmental impact of 
refinery emissions; this impedes actions to 
reduce emissions. The public loses trust in the 
ability of government to protect public and 
environmental health from refinery emissions.  
 
  Actions needed: California should ensure that 
air districts, in cooperation with the state Air 
Resources Board, have the capacity to conduct 
air monitoring on a routine basis and are able to 
post that information online. The districts 
should establish systems to effectively 
communicate this information to the public. 
Health warning levels for both acute and 
chronic effects should be those established by 
the California EPA Office of Environmental 
Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) and should 
be calibrated for exposures to children and 
other susceptible groups. The refineries should 
carry the costs for the purchase and 
maintenance of state‐of‐the‐art, real‐time air 
monitoring and communications equipment.  
 
H) Refinery safety is compromised by the use of 
transient, contract employees, who are generally less‐
well trained, less committed to safety, and less able 
and willing to speak up about safety hazards, 
compared to full‐time, union refinery workers.  
 
  Example: During turn‐around periods, hundreds 
of transient, contract employees are hired by a 
refinery to perform maintenance work. In some 
areas, contractors are serving as plant 
operators.  
 
  Implications: Contract employees often perform 
critical tasks with less attention to safety for 
themselves, their co‐workers, and the public. 
 
  Actions needed: California should require 
refineries to report the number of contract 
employees they hire each year, their duration of 
employment, their level of training, and the 
positions these employees fill. Local hiring 
requirements and incentives should be 
implemented, along with industry‐supported 
and state‐organized apprenticeship programs 
for residents of cities that host a refinery.  
 
I) The emergency public warning system largely failed 
to function during the August 6 Chevron refinery fire. 
 
  Example: The automated phone system crashed 
and the auditory alarms were not activated 
broadly or were simply not heard; there was no 
public agency website dedicated to providing 
information to residents and updates on the 
incident.  
 
  Implications: Residents in Richmond and 
neighboring areas could see a large black cloud 
of smoke coming from the refinery, but they did 
not know what actions they should take, where 
they could get information, or how serious their 
situation could become. 
 
  Actions needed: California should ensure that 
refineries fund the development of effective, 
audible warning sirens and a dedicated website 
that can be updated by a public agency in the 
event of an incident. These systems should be 
coupled with outreach to the public and to 
radio and television stations. Funding to 
establish community emergency response 
teams (CERTs) and training for block captains 
would improve community resiliency during a 
major incident.   
 
J) Public transit lines were shut down during the 
August 6 Chevron refinery fire. 
 
  Example: Without having developed an 
alternative plan, the Bay Area Rapid Transit 
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(BART) train system stopped carrying 
passengers into Richmond, stranding 
passengers in outlying stations.  
 
  Implications: This made it nearly impossible for 
some residents to return to Richmond to take 
care of families and other needs. 
 
  Action needed: California should ensure that 
local transit districts have developed protocols 
to respond effectively in the event of an 
industrial emergency. Shutting down transit 
lines might be appropriate in some cases; these 
decisions, however, should be made using pre‐
planned protocols and with information from 
emergency services personnel; they should not 
be made ad hoc or left to the individual 
judgment of bus and train operators.  
 
 
II. PREVENTION 
 
Background 
 
The U.S. Chemical Safety Board, the Federal and 
California OSHA programs, the United Steelworkers, the 
U.S. EPA, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 
and the Contra Costa County Health Services Agency 
have all created recommendations for improving 
refinery safety, most of which focus on a broad range of 
prevention strategies. Many of these strategies have 
been adopted in California, and yet improvements 
continue to be urgently needed, in part because most of 
these efforts rely primarily on self‐regulation by the 
industry and lack robust regulatory requirements with 
stiff civil and criminal penalties. The evidence here 
suggests that health, safety and environmental 
performance remains tangential—not central—to the 
primary mission of the refinery industry.  
 
A) The refineries have not proactively communicated 
information on corrosion damage to government, 
workers, or the public. 
 
  Example: After a corroded pipe burst in the 
August 6 Chevron incident, evidence of serious 
corrosion damage and deferred maintenance 
was uncovered throughout the Richmond 
refinery.  
 
  Implications: Unless corrosion information is 
gathered and communicated proactively by the 
refineries, it is not possible for the public, 
workers, or government to understand the 
nature of this hazard and take steps to ensure 
that it is corrected.  
 
  Actions needed: California should require the 
refinery industry to conduct a comprehensive 
audit of corrosion damage, and the results 
should be reported publicly. A useful initial 
measure for providing information on corrosion 
damage is through reporting on the use of 
clamps and Management of Change (MOC) 
actions taken for each clamp. Ongoing auditing 
and public reporting of clamp usage, and its 
scheduled replacement time, should be 
required of the refineries to ensure that 
corrosion risks are identified, prioritized, and 
repaired.  
 
B) While workers have the authority to shut‐down 
unsafe operations, the power to do so is continually 
undermined by plant managers; relying on shut‐down 
actions taken by workers also shifts responsibility 
away from management’s obligation to ensure 
mechanical integrity through preventive maintenance.  
 
  Example: Although workers raised concerns 
over corrosion at the Richmond Chevron 
refinery, corrosion problems were not 
prioritized and corrected by plant managers, 
and a hole subsequently opened in the crude 
unit piping on August 6. Chevron continued to 
operate the unit under pressure while workers 
attempted to fix the source of the leak.   
 
  Implications: The resulting catastrophic fire 
nearly killed 12 workers and ultimately sent 
some 15,000 residents to area health care 
facilities.  
 
  Actions needed: California should require the 
implementation of a robust preventive 
maintenance program at all refineries, as noted 
below. California should also consider a means 
for workers to report immediate unsafe 
conditions to an agency, in addition to reporting 
to plant managers.  
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C) Maintenance and safety problems identified by 
refinery workers are often not corrected for months or 
years.  
 
  Example: Since 2002, Chevron repeatedly 
postponed replacing the corroded section of 
pipe that finally burst on August 6, 2012.  
 
  Implications: Refineries run an increasing risk of 
failure, which can range from a small leak to a 
catastrophic explosion and fire.  
 
  Actions needed: California should require 
refineries to disclose to government, employee 
representatives, and to a publicly accessible 
database normalized information on (i) 
maintenance and safety requests made, (ii) 
corrective actions taken or not taken, (iii) 
outcomes, (iv) root cause of the maintenance or 
safety problem, and (v) the management 
individual accountable. An accessible record of 
this type will highlight best practices among 
leading refineries and will allow the public, 
workers and government to track refinery 
performance. Regulatory actions should be 
triggered based on the number of maintenance 
and safety requests left open and uncompleted 
over a defined period of time.  
 
D) There is a need for much greater worker 
involvement in management decisions regarding 
health, safety and environmental performance.  
 
  Example: While workers at unionized refineries 
can provide input into safety issues, they do not 
share decision‐making authority with plant 
managers, whose economic interests are not 
consistently aligned with safety.  
 
  Implications: Safety is continually marginalized 
in favor of production during both routine 
operations and turn‐overs.  
 
  Action needed: California should require that 
refineries operate with a tripartite labor‐
management‐government structure for 
decisions pertaining to health, safety and 
environmental performance. This structure 
would provide the authority for full‐time 
workers and government to engage in tracking 
of leading and lagging indicators, near‐miss 
reporting and investigation, and sharing of 
lessons for continuous improvement, based on 
the United Steelworkers (USW) Triangle of 
Prevention framework.   
 
E) It is unknown whether and to what extent refineries 
are tracking and acting on leading, lagging, and near‐
miss performance indicators.   
 
  Example: Even under its Industrial Safety 
Ordinance, Contra Costa County is unable to 
identify, track and compare performance 
indicators among refineries; had it been able to 
do so, the County might have been made aware 
of extensive corrosion problems at the 
Richmond Chevron plant.   
 
  Implications: A refinery that documents, tracks 
and takes action on performance indicators is 
more likely to identify problems early and 
operate more safely and efficiently, compared 
to refineries that pay less attention to 
performance metrics. It is currently not possible 
to identify the best and worst performing 
refineries in the state, which makes it difficult 
to take appropriately scaled regulatory and 
other actions.  
 
  Action needed:  California should require 
refineries to disclose to government and to a 
publicly accessible database normalized 
information on (i) leading, lagging, and near‐
miss performance metrics, including both 
planned and unplanned flaring events; (ii) 
corrective actions taken or not taken; (iii) 
outcomes; (iv) root cause of deviations in the 
performance metric; and (v) the management 
individual accountable. Regulatory actions 
should be triggered based on continuing failures 
in certain performance indicators, based on a 
to‐be‐determined set of metrics.   
 
F) The Contra Costa County Industrial Safety Ordinance 
(ISO) is a nationally recognized regulatory program 
that has produced a marked decline in refinery 
incidents and could serve as a statewide model; there 
are also areas where it should be modernized and 
strengthened.  
 
  Example: Incorporating inherent safety through 
choices in the types of materials, technology, 
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feedstocks, and equipment used at a plant 
eliminates (or reduces) hazards at the source 
and is therefore the preferred method for 
reducing health, safety and environmental risks. 
Inherent safety is recommended in the ISO but 
is not required. 
 
  Implications: The potential benefits of inherent 
safety in the refinery industry have not been 
fully realized.  
 
  Action needed: Evaluate the ISO for areas that 
are in need of modernization and 
strengthening, and then evaluate its efficacy as 
a statewide model.  
 
III) SUSTAINABILITY 
 
A) The sulfur content of crude oil imports into 
California refineries has increased steadily since 1985 
and is expected to continue to do so. 
 
Example: The U.S. Energy Information Agency reports 
that the weighted average sulfur content of crude oil 
inputs for West Coast refineries increased from 1.05% 
in January 1985 to 1.35% in December 2012 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. U.S. EIA trend data on West Coast sulfur 
content, 1985—2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implications: When the total sulfur content in the crude 
oil used by refineries is greater than 0.5 to 1.0%, the oil 
is classified as "sour” and is less expensive and more 
difficult to process. Sulfur impurities need to be 
removed prior to processing, which increases energy 
demands. Higher‐sulfur crude oil also produces toxic air 
contaminants (hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide) and 
greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and it increases the rate of 
corrosion throughout a refinery’s piping and mechanical 
systems.  
 
Action needed: Require air districts to promulgate rules 
that prohibit increases in routine and episodic air 
emissions that result from the use of higher sulfur‐
content oil inputs. Consider rules that would bar or limit 
the importation of refined oil products.  
 
B) Refineries are the largest energy‐using industry in 
California and the most energy intensive industry in 
the U.S. The state’s refineries have added energy 
intensive equipment, such as hydrogen plants and 
hydrotreaters, to process higher‐sulfur crude oil inputs.  
 
Example: California industrial facilities emit about 23% 
of the state’s GHGs; refineries produce 40% of these 
industrial emissions, or about 10% of the state’s total 
GHG emissions. One new refinery hydrogen plant can 
emit over one million tons of CO2 annually. 
 
Implications: GHG emissions are increasing as a result of 
direct plant emissions and from increased energy use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actions needed: California should (i) require refineries 
to conduct a comprehensive energy audit, report on the 
results, and establish a reduction schedule. The audit 
should include energy uses by, for example, hydrogen 
plants, hydrotreaters, hydrocrackers, fluid catalytic 
crackers, cokers, sulfur recovery units, boilers and 
heaters; (ii) require refineries to proactively replace old 
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boilers, heaters, and other inefficient equipment, some 
of which were built over 50 years ago; (iii) require 
refineries to replace a portion of grid energy used each 
year with alternative energy sources; and (iv) evaluate 
U.S. EPA recommendations on available and emerging 
technologies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in 
the refining industry.  
 
C) Refineries are the largest industrial emitters of toxic 
air contaminants in California.  
 
Example: The U.S. EPA Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) 
shows that refineries dominate by far the top 15 largest 
sources of toxic air emissions in both Northern and 
Southern California.  
 
Implications: Air contaminants are dispersed regionally, 
causing population‐wide health effects and reducing 
quality of life; residents of communities that host a 
refinery—who are disproportionately minority and 
lower income—are exposed to toxic air contaminants at 
high levels and suffer higher rates of asthma, cancer 
and other diseases, relative to rates in California as a 
whole. 
 
Actions needed: California should require refineries to 
rapidly and continually reduce emissions through the 
use of Best Available Control Technologies (BACT) or 
Best Available Retrofit Control Technologies (BARCT), as 
defined under the Federal Clean Air Act.  
 
 
 *  *  *  *  *  * 
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